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More often than not, when regional powers involve 
themselves in a country where conflict is present, there is 
always the implication that intervention can: (a) buttress 
an otherwise fragile regime; (b) assist in neutralizing 
threats; (c) allow a regime to consolidate power; (d) help 
rejuvenate the state; (e) extend the conflict; and (f) bring 
conflict to an end or quickly reduce its scale. The 
purposes of intervention vary depending on the interests of 
the regional powers and the strengths and motivation of 
contending groups engaged in civil conflict. 
This study demonstrates that the economic community of 
West African State's initiative brought an end to the 
Liberian civil war and helped forge regional unity among 
West African States. Since the creation of modern Liberia 
in 1821, the country has experienced repression, denial of 
basic rights, and socioeconomic inequalities. 
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These conditions set the stage for the military 
takeover of April 12, 1980 led by Master-sergeant Samuel K. 
Doe who overthrew the William Tolbert regime. Doe's 
continuation of his predecessors' policies and 
administrative style, combined with his own lack of 
experience in governance, and dismal performance, promoted 
discontent among the Liberian majority, such as the Krus 
Krelles, Grebo, and Gbande. On December 24, 1989 civil war 
broke out. 
This study identifies internal factors leading to civil 
war such as Liberia's historical legacy, the nature and 
basis of the Liberian government, its policies, and the 
means and effectiveness with which the Liberian government 
enforced its authority. Hoping to resolve the Liberian 
conflict, the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) formed a monitoring group, Economic Community of 
West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), to intervene 
and bring the war to an end. The study's conclusion is that 
ECOMOG has the potential to bring peace, stability, economic 
growth and good governance to Liberia, and help forge unity 
among West African states. The war has created an enormous 
refugee problem and economic hardship for Liberia, and has 
threatened the health, security, and stability of the West 
African region. This study recommends that the gap between 
the impoverished masses and the elite in Liberia be bridged. 
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GLOSSARY OF TERMS AND CONCEPTS 
This glossary provides brief definitions of key terms or 
concepts used in the text. These definitions are 
neither exact nor comprehensive, but merely provide an 
indication of what these terms mean in political 
discourse. 
Alienation. To be separated from one's genuine or essential 
nature. Used by Marxists to describe the process 
whereby under capitalism labor is reduced to being a 
mere commodity and work becomes a depersonalized 
activity rather than a creative and fulfilling one. 
Authoritarianism. The belief that strong central authority, 
imposed from above, is either desirable or necessary, 
and therefore demands unquestioning obedience. Very 
different from authority, a form of power which 
operates because it is perceived to be rightful or 
legitimate, and is therefore based upon consent. 
Autonomy. Literally self-government, the ability to control 
one's own destiny by virtue of enjoying independence 
from external influences. Can be applied to the 
individual, social group, region, political institution 
or state. 
Capitalism. An economic system in which wealth is owned by 
private individuals or businesses and goods produced 
for exchange, according to the dictates of the market. 
Civil society. A realm of autonomous associations and 
groups, formed by private citizens and enjoying 
independence from the government; includes businesses, 
clubs, families and so on. A "private" sphere of life 
in contrast to the "public" sphere of government and 
the state. 
Class, social. Social division based upon economic or 
social factors: wealth, income, status, living 
conditions and so on. A social class therefore 
constitutes a group of people who share a similar 
social and economic position. Marxist use class- 
consciousness to denote an awareness of class interests 
and a willingness to pursue them. 
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Conflict. Opposition or competition between two or more 
forces, arising either from the pursuit of incompatible 
goals or a clash of rival opinions. 
Consensus. An agreement on basic issues or principles which 
may permit disagreement about matters of detail or 
emphasis. 
Contract. An agreement entered into voluntarily and on 
mutually acceptable terms. A social contract is an 
agreement amongst individuals through which they form a 
state in order to escape from disorder and chaos in the 
"state of nature." 
Co-operation. Working together, collective effort intended 
to achieve mutual benefit. 
Development. A process of social, economic and political 
change, usually associated with the Third World, so- 
called "developing nations." Often based upon a 
specifically Western model of development, the 
emergence of industrial capitalism, and a competitive 
political system. 
Equality. The principle that human beings are of identical 
worth or are entitled to be treated in the same way. 
Can have widely differing applications: equality before 
the law (equal rights), equality of opportunity, 
political equality, social equality, even biocentric 
equality (the belief that all species are of equal 
significance). 
Freedom or liberty. The ability to think or act as one 
wishes, a capacity which can be associated with the 
individual, a social group or a nation. Negative 
freedom is the absence of restrictions or constraints, 
allowing freedom of choice. Positive freedom involves 
self-realization, the achievement of autonomy and the 
development of human capacities. 
Fundamentalism. A belief in the original or most basic 
principles of a creed, often associated with fierce 
commitment and sometimes reflected in fanatical zeal. 
Gender. A social and cultural distinction between males and 
females. Different from sex which refers to biological, 
therefore ineradicable, differences between men and 
women. 
Human nature. The essential and innate character of all 
human beings, what they owe to nature rather than to 
society. Often thought to be the key to understanding 
social conduct and political life. 
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Imperialism. The extension of control by one country over 
another. This can take the form of colonialism, the 
attempt to establish overt political control and 
jurisdiction over another country; neo-colonialism, 
control exercised through economic domination; or 
cultural imperialism, the destruction or weakening of 
an indigenous culture and the imposition of an alien 
one. 
Justice. A moral standard of fairness and impartiality. 
Social justice is the notion of a fair or justifiable 
distribution of wealth and rewards in society. 
Laissez-faire. The doctrine that economic activity should 
be entirely free from government interference, an 
extreme belief in the free market. 
Law. Established and public rules of social conduct, backed 
up by the machinery of the state, the police, courts, 
prisons. 
Legitimacy. The acceptance that political authority is 
rightful and therefore that those subject to it have a 
moral obligation to obey. Government is legitimate if 
it is based upon the consent of the governed rather 
than on manipulation or coercion. 
Market. A system of commercial exchange between buyers and 
sellers, controlled by impersonal economic forces, 
"market forces." Often regarded as the organizing 
principle within a capitalist economy. 
Modernization. The process of social and political change 
through which the industrialized West came about; the 
emergence of a capitalist economic order and a liberal 
democratic political system. 
Myth, political. A belief that has the capacity to provoke 
political action by virtue of its emotional or symbolic 
power rather than through an appeal to reason. 
Nation. A collection of people bound together by cultural 
factors: shared values and traditions, a common 
language, religion, history; and usually occupying the 
same geographical area. 
Order. Settled, predictable and peaceful social 
circumstances in which personal security is upheld. 
Pluralism. The theory that political power is, or should 
be, widely and evenly dispersed amongst the groups that 
comprise civil society. Political pluralism refers to 
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an open and competitive political system, based upon 
multi-party politics and freedom of expression. 
Politics, (i) Activity related to the institution of the 
state, or "polis," and the machinery of government. 
(ii) Activity through which social conflict is 
expressed and attempts (not always successful) to 
resolve conflict are made. 
Progress. Moving forward, usually implying improvement. 
Based upon the belief that human history is marked by 
the advance of knowledge and the achievement of higher 
levels of civilization. Progressive ideas or movement 
therefore support change, reform and, possibly, 
revolution. 
Property. Ownership of physical goods or wealth. Private 
property is owned by private individuals who can 
'therefore control how it is used or disposed of. 
Collective property is owned in common by a group of 
people: workers or consumers, a local community, nation 
or humanity itself. 
Race. A collection of people who share a common genetic 
inheritance and are thus distinguished from others by 
biological factors. Racialism, the belief that racial 
divisions are politically significant, either because 
races should live apart or because they possess 
different qualities and so are suited to different 
social rules. Racism, the expression of hostility 
towards or discrimination against a person or group on 
grounds of race. 
Revolution. A fundamental and irreversible change. Often 
implies a brief but dramatic period of upheaval, as in 
the case of a political revolution, the overthrow and 
replacement of one system of government by another. 
Can involve a longer and more gradual process of 
change, as in an industrial revolution. Marxists use 
social revolution to describe the transition from one 
economic system or "mode of production" to another. 
Rights. Moral entitlements to act or be treated in a 
particular way. Can take the form of natural or human 
rights, supposedly invested in humans by either God or 
nature; or civil rights, legal, political or welfare 
rights gained by virtue of citizenship. 
Science. A method of acquiring knowledge through a process 
of careful observation and the testing of hypotheses by 
repeatable experiments to establish if they are true or 
false. Scientism is the belief that scientific method 
is the only value-free and objective means of 
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establishing truth, applicable not only in the natural 
sciences but also in fields such as philosophy, history 
and politics. 
Sovereignty. The principle of absolute or unrestricted 
power. Has been regarded as the defining feature of 
the state; it can be invested in the nation, as in 
national sovereignty, in government institutions, as in 
Parliamentary sovereignty, or in the people themselves, 
popular sovereignty. 
State. An association which establishes sovereign power 
within a defined territorial area, usually possessing a 
monopoly of coercive power. Government, the machinery 
through which collective decisions are made on behalf 
of the state, usually comprising a legislature, 
executive and judiciary. 
"Three" Worlds. A broad classification of countries 
according to material wealth and ideology. The First 
World comprises the most affluent nations of the world, 
those of the industrialized West. The Second World, 
included the orthodox communist countries of Eastern 
Europe. The Third World refers to the developing 
countries of Africa, Asia and Latin America. Both 
ideological and material distinctions have become 
blurred in recent years. The "North-South" division is 
preferred by some. 
Tradition. Practice or institution that has endured through 
time and has therefore been inherited from an earlier 
period. A political tradition is a recognized and 
established body of political ideas. 
Violence. Destructive action undertaken against either 
property or persons. Can be deliberate or spontaneous, 
undertaken by governments or private individuals. It 
therefore embraces a wide range of actions, including 
intimidation, terrorism, repression, riots, revolutions 
and all forms of warfare. 
West, the. The countries of Europe and North America, and 
countries tied culturally and historically to them like 
Australia and New Zealand. Distinguished culturally by 
common Greco-Roman and Christian roots, socially by the 
dominance of industrial capitalism, and politically by 
the prevalence of liberal democracy. 
Source: Andrew Heywood, Political Ideologies: An 





Liberia is the oldest republic in Africa, having 
attained its independence in 1847, more than a century 
before any other African state (see Maps 1 and 2). Liberia 
is a country in crisis. The position taken is that the 
origin of the Liberian crisis lies in uneven socioeconomic 
progress and in the problems of leadership and legitimacy. 
John Burton's general assessment of African political 
life agrees with the political history of Liberia, that 
though plagued with conflict and disorder, it is still a 
society capable of acquiring community loyalty. 
With the arrival and assumption of power by the freed 
slaves from America in the 1860s, Liberia virtually became 
two states, with the American freed slaves on one side and 
the native Liberians on the other. The rivalry and 
hostility between various ethnic groups, referred to by Dr. 
George K. Kieh, Jr. as "the by-product of the perennial 
problems of socioeconomic underdevelopment and political 
repression since 1847,Ml are some of the causes of the 
Liberian civil war. 
1George K. Kieh, "Combatant, Patrons, Peacemakers, and 
the Liberian Civil Conflict," Studies in Conflict and 




Map 1. Liberia 
Source: The Atlas of African Affairs (London and New 
York: Watersand University Press, 1994), 99. 
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Map 2. Africa - Political 
Source: Africa Betrayed (New York: St. Martin's Press 
1992). 
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The subject of this study comes under the general area 
of conflict and intervention in Liberia. The study will 
critically analyze internal factional military conflict as 
well as external military intervention in the Liberian civil 
war by the Economic Community of West Africa States (ECOWAS) 
through the Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG). 
The study will also examine the outcome and the impact of 
such intervention on the West African countries. 
Since the mid 1800s when the American freed slaves 
arrived in what was then called the Grain Coast (now 
Liberia), that country has endured times of conflicts, 
upheaval and wars. These conflicts were often attributed to 
claims and counterclaims, disputes and differences mainly 
among the ethnic groups Kpales, Krus, Gio, Bassa, and the 
Grebo. Collectively these ethnic groups often engaged in 
land wars against the repatriated freed slaves, settlers 
whom they claimed deprived them (native Liberians) of their 
land with little or no compensation. Ethnic Liberian 
warriors attacked the freed American settlers even after 
signing a treaty that allowed the sale of land in the 
Mesurado area to the settlers.2 The settlers' group feeling 
of superiority over the ethnic Liberians was met with great 
hostility. Conflict often erupted with these two groups 
when the indigenous Liberians felt that their cultures were 
2J. E. Holloway, Liberian Diplomacy in Africa: A Study 
of Later African Relations (Washington, D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1981), 3. 
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subjugated by the settlers. This conflict was put to rest 
when King Botswain threatened to "take the heads from the 
shoulders of any chief who disturbed the colonists."3 
The Liberian civil war is one of the most destructive 
and senseless civil wars in modern history. Thousands of 
lives have been lost and properties destroyed. Even after 
Doe was killed, [which Mr. Charles Taylor said was one of 
his goals of the war], the destruction of lives and 
properties continued. These killings of approximately 
13,000 Liberians during the war are symptoms or underlying 
causes which need to be identified if the nation is to be 
saved. Many observers of the Liberian situation will argue 
that this war has been in the making since the founding of 
the nation. All Liberians are responsible for the civil war 
in one way or another. Individual Liberians for many years 
put their own interests over those of the nation. 
Consequently, the nation lost part of its land to European 
imperialists and; subsequently, very little development took 
place there, despite the abundance of natural and human 
resources. 
This study will examine the Liberian civil conflict 
from two perspectives. First, it will trace the roots of 
the conflicts to 1821 when Liberia was founded, but will 
focus mainly on the period 1980-1997. 
3C. L. Simpson, The Memoirs of C. L. Simpson's The 
Symbol of Liberia (London: The Diplomatic Press and 
Publishing Co., 1961), 46. 
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The second aspect of this study is the role of 
intervention to restore peace in Liberia by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) through its 
monitoring groups, the Economic Community Monitoring Group 
(ECOMOG), and its impact on West African countries. 
A brief historical background of the native Liberians 
aims at establishing their identity and their inter¬ 
relationship with the Americo-Liberians. The process of 
domination of the native Liberians by the Americo-Liberians 
was completed by 1971. What is being called into question 
is the character of Liberian leadership and most African 
leaders. In 1989, Liberia found itself in a socioeconomic 
and political turmoil and was ripe for a conflict. 
The Liberian people found themselves divided into two 
camps. The first were those indigenous Liberians who found 
themselves disadvantaged in leadership, education, economic 
advancement and promotion in the military. Among the many 
sources of bitterness of the indigenous Liberians was a 
total lack of development in the rural parts of the country. 
The second camp among the Liberian citizens was that of the 
Americo-Liberians who saw nothing wrong in their modus 
operandi. For them, all rights--political, social, and 
economic--were reserved for them and their children. 
The evolution of the Liberian crisis and the ensuing 
intervention are placed in both the Liberian context and a 
broader African context. This enhances our understanding of 
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the impact of ECOMOG's intervention in the struggle for 
peace, equality, and justice, as well as economic growth and 
development for all Liberians throughout the country. It 
also facilitates our understanding of the role which each 
participatory West African country, such as Nigeria, Ghana, 
Guinea, Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Gambia, Mali, and Togo, 
played through ECOMOG in the Liberian conflict. This study 
will employ descriptive and historical approaches in the 
course of its investigation. 
Chapter I of this study is an introduction of Liberia 
and its underlying problems. It also reviews various 
literature as it relates to the Liberian situation, and 
informs its readers about the scope and limitation that the 
survey will embrace. 
Chapter II, The Liberian State in Historical 
Perspective, discusses how the present state of Liberia came 
into existence. The historical background of Liberia will 
be studied in order to explain their defeat by the American 
settlers in their struggle to extend their colonization 
efforts beyond the Liberian coast. The descriptive and 
historical methods utilized in this study are also 
discussed, as well as the significance of this study. 
A brief summary of the creation and the modus operandi 
of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) is discussed in 
Chapter III. In particular, the OAU's policy regarding wars 
and its role in conflict and conflict resolution is 
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examined. This chapter also discusses the role of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in 
regional crises. 
In Chapter IV, the Liberian civil conflict is 
discussed, tracing its root cause to the early 1800s when 
the first freed American settlers set foot on the Liberian 
soil. This chapter also discusses the immediate and the 
remote causes of the war, emphasizing the formation of the 
various belligerent groups. The role played by various 
organizations, including the church, Islamic groups and 
peace councils, and the response of the Liberian state will 
be examined. 
Chapter V discusses ECOMOG's raison d'être in Liberia. 
It also notes ECOWAS' changing role from peace keeper to 
peace enforcer. This chapter identifies the various 
external state and non-state actors, including their 
objectives both in the theater of war and their attempt 
and/or overtures for a democratic Liberia. ECOMOG's 
intervention in the Liberian crisis will also be examined 
from a peace perspective. This intervention will be seen as 
bringing about the interim government and the Transitional 
National Government. 
In Chapter VI, the study discusses the impact that the 
ECOMOG intervention in the Liberian crisis had on Liberia 
and the rest of the West African countries. The economic, 
strategic, diplomatic, military and social impact of the 
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intervention on West African countries will be noted. The 
study highlights the role of the Organization of African 
Unity (OAU) and Economic Community Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
in responding to the Liberian civil war and other African 
and regional situations. This chapter also gives a final 
conclusion and recommends various steps and strategies 
capable of making Liberia a more viable society. 
Statement of the Problem 
This study is aimed at describing the political 
development of the Liberian civil conflict and the impact of 
the intervention of the West African Economic Monitoring 
Group (ECOMOG) on Liberia and West African countries. 
The Liberian civil conflict and the ECOMOG intervention 
are a challenge to the unity of West African countries. 
ECOMOG's intervention in the Liberian civil conflict is also 
a search for unity, and a commitment to the principles that 
are uniquely characteristic of all the people of West 
Africa. The problems that the Liberian people are facing 
currently had always existed, but were suppressed during the 
Americo-Liberian rule. The indigenous Liberians were 
helpless and had no avenue of channeling grievances, except 
in conflict. The objectives of the Liberian State were to 
achieve national integration, as well as economic, 
educational and social development. During his executive 
council meeting in 1954, President Tubman declared: 
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Americo-Liberianism must be forgotten and all of us 
must register a new era of justice, equality, fair 
dealing and equal opportunities for everyone from 
every part of the country, regardless of tribe, 
clan, section, element, creed or economic status.4 
The indigenous Liberians welcomed the President's 
message and saw him as their ally. Some of the Americo- 
Liberians, especially the Barclays, Coopers and the 
Colemans, interpreted Tubman's latest reunification, 
integration, economic, educational and social development 
programs as an economic, social and political threat, and 
as one paving the way for a possible takeover of the 
Liberian political machinery and the economic system by 
the indigenous Liberians. 
Objections to the Tubman Plan were raised by such 
influential Americo-Liberian families as the Barclays, the 
Coopers and the Colemans. Particularly, these influential 
Liberians felt their influence and prestige dwindling with 
an attempt to share power with the indigenous Liberians if 
the Tubman plan was promulgated. The position of President 
Tubman and his new allies was clear in that his policies of 
unification, integration, educational, economic and social 
attainment for all Liberians had to be implemented. 
Clearly, this impasse created a conflict between these 
influential Americo-Liberians and the President. An 
attempted coup was uncovered against President Tubman. 
4Tubman papers, President Tubman's Address at the First 
Executive Council, July 1954. 
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This new relationship between the President and indigenous 
Liberians further created more animosity between some 
members of the Americo-Liberian population and the 
indigenous population. This new development in Liberian 
history did not eradicate the existing dependent 
relationship between the Americo-Liberians and the 
indigenous Liberians. Instead, it helped to sow the seed 
for a future conflict in the country. 
The ambition of the indigenous Liberians to recover 
power from the Americo-Liberians through the use of force 
created an alliance across the various ethnic groupings. 
The military takeover of Liberia in 1980 was expected to: 
(1) bring about the cessation of hostilities between the 
Americo-Liberians and the indigenous Liberians and; (2) 
chart a new course in their relationship. In addition, the 
military takeover was motivated by domestic class conflict 
and inefficiency in the Liberian government. 
It is the assertion of this study that the military 
takeover of 1980 in Liberia was designed to end the Americo- 
Liberian hegemony and give the indigenous Liberians a fair 
chance in the administration of the national affairs. A 
military style approach to solving most of Liberia's problem 
led to President Samuel Doe's abuse of power, hostilities, 
group formation and an inevitable civil war. The 
intervention of ECOMOG in the Liberian civil war was timely 
and designed to end further bloodshed and suffering. 
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ECOMOG's initiative was also designed to incorporate all 
West African countries to solve one of its own problems. 
Objectives of the Study 
This study will determine the role of the Economic 
Community of West African States in bringing an end to the 
Liberian civil war. This study also seeks to determine if 
the West African economic community's initiative in Liberia 
can help forge regional unity among West African states. 
These objectives will be achieved by examining: 
(a) The causes of the civil war, 
(b) The conflict, 
(c) Intervention and its impact in Liberia and in the 
region of West Africa. 
The motivation of each intervening country will be 
examined. This study will also examine areas of regional 
cooperation necessary to stimulate peace, stability and 
economic growth in the region. 
Methodology 
This study will utilize two principal methods of 
inquiry--viz-- (a) descriptive analysis and, (b) historical 
analysis. 
Descriptive analysis is mainly concerned with 
describing and interpreting issues. Its primary concerns 
are with existing conditions, as well as beliefs, views and 
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attitudes that are held. It is advantageous in evaluating 
the prevalent practices, the effects that are being felt and 
the trends that are developing. Descriptive analysis is 
also used to identify goals and objectives and how they may 
be reached. It deals with the analysis and interpretation 
of data collected for specific purposes and for the 
understanding and solution of important problems.5 
Since Liberia has been governed by the Americo- 
Liberians for so many years, this method describes the 
specific historical period, events, various political 
activities and warlords in Liberia since 1847. It also 
allows us to describe events and conflicts in Liberia. 
Historical analysis provides a descriptive and critical 
analysis of events. This approach is very important in view 
of ECOWAS' attempt to bring peace to Liberia. 
An historical analysis allows the writer to explain 
Liberia's dependence on Regional (West African) power, its 
lack of security and its desire and drive for modernization. 
The historical approach also enables us to view present 
events in a historical, as well as a scientific, 
perspective, so that the study may penetrate beneath the 
surface and perceive the profounder historical forces which 
control events.6 
5Martin Bulmer, Sociological Research Methods: An 
Introduction (London: Macmillan Press Ltd., 1977), 3. 
6George Lukâcs, History of Class Consciousness : Studies 
in Marxist Dialectics (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1971), 224. 
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So that an acceptable conclusion can be reached, this 
research will employ the following procedures. 
The first step will document and analyze the Liberian 
history. After establishing that the economic, 
administrative and social structure of Liberia was not 
beneficial for all Liberians, a link will also be 
established between the Americo-Liberians, who control the 
state, and the ethnic minorities, who provide the labor. 
Though the alliance existing between the Americo-Liberians 
and the indigenous Liberians is based on economic factors, 
this alliance also has an impact on political decisions. 
Firstly, in an attempt to modernize Liberia, each 
president did not hesitate to be active among Liberians and 
the progressive African leaders. President Tubman's theme 
of an open-door-policy and his active part in the formation 
of the Organization of African Unity, President Tolbert's 
Rally Time and President Doe's themes of Equal Opportunity 
for All were all designed to get support from the Liberian 
masses and help put the country on the road to modernization 
and less "dependency." Each of these presidents echoed 
familiar tunes that Liberia was for all Liberians. 
Secondly, the Liberian leadership and the national 
economy were heavily dependent on foreign firms and foreign 
aid. Its military depended on U.S. assistance and the 
president was personally dependent on Israeli guards. 
Liberia depended on regional powers for its survival, as 
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well as the continuity of its armed forces. The dominant- 
dependent character of Liberia was also seen in the western 
world's influence in development and modernization. 
It can be determined by deduction and inference that 
Liberia acted on the basis of "dependency" in almost all 
situations. The use of these approaches helps in 
understanding the root cause(s) of the Liberian civil war, 
all the belligerent factions and ECOMOG's intervention. It 
also explains the steps taken by ECOMOG to resolve the 
Liberian conflict. 
Newspaper articles, magazines, books and many other 
sources have been located in reporting the study. Reference 
volumes such as Social Science Index, Readers Guide to 
Periodical Literature, and the Public Affairs Information 
Service Bulletin will be used. Primary sources include the 
Organization of African Unity documents, the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) documents, United 
Nations documents, and Liberian government documents. Other 
sources used to research the problems include documents from 
Liberia's peace council, the Liberian clergy and various 
peace plans signed to bring about the cessation of 
hostilities and end the Liberian civil war. 
Significance of the Study 
This writer chooses to undertake this study on the 
Liberian conflict and the implication of ECOMOG's 
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intervention in West African States for several reasons. 
This study posits that the significant problem of leadership 
and legitimacy is not only common to Liberia and West 
Africa; but also to other African countries. Other 
significant reflections of the political, economic and 
social reality in Africa include regional problems arising 
out of ethnic colonial boundaries, poor economic conditions 
and the need for development. The most significant reason 
for undertaking this study is to analyze how an economic 
organization with a security protocol can undertake a 
successful military expedition. The Americo-Liberian 
domination in all Liberian affairs has been evident since 
its independence in 1894. Though Liberia, under President 
Tubman, had moved towards a policy of unification and 
integration along with economic, educational, and social 
equality, the country was already at a crossroad. The 
internal situation in Liberia led to cross-cutting alliances 
between various ethnic groups, armed factions and a civil 
war with foreign involvement. 
The internalization of the Liberian crisis created a 
highly social, economic, political and military change in 
West Africa. The Liberian civil war and ECOMOG's 
intervention has offered a new challenge for the Economic 
Community of West African States and its ability to deal 
with regional issues as a regional organization (see Chapter 
III). From its inception, there have been some voices in 
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and out of West Africa aimed at discrediting West African 
countries and even African leaders. The ability of African 
leaders in general, and/or West African leaders in 
particular, to solve their own problems without any 
superpower or former colonial master's involvement was in 
doubt. 
The problem of intervention by ECOMOG in the Liberian 
civil war is significant for several reasons. First, a 
number of scholars, military strategists, and economists, 
including Helmut Schmidt, Naomi Chazan, Richard Joseph, 
etc., have argued that African leaders in general and West 
African leaders in particular cannot solve their own 
problems, no matter what resources are made available to 
them. Also, since a number of economic integration 
arrangements, such as the East African Community (EAC), the 
Southern African Development Coordination Conference 
(SADCC), the Arab Mahgreb Union (AMU) (see Map 3 and Table 
1), etc., are already in existence, it becomes necessary, 
then, to show their effect on the economy and security of 
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countries. The significance of this study as it relates to 
ECOWAS' ability to forge itself as a regional force, 
therefore, has great risk or opportunity for the cause of 
peace in Liberia and West Africa. If it helps to reduce 
human want and need, the quality of life for the West 
African population could indeed drift in the direction of 
stability and progress as a result of the ECOWAS construct. 
The result of a successful intervention in the Liberian 
crisis could enhance the economic growth in Liberia. The 
result of peace and unity in Liberia could be a catalyst for 
a new outbreak of African and world conflict management and 
conflict resolution recipe. 
Hypothesis 
The Economic Community of West African States 
Monitoring Group's (ECOMOG) intervention in the Liberian 
civil war led to an end to hostilities between all 
belligerent factions and an end to the war. ECOMOG also 
created a balance of power between all warring factions 
and/or ethnic groups, and established a democratically 
elected government in power. 
Assumptions 
(1) Doe's military-style approach to solving the 
Liberian situation was not the best policy option to bring 
about fundamental change in the country. 
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(2) The ideological and foreign policy orientation 
differences between the francophone and anglophone ECOWAS 
countries did not hinder their participation in ECOMOG. 
(3) ECOMOG's intervention in the Liberian crisis has 
impacted on Liberia and West Africa. 
Conceptual and Theoretical Framework 
Before going further, it should be noted that this 
study uses balance of power to imply an equilibrium 
condition in the power play between government, civil 
society (including all ethnic groups) and human rights 
groups. Each body will respect the authenticity and 
autonomy of the other without encroachment, fear or favor. 
It is explained in the foregoing chapters that a 
vibrant civil society in Liberia is the main missing element 
to a legitimate state, sustained socio-political reform, 
improved governance and viable state society relations. It 
is also the prohibition of all socio-political and economic 
activities that has undermined the growth of Liberia. 
The main impediment for the establishment of democracy 
in Liberia must be government-free associations and popular 
movements. The state-civil society link is a dynamic and 
cooperative process. It cannot or should not attempt to 
replace the Liberian state in all its functions. In Liberia 
or other states, an effective, competitive market and 
political pluralism should develop and prosper out of 
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associational activities. "Civil organizations rely on the 
state for the creation of an enabling environment or 
political and economic space for its survival."7 
Michael Bratton forcefully suggests that a vibrant 
society is possible when the economy has undergone the 
greatest "degree of indigenous capitalist 
industrialization."8 Is this assertion true of Liberia? If 
so, what are or should be the current socio-political, 
economic and administrative conditions in Liberia? If it is 
not true--why? If it is an acceptable presentation that 
ECOMOG will bring the Liberian war to an end, restore 
democracy and forge unity among West African States, then 
the Liberians are buoyant with confidence to enjoy a 
government that allows socio-civil cum political rights. 
Political theorists continue to use various 
perspectives in their ongoing debate about the significance 
of factors to be emphasized or even considered in analyzing 
African politics. The focus has been on whether ethnicity, 
class struggle, militarism, "dependency," imperialism, 
regionalism or the new international order should be 
7This concept is adapted from Michael Bratton, "Beyond 
the State: Civil Society and Assocational Life in Africa," 
World Politics 41, no. 3 (1989): 427-430; Naomi Chazan, 
"Patterns of State-Society Incorporation and Disengagement 
in Africa," in The Precarious Balance: State and Society in 
Africa, ed. Donald Rothchild and Naomi Chazan (Boulder, 
Colo.: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1989), 121-148. 
8Bratton, 427-430. 
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emphasized.9 Writers like Walter Rodney argue that African 
problems have external roots. This foreign domination and 
exploitation is actually linked to the underdevelopment of 
Africa. Liberia's greatest needs are private investment, 
technical skills and appropriate values for development. 
Civilian administration in Liberia believed and hoped 
for the infusion of capital and technology while the radical 
military leaders aimed at restructuring the whole of 
Liberia. Are there other conceptual frameworks that can 
improve our understanding of the behavior of civilian or 
military governments and their policies in Africa? This 
study uses the modernization framework to explain military 
policies and bourgeois behavior in Liberia. 
Let us briefly examine some works in this area of 
military and socio-economic development as it pertains to 
the Third World/Black Africa. Interest in writing on the 
role of the military and their performance in Third World 
countries started about the 1960s and has continued in 
recent years.10 There are three major points of view with 
respect to the role of the armed forces in the modernization 
and development of Third World/Black African nations. The 
first view holds that the military is, by definition and 
tradition, an apolitical, institutionally conservative 
9"Dependency Theory: A Reassment," Latin American 
Perspectives Special Issue 1, no. 1 (Spring 1974). 
10Olatunde Odetola, Military Regimes and Development 
(London: George Allen & Urwin, 1982). 
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force, untrained in the tactics and strategies of civilian 
rule and political management. It further contends that the 
military has an inherent institutional desire to serve its 
corporate interests, and is, thus, incapable of leading 
these modernizing nations to advancement.11 Huntington 
(1962) has emphasized that there should be a distinction 
between modernization on the one hand and development on the 
other. Development, according to the author, is a 
"phenomenon" which involves the building of political 
institutions that will far outlast military rule. 
Lieuwen (1960) has agreed that military interventions 
may change present situations slightly, but in the final 
analysis, those changes may not be profound or far-reaching. 
Essentially, one must agree that, in spite of their 
rhetoric, the military is incapable of undertaking any 
political and socio-economic development in black Africa. 
On the black African arena, Bienen (1971) and Welch 
(1970) have expressed doubts in various forms and in varying 
degrees on the ability of the military to bring about 
political stability and to engender economic development. 
A second view stresses that revolution is the only 
mechanism by which development and reform can be brought 
about, and that the regular military establishments are the 
chief obstacles to this process in black Africa/Third World. 
This argument is based on the fact that military 
4 . xlIbid • / 
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establishments, especially in Latin America, have frequently 
allied with the oligarchy and/or middle classes to uphold 
the status quo, and have often acted to support counter¬ 
insurgency forces to thwart real change in their own 
countries. This view is related to the conservative nature 
of the military, although the main theme differs. Neo- 
Marxism rejects the notion that the black African military 
is capable of any real development due to its dependence on 
the "big powers" for hardware, training and other 
procurement. 
Murray (1966) believes that the military in black 
Africa is essentially reactionary. In his viewpoint, only 
the military of Congo Brazzaville, because of its Marxist 
orientation at the time, was truly developmental. In this 
case, the Marxist regime of Ethiopian Mengistu would 
certainly qualify for good marks. However, due to the 
concentration of money on military spending, Ethiopia under 
Mengistu suffered immensely. 
Some other writers have stressed the dependence of 
black Africa/Third World on the First World, but do not 
subscribe to the general view that the military is incapable 
of real development.12 Gutteridge (1969) entertains high 
hopes that the African military will be more effective than 
political parties in modernizing their societies. Horowitz 
12Michael Radu, et al., Africa in the Post- 
Decolonization Era (New Brunswick, N.J.: Transaction Books, 
1984) . 
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(1966) has argued that military assistance to Africa should 
become a focal point in maintaining exclusive relations with 
the former imperial power. He, surprisingly, maintains that 
the military is an important agent of development. 
A third view asserts that military values, skills and 
ideologies are antithetical to the first two propositions - 
that the military politicians in black Africa make the best, 
the most thorough and perhaps the only reliable managers of 
social change. Implicit in this view is the argument that 
the military in black Africa is the most "effective 
supervisory agency for directed change."13 The crux of the 
argument is that the military is itself, as a rule, the most 
effective highly disciplined nationwide institution capable 
of guaranteeing the political stability necessary for 
economic development. Halpern (1962, 1963) and Pye (1962) 
are the most ardent supporters of military rule in the Third 
World. Without dwelling too much on the modernization 
theorists, one might add that an efficient military 
institution is an investment. It ensures the stability 
necessary for economic growth. 
Modernization in relation to development, involves the 
integration and innovation of socioeconomic, educational and 
political systems without subsequent disintegration. It 
provides a suitable framework necessary for living in an 
advanced society. Samuel P. Huntington states that 
130detola, 
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modernization consists of "industrialization, economic 
growth, increasing social mobility, and political 
mobilization. "14 
The applicability of variables from the modernization 
concept concludes that any policy that affects the 
development of the productive forces in society has to take 
into consideration elements of modernization. Modernization 
is useful in explaining the Liberian situation because it 
helps us understand the bourgeois and military behavior. 
Huntington's modernization variables give us a theoretical 
edge in studying the Liberian civil war. It also makes it 
necessary to understand the difference between civilian and 
military policies, objectives and results. A.F.K. Organski 
explains that modernization enables us to understand 
"government efficiency in the mobilization of human and 
material resources towards rational ends."15 
Liberian leadership, in their pursuit of power, had 
always maintained "no permanent ties with the Liberian 
population, only permanent interests."16 The Liberian 
leadership, civilian and military, failed to take into 
account the nation's survival. They pursued their lesser 
14Samuel Huntington in Ronald Chilcote, ed., The 
Theories of Comparative Politics : The Search for a Paradigm 
(Colorado: Westview Press, 1981), 280. 
15A.F.K. Organski in Ibid., 279-280. 
16Edward L. Morse, Modernization and the Transformation 
of International Relations (New York: The Free Press, 1976), 
40 . 
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interests, thereby creating room for self-destruction.17 It 
is a widely held view that modernization is a western 
approach to development. This study will use modernization 
as a framework to examine the Liberian leadership. This 
examination, in this author's judgment, will explain why 
military and civilian leaders in Liberia and Africa behave 
the way they do or make the kind of policies they make, even 
if it leads to war. 
Literature Review 
Conflict 
The literature on Africa is as diverse and complex as 
the disputes and conflicts themselves in the region. In the 
case of the Liberian conflict, the complexity and diversity 
was heightened by the display of distrust, fear and 
suspicion on one part by all the belligerent forces: the 
National Patriotic Liberation Front (NPLF), Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL), Independent National Patriotic Liberian 
Forces (INPLF), the Liberian government, etc., and on the 
other part by most of the ECOMOG countries (Ghana, Nigeria, 
Sierra Leone, Côte d'Ivoire, Guinea, Mali, Togo, Gambia, and 
Benin) expected to keep and maintain peace. This study, 
however, seeks to describe the origin and causes of the 
Liberian civil war, which made it possible for the West 
17Hans J. Morganthau, Politics Among Nations: The 
Struggle for Power and Peace, 5th edition (New York: Alfred 
A. Knopf, 1978), 11-14. 
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African Economic Community to intervene, and its implication 
for West Africa from 1980-1997. 
Literature on the Liberian crisis is not as abundant as 
one would wish, but much literature on conflict and 
intervention has been identified. Our limitation has been 
in obtaining primary sources and government documents on 
Liberia. However, abundant secondary sources have somewhat 
remedied this situation. The U.N. Charter described 
conflicts or disputes as: 
An organized violence that emerges from a 
particular combination of parties (not necessarily 
governments of nation-states with the only 
exception being the PLO, the Vietcong, and the 
Secretary General of the United Nations). Parties 
often seek to achieve some objectives, i.e., 
territory, security, access to markets, prestige, 
alliances, world revolution, the overthrow of 
unfriendly government, changes in the United 
Nations procedures and the like.18 
Conflicts and disputes are carried out in an effort to 
achieve or defend the above objectives, demands, actions, or 
defend the interests and objectives of parties. Conflict or 
dispute involves the subject of contention between parties 
and includes the position that is incompatible with the 
wishes of interests of two or more parties. The most 
traditional field issue is territorial ambition or 
acquisition; however, territorial control per-se is often 
not the only source of creating international tension 
18Raymond W. Mack and Richard C. Snyder, "The Analysis 
of Social Conflicts Toward an Overview and Synthesis," 
Journal of Conflict Resolution (1957): 217. 
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conflict. An issue could be tariff structures, the price of 
oil, the proliferation of nuclear weapons, the treatment of 
ethnic minorities in X or Y country or countries. 
Conflict or dispute refers to tensions, a set of 
attitudes and predisposition which involves distrust and 
suspicion. In the international system, tensions alone do 
not generate or cause military conflict, but only predispose 
participants to manifest conflict behavior should they 
struggle to achieve incompatible objectives. "In all 
conflicts or disputes, antagonism, mistrust, suspicion and 
the like are more sufficient conditions for the occurrence 
of conflict or crisis."19 
Conflict or dispute includes actions such as diplomatic 
actions, initiatives, propaganda, commercial or military 
threats and/or the deployment of force. Conflict in Liberia 
arose from problems basic to all populations, the tugs and 
pulls of different identities, the unequal distribution of 
resources and access to power and competing definitions of 
what is right, fair and just. According to Stephen John 
Stedman, "when individuals and groups turn to violence to 
solve such problems, conflicts take on a second dimension-- 
security and survival."20 William Zartman asserts that: 
19Clinton Fink, "Some Conceptual Difficulties in the 
Theories of Social Conflicts," Journal of Conflict 
Resolution 12 (1968): 434; Lewis Coser, The Function of 
Social Conflict (New York: The Free Press, 1956), 37-38. 
20Stephen John Stedman in "Conflict and Conflict 
Resolution," in Francis M. Deng and William Zartman, ed., 
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Conflict is an inevitable aspect of human 
interaction, an unavoidable concomitant of 
choices and decisions, . . . it is brought on by 
the presence of several actions and compounded 
by several choices. It cannot be avoided.21 
This study states that without a doubt, the Liberian 
civil conflict was unavoidable, especially in the wake of 
the Doe atrocities and gross human rights violations against 
the people of Liberia from 1980 when he assumed power by 
military coup. 
The crisis in Liberia today, as we know it, is one in 
which protesters and rebels act and government reacts. John 
Walton sees African conflict arising partly from the "crisis 
of Modernization attendant to the full-scale implementation 
of dependent capitalism."22 John W. Burton goes to a great 
extent in romanticizing conflict, stating that: 
Conflict, like sex, is an essential element in 
human relations. It is the means to change, the 
means by which our social values of welfare, 
security, justice and opportunity for personal 
development can be achieved. If repressed, as is 
often the case in traditional societies where 
conflict is settled according to traditionally 
accepted norms, society becomes static. Conflicts 
are neither to be deprecated nor feared. The 
existence of a flow of conflict is the only 
guarantee that the aspiration of society will be 
Conflict Resolution in Africa (Washington, D.C.: The 
Brookings Institution, 1991), 367-368. 
21Ibid. 
22John Walton, Reluctant Rebels: Comparative Studies of 
Revolution and Underdevelopment (Columbia University Press, 
1984), 157-162. 
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attained. Indeed, conflict, like sex, is to be 
enj oyed.23 
Though this study might not go as far as John Burton in 
fantasizing and romanticizing conflict, it must be agreed 
upon that conflict arises between parties in an 
interactional process. In Liberia during both the civilian 
and military regimes, the failure of the leadership to 
perceive the needs of the governed and the application of 
incompatible means to satisfy such needs brought about the 
conflict. In South Africa, conflict arose due to (in parts) 
the denial of the black majority population a chance in the 
meaningful participation in affairs of the nation. In 
countries such as Chad, Sudan and Ethiopia, the root of the 
conflict is traced to the lack of proper democratic 
arrangements which ensure meaningful participation in the 
democratic process to all the various groups in the affected 
and respective country. The Nigerian civil war started 
mainly due to an attempt by the Igbo-dominated East to 
secede from the Federal Republic of Nigeria. In these few 
examples and all others across Africa, it is believed that 
war was necessary in terms of certain deeply held beliefs. 
There is an appropriate assumption at the international 
level that conflict involves at least two parties, but this 
assumptive description of conflict is still too vague. 
23John W. Burton, World Society (New York: UPA, 1987), 
137-138. 
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Barbara proposed five other assumptions of conflict to 
include : 
(1) Rationality: Individuals pursue their own 
self-interest and therefore seek to enhance their 
relative advantage. 
(2) Methodological Individualism: In any conflict, 
the basic unit to be considered is the individual 
human being. 
(3) Adaptive Nature of Humanity: Individuals are 
fallible, but they also possess the capability of 
learning and modifying their behavior based on the 
results of their experiences. 
(4) Necessity for Political Constraint: Some 
system of political order (broadly defined) is 
needed to maintain conditions of social 
organization, such as reason and justice. 
(5) Democratic Values of Equity and Liberty: Human 
beings seek a balance between the potential paradox 
created by desiring no constraint upon their own 
actions (liberty) and the desire that no one shall 
have special privileges and/or immunities 
(equality) .24 
This assumption implies that conflict might arise as a 
result of how human beings make their choices. Conflict may 
also arise from the need for a joint decision, either 
between individuals or between groups. Thus, there is a 
wide range of possible interaction that might lead to 
conflict. 
Almost all the subregions in Africa for the past three 
decades have witnessed a major conflict of one 
characteristic or another. Available literature suggests 
that between 1963 to 1979, 41 percent of all civil crises in 
24Barbara Hill, The Journal of Conflict Resolution 26, 
no. 1 (March 1982): 113. 
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the world occurred in Africa, and more are predicted to 
occur until 1997 and beyond. This study also posits that 
Liberia's internal conflict of 1980-1997 represents most 
accurately the problem of unsuccessful internal 
consolidation. 
Intervention 
As this literature reveals, intervention is a major 
force of the contemporary international system and one "that 
lacks a suitably established definition."25 However, Stanley 
Hoffman stressed that: 
The extremes of state action can be called 
intervention. In its widest sense, intervention 
can refer to virtually every act of state; on the 
other hand, in an allusion to the French Statesman 
Talleyrand, Hoffman agrees that intervention and 
non-intervention have been interpreted as 
essentially the same thing.26 
Interestingly, Max Beloff sees intervention as: "...the 
attempt by one state to affect the internal structure and 
external behavior of other states through various degrees of 
coercion."27 Oran Young reflects on intervention as: 
25James N. Rosenau, "Intervention as a Scientific 
Concept," Journal of Conflict Resolution 13, no. 1 (1969): 
152 . 
26Stanley Hoffman, "The Problem of Intervention," in 
Hedley Ball, ed., Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1986), 8. 
27Max Beloff, "Reflection on Intervention," Journal of 
International Affairs (1968), 198. 
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"organized and systematic activities across recognized 
boundaries aimed at affecting the political authority 
structures of the target."28 Hedley Bull asserts that what 
"...allows an intervention to be coercive is that the 
intervener is generally superior in strength to the object 
of intervention."29 Most interventions have the concept of 
an outside power trying to change the course of events in 
the target country. Morgenthau sees contemporary: 
Intervention which began at the end of the 
Second World War as a continuation of the 
pattern established in the nineteenth century. 
He explained that the Soviet Union intervened in 
Hungary in 1956 as Russia had done in 1938, while 
the U.S. intervened in Cuba at the beginning of 
the sixties as it had done in the first decades of 
the century. The type of intervention that Russia 
and Great Britain practiced in the nineteenth 
century is presently practiced by the Soviet Union 
and the U.S. Thus interventionism is regarded as 
a situation between super-powers and weak 
nations.30 
In any interventionary action, Morgenthau argues that 
success should take priority over other considerations. He 
cites the Soviet Union's intervention in Hungary in 1956 as 
a model of a successful intervention. 
280ran Young, "Intervention and International Systems," 
Journal of International Affairs (1968), 198. 
29Hedley Bull, "Introduction," in Hedley Bull, ed., 
Intervention in World Politics (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1986), 8. 
30Hans J. Morgenthau, "To Intervene or Not to 
Intervene," in Steven L. Spiegel, ed., At Issue: Politics in 
the World Arena (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1974), 61-77. 
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Zartman states that there is evidence of an "autonomous 
subordinate system in Africa with defining characteristics 
and capable of performing some limited functions."31 In 
order for this system to operate effectively, problem 
solving and autonomy are to be prioritized, not allowing one 
state to seek advantage over the other. If states' 
capabilities to execute priorities become overburdened and 
unable to perform expected functions, then the state becomes 
susceptible to external influence. An inability to control 
violence, aggression or conflict may lead to appeals for 
assistance and leave the system open to penetration from 
outside. Such was the case in Liberia. Zartman notes that 
the "absence of modern, effective forms of power in Africa 
means that Africa's security is often out of its own hand 
and at the mercy of external forces."32 African leaders are 
aware of this vacuum and often pursue a neutralist policy 
towards external powers as a means of avoiding intervention. 
Shoemaker and Spanier offer a "patron-client relationship"33 
as another approach to intervention. This approach is 
useful in accounting for the often long-term aspect of 
31William Zartman, "Africa as a Subordinate State System 
in International Relations," International Organization 21 
(Summer 1967): 549. 
32Ibid. , 559. 
33Christopher C. Shoemaker and John Spanier, Patron- 
Client Relationship : Multilateral Crises in the Nuclear Age 
(New York: Praeger, 1984), 12. 
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relations among states and is entirely compatible with the 
relationship between Liberia and the West African countries. 
One of the conditions outlined by Shoemaker and Spainer 
as a "necessary determinant for the existence of patron- 
client relationship is the perception of the outside world"34 
of the patron as having acquired influence in a region or 
state. This is so even if the material gained is few or the 
encounter is brief. 
While Liberia does not offer some economic or strategic 
benefits to Africa, its importance in these respects is not 
limited. The patron-state's relationship with client-states 
such as Liberia is valuable mainly because it provides the 
prospect of expanded global reach in a relatively low-risk 
environment. 
According to MacFarlane, "States which are already 
internally divided are less capable of resisting 
intervention."35 Internal conflicts, then provides an "entry 
point" for outside interventionist states. In this regard, 
intervention is less a cause of conflict than a 
manifestation of instability within the region. In some 
instances, intervention is often resisted and resistance is 
often manifested in a strong sense of nationalism. 
34Ibid., 13. 
35S. Neil MacFarlane, "Africa's Decaying Security System 
and the Rise of Intervention," Internal Security 8, no. 8 
(Spring 1984): 129-130. 
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Intervention can be displayed in any form or act. 
Examples range from propaganda statements, granting of 
foreign aid, display of military might, a continuous display 
and use of a veto power in the United Nation's Security 
Council, arms supply to a client state, and/or a mere 
issuing of warnings. As stated earlier, if Country A 
intervenes in the internal affairs of Country B, this 
implies that Country A's objective(s) can be achieved. 
Country A does help or intervene either by invitation, 
directly or indirectly. 
This political process according to this circumstance, 
then renders the act of intervention or the ability of one 
country to influence the behavior of another into three 
distinct groups: 
(1) "dependency" is created by Country A (or group of 
countries) on Country B by using economic aid, 
(2) Country A (or group of countries) often use 
ideology to influence situations or promote their 
interest in Country B, and 
(3) the use of military aid to influence a political 
outcome is commonly practiced. 
Under the norms of international law, there are legal 
justifications for intervention. (1) If a citizen of a state 
feels threatened. This was the pretense of the United States 
intervention in Grenada. The need to intervene was felt to 
protect the American medical students studying or residing 
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there. (2) It is for self or territorial defense. (3) If 
the intervening state has the mandate by treaty. The United 
States justified its intervention in Vietnam under the terms 
of the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO). (4) If 
there is a violation of an agreement for unilateral action. 
An example of this has been stated earlier citing the Soviet 
invasion of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968. (5) 
If a state violates international law. 
Though controversial, a sub-regional or international 
collective action can be effected by the international 
community against a state or country that is acting as a 
threat or attempting to breach a union. The conditions here 
are temporary, rather than permanent, due in part to the 
plurality and characteristic of both hegemony and balance of 
the regional power. Intervention can be used to generate 
influence in the international system given several changes 
in international relations and the lack of permanency in the 
international system. Therefore, influence is an aspect of 
power which is a means to an end. In international 
relations, influence is used to achieve or defend various 
goals, such as territory, prestige and security of alliance. 
Stated differently, intervention is an ingredient of 
inducement, threatening or punishing. 
In attempting to explain the causes of intervention in 
Africa, Legum identified three major parties as being 
involved in foreign intervention in Africa: (a) African 
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nations, (b) Foreign Powers, and (c) The Organization of 
African Unity (OAU). He attributes foreign intervention in 
Africa to the dynamics of internal structure and the 
situations in that region as a whole. He perceives that 
"the African continent is being made up of 50-odd African 
countries" (see map on p. 3) with each being dispossessed of 
homogeneity that would facilitate conflict-free national 
integration; therefore, virtually no nation-states exist in 
Africa. 36 
An interventionist power acts for or against any regime 
for its own interest, and not for the purpose of benefiting 
the regime. Intervenors are interested in a regime only to 
the extent that such a regime is willing to foster, protect, 
promote and carry-out the program of the defined objectives 
of the intervenor. In a crisis situation in a target area, 
the first task of an interventionist power is to decide 
whether to (a) retain the ruling regime, (b) replace it by a 
new regime, and/or (c) reinstate an old regime. 
ECOMOG's readiness to replace the Liberian leadership 
was shown by her inability and/or refusal to act in good 
faith to save the life of master-sergeant Doe following his 
36Colin Legum, "Foreign Intervention in Africa," The 
Yearbook of World Affairs 1980 (New York: Praeger 
Publishers, 1980); and Colin Legum, "Communal Conflict and 
International Intervention in Africa," in Colin Legum et 
al., Africa in the 80s: A Continent in Crisis (New York: 
McGraw-Hill Company, 1979). Both works are complementary to 
one another. 
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capture by Prince Johnson's forces--The Independence 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). 
The impact of intervention is a subject that many 
authors have written on. MacFarlane asserts that: 
"intervention over a short-term may enhance or detract from 
a state's political stability depending on the intentions of 
the interventist state."37 
Strategist and external powers often choose "military 
intervention as the best means of intervention since it 
offers the best chances of success over a short-term."38 
Though the most immediate threat to the state may be 
removed, divisive issues may still remain and an expensive, 
protracted commitment may be required. Furthermore, a 
regime may become convinced that "negotiation is not 
necessary or that military solutions are an adequate means 
of conflict resolution."39 Despite the efforts of an 
external power, its impact can be neutralized if a leader 
refuses to follow the external power's desires. Conflict in 
this case may still be present. This study also notes that 
the absence of any stabilizing factors that the regional 
intervention can bring in can result in a "de-restraining" 
of internal destabilizing factors. 
37MacFarlane, "Africa's Decaying," 141. 
38MacFarlane, "Intervention and Regional Security," 
Adelphi Papers, no. 196 (1985): 31. 
39MacFarlane, "Africa's Decaying," 141. 
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In conclusion, some of the studies that are clearly- 
directed towards conflict, conflict resolution and 
intervention as examined in this chapter are sometimes in 
error. There are inappropriate conceptions, confusion and 
motives with objectives of intervenors. These amount to the 
neglect of analysis of objectives or the description of 
intervention mechanism and how they operate during actual 
intervention situations. Some of the studies also fail to 
separate between intervention when only two powers are in 
conflict, and confrontation when intervention occurs with 
more than two belligerent forces at war with each other. 
It is the intention of this study to locate, analyze 
and explain the successful intervention of ECOMOG in the 
Liberian civil war. This study will also show how ECOMOG 
avoided confusion associated with misconception and the 
underlying motive of each intervening country. It is shown 
in the literature review above that most writers differ on 
how to categorize conflict and intervention. This study 
will deal with the dilemma of the need to clarify disputes, 
"conflict," and intervention on one hand and objectives and 
motives on the other. In the midst of this confusion is 
"conflict" and "intervention," which dominates this study. 
It is the opinion of this writer that the major works in 
conflict and intervention have also failed to explain 
interventionist behavior in relation to the objectives of 
interventionist powers. This researcher, however, will take 
43 
into account objectives, motives and mechanisms of conflict 
and intervention, along with historical continuity, in 
making this study possible. 
In general, Liberians will agree that: 
As we enter the final decade of the twentieth 
century, with the European nations poised for a 
higher level of economic integration... and with 
the nations of the Soviet bloc shedding the 
carapace of their overly centralized systems, 
Africa must discover the routes to its own 
political and economic renaissance.40 
The persistent question that must be asked is: Why can 
the Africans not create an African community or nation even 
with its various but diverse background? The answer often 
considered is that the unchangeable different tribes, 
different backgrounds, cultures, and customs contribute to 
making Africa in general and each African state in 
particular resistant to change. 
Though the concept of the state seems elusive, in many 
respects the states of Africa share similar characteristics 
that apply to states in any other continent. Independence 
in some states (such as Guinea-Bissau, Algeria, Zimbabwe, or 
Angola, to name a few) was accomplished only by means of 
enormous armed struggles, and some negotiations, like the 
Zimbabwe's Lancaster House Conference.41 
40Richard Joseph, "Introduction," in Perestroika Without 
Glasnost in Africa, Conference Report Series Volume 2, 
number 1, 1989 (Atlanta: The Carter Center of Emory 
University), iii. 
41George M. Houser, No One Can Stop the Rain: Glimpses 
of Africa ' s Liberation Struggle (New York: The Pilgrim 
Press, 1989), 216. 
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Despite the attainment of independence by African 
states, imperialism and neo-colonialism remain very pivotal 
in the conduct of relations between the African states and 
the advanced capitalist countries. This results often in a 
"peripheral stance" by African leaders which is reflected in 
their political activities, socio-economic policies, and in 
regional unions. As Robert Fatton, Jr. forcefully argues in 
his work: Predatory Rule: The State and Civil Society in 
Africa, "...the state, in other words, is the means through 
which the ruling class seeks to cement its divisions and 
reconcile its divergent projects and policies."42 He further 
explains : 
The state, therefore, is the decisive means of 
acquiring capital, power, and prestige. Control 
over the state is the sine-qua-non for the making 
of a ruling class. The state embodies a structure 
of dominance as it organizes the rule of the 
emerging ruling class and disarticulates the 
challenges and unity of subordinate classes. Its 
main functions are coercive and extractive as well 
as ideological and co-optive. It represses and 
disciplines the poor while pacifying them through 
the corrupting graft of personalistic webs of 
independence. The state is thus the prime location 
of the sites of ruling class formation and class 
disarticulation.43 
Emerging literature often points to conspicuous 
lifestyles of the ruling class or classes when questions on 
African leadership are raised as is the case of Liberia. An 
42Robert Fatton, Jr., Predatory Rule: The State and 
Civil Society in Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Reinner 
Publishers, 1992), 19. 
43Ibid. , 21. 
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excellent text titled, Challenges of Leadership in African 
Development, makes a strong and unequivocal appeal in part 
to African leaders. It states, 
...for us in Africa, our salvation lies in our own 
hands and nowhere else. Only we can be the 
architects of our own fortune; as we have been the 
architects of our own misfortune by and large for 
the past quarter of a century....44 
This study suggests that African crises are not purely 
economic. Leadership, legitimacy and policy decisions 
contribute to conflict and war. Thomas Patrick Melady 
observed in the late 1950s that "The emergence of a high 
level African leadership elite is a reality in today's 
world. 1,45 This reality was observed by Claude Ake after 
almost four decades. Claude Ake, an African scholar and a 
noted authority on the political economy of Africa, sums up 
the situation pretty well: "We are never going to understand 
the current crisis in Africa, much less contain it as long 
as we continue to think of it as an economic crisis...."46 
Having carefully and generally examined leadership, 
legitimacy and policy decision in Africa, the question now 
is what makes the state of Liberia and its components so 
4401usegun Obasanjo and Hans d'Orville, ed., Challenges 
of Leadership in African Development (New York: Crane 
Russak, 1990), v. 
45Thomas Patrick Melady, Profiles of African Leaders 
(New York: The MacMillan Company, 1961), 17. 
46S.K.B. Asante, African Development: Adebayo Ade Deji's 
Alternative Strategies (London: Hans Zell Publishers, 1991), 
58. 
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violent and makes war inevitable? In defining the state, 
Naomi Chazan et al. described the state as "the organized 
aggregate of relatively permanent institutions of 
governance."47 They further elaborated that the main 
components of the state are: 
Decision making structures (executives, parties, 
parliaments), decision-enforcing institutions 
(bureaucracies, parastatal organizations, and 
security forces), and decision-mediating bodies 
(courts, tribunals, and investigatory 
commissions) .48 
Peter Duigan adds that: 
When black Africa set out on the road to 
independence, there was a mood of confidence in the 
air. Freedom would bring peace, prosperity, and an 
end to colonial oppression. The optimistic 
forecasts made by African independence leaders 
found a steady response in academe and the news 
media.49 
The above quotation summarizes the state's composition and 
the expectations of both the Liberians and all Africans. 
Since 1847, Liberia has not "fulfilled" the socio¬ 
economic promises that came with independence. The dreams 
and hopes that were conceived at the time of independence 
have largely been abandoned. Liberians have generally 
become alienated from their government and become 
47Naomi Chazan and others, Politics and Society in 
Contemporary Africa (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rienner 
Publishers, 1992), 39. 
48Ibid. 
49Peter Duigan and Robert H. Jackson, ed., Politics and 
Government in African States 1960-1985 (London: Croom Helm 
Limited, 1986), 1. 
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pessimistic about their futures. The indigenous Liberians 
were denied their basic rights and overlooked in job 
placement and promotion. The question that seems obvious 
is, how can one account for the decay in the performance of 
the Liberian state since independence? 
The preparation for independence by the settler group 
has been described as hasty and incomplete. Given that by 
1945 there was virtually no expectation that events would 
move so quickly, even the manpower skills for the Liberians 
at that time were too few and limited to master the tasks of 
modern governance. The settlers administrative structure, 
therefore, became the institutional inheritance on the eve 
of independence. As Robert Fatton Jr., explains: 
It is true that in most African countries social 
discipline is weak and power lacks 
institutionalization, but this general systemic 
weakness favors in disproportionate ways the 
interests of the privileged ruling circles.... In 
this circumstance it is not surprising that the 
struggle for control of the state, in conditions of 
monolithic political structures and generalized 
material scarcity, becomes Hobbesian, violent, and 
deadly.50 
The central tenet is that leadership, its legitimacy, 
institutional arrangement, repressive rule and government 
policies had important consequences for the kinds of 
atmosphere that prevailed in Liberia which ultimately led to 
war. 
50Fatton Jr. , 33 . 
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These manifested themselves in Liberia through the 
various ways that each president managed the affairs of 
state, and how legitimate each of them wanted their reign to 
look. Subsequent chapters elucidate the repressive nature 
of each president and the policies that each of them 
embraced. 
Organizational Design 
Chapter I of this dissertation is an introduction to 
the study. It includes a statement of the problem, and 
presents the objective, methodology, and significance of the 
study. It presents the hypothesis, and does so in the 
context of the conceptual and theoretical framework. A 
review of the literature is presented, and is followed by an 
organization of this study. The scope and limitation of the 
study conclude the chapter. Chapter II provides a 
historical perspective of the Liberian State. Chapter III 
presents the attitudes of both the OAU and ECOWAS towards 
intervention, conflict and conflict resolution. It also 
interprets the ECOWAS' role in the West African crisis. 
Chapter IV discusses the Liberian Civil War. Chapter V 
describes the intervention of the ECOWAS. Chapter VI 
analyzes the impact of the Civil War on West Africa and 
gives the final conclusion and recommendation. 
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Scope and Limitation of the Study 
This study will cover the period 1980-1997. This 
period was chosen because during this time there were many 
major developments that affected Liberia. In 1980, Master- 
Sergeant Samuel K. Doe overthrew the civilian government of 
Mr. Tolbert. In 1985 it was alleged that Doe's National 
Democratic Party of Liberia (NDPL) rigged the Presidential 
election. In 1985 the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) foiled 
an attempted coup led by Thomas Quiwonkpa. 
In 1989, an armed insurrection began in the 
Northeastern border of Nimba county. In 1990 ECOWAS met in 
Banjul and established a standing mediation committee. In 
1990 various church leaders attempted to mediate between the 
various belligerent factions. In 1990 ECOMOG was 
established. In 1990 Dr. Amos Sawyer was installed as the 
interim President of Liberia. In 1993, President Samuel Doe 
was captured, tortured and killed by the Independent 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia led by Prince Johnson. 
In 1995, all parties agreed to a negotiated peace settlement 
and an end of the war. In April of 1996, fighting erupted 
in Monrovia when Charles Taylor's elite force stormed 
Johnson's headquarters in an attempt to capture him and 
force him to stand trial for war crimes. On August 17, 
1996, Ruth Sando became the first woman to replace Mr. 
Sankawalo as council chairperson. Then on the same day, the 
revised Abuja Accord called for disarmament and 
50 
demobilization by January of 1997. A provision was also 
made for elections in May of 1997 and the formation of an 
elected government by June 15, 1997. 
CHAPTER II 
THE LIBERIAN STATE IN HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
Overview 
The post-independent period in Liberian history was 
marked by the failure of this country to fulfill the high 
hopes of her peoples' desire for economic prosperity, 
political and social equality, freedom, peace and or even 
stability. To the contrary, a destabilized Liberia exploded 
into war. The power politics of Liberia was based on 
property qualifications, serving only to incorporate a few 
without changing the lives of the majority.1 
At the beginning of the Republic, internal economic, 
social and political factors that were designed for National 
Unity often deepened the social divide in Liberia. This 
chapter contends that these divisions created tension and 
added fuel in the form of civil disobedience, faction 
formation and demand for changes. By the end of the 1980s, 
the national dimension was a source for factional rivalry 
1See Martin Lowenkopf, Politics in Liberia : The 
Conservative Road to Development (Standford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1976), 113; and J. Gus Liebenow, Liberia: 
The Evolution of Privilege (Ithaca: Cornell University 
Press, 1969), 73-74. 
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and ethnic strife making substantial contributions towards 
conflict and an imminent civil war. 
Pre-Colonial Liberia to 1800 
History, perhaps out of colonial oversight, remains 
silent over the pre-colonial history of the Liberian State. 
Liberia and Ethiopia were the only African countries that 
survived colonialization by the Europeans. 
What we know as Liberia today was originally known as 
the Grain Coast, so named by European explorers because of 
the abundance of foods grown on these shores. The Grain 
Coast was inhabited by 16 main ethnic groups (Bassa, Belle, 
Dey, Gbande, Gio, Gola, Grebo, Kissi, Kpelle, Krahn, Kru, 
Loma, Mandingo, Mano, Mende, and Vai; see Table 2 and 
Figure 1) who co-existed in relative peace, destabilized 
occasionally by minor internal conflicts chiefly deriving 
from lack of communication and conflict of interests. No 
ethnic war has ever assumed the magnitude and duration the 
current civil war has assumed. 
Inter-marriage, mutual farming ventures and the 
operation of traditional societies, such as Poro and Sande, 
contributed to the peace and stability of the Grain Coast. 
The tribes were hospitable not only to one another, but also 
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TABLE 2 





Urban Population Number Percentage 
Kpelle 43,676 14.6 10.0 298,532 19.9 
Bassa 80,084 37.4 18.3 214,143 14.2 
Gio 18,898 14.5 4.3 130,300 8.7 
Kru 55,230 45.5 12.6 121,414 8.1 
Grebo 41,185 34.3 9.4 119,985 8.0 
Mano 22,128 20.0 5.1 110,770 7.4 
Loma 29,687 33.6 6.8 88,351 5.9 
Krahn 16,730 23.5 3.8 71,177 4.7 
Gola 14,764 21.8 3.4 67,549 4.5 
Mandingo 23,094 39.5 5.3 58,414 3.9 
Kissi 14,758 28.8 3.4 51,318 3.4 
Vai 19,519 39.4 4.5 49,504 3.3 
Gbandi 7,480 19.4 1.7 38,548 2.6 
Mende 3,333 38.4 0.8 8,678 0.6 
Belle 1,565 21.2 0.4 7,369 0.5 
Dey 1,444 22.7 0.3 6,365 0.4 
Other Liberian 
tribes2 804 25.6 0.2 3,141 0.2 
Fante1 5,773 87.0 1.3 6,634 0.4 
Other African 
tribes 5,929 73.5 1.4 8,072 0.5 
No tribal 
affiliation4 32,160 75.1 7.3 42,834 2.8 
TOTAL 438,241 29.1 100.35 1,503,098 100.0 
4These were the officially recognized "tribes" (in Liberian nomenclature) at the 
time of the 1974 census. There had been no indication of change in the names of 
these "tribes” as of late 1984. 
2It is not clear which groups are referred to under this heading. Several peoples 
claimed to be independent but were not officially recognized as such. 
2These people (or their ancestors) originated on the Ghanaian coast but have been in 
Liberia for some time. 
4Includes persons called Americo-Liberians and others. 
-’Figures do not add to 100.0 because of rounding 
Source: Based on information from Liberia, Ministry of Planning and 
Economic Affairs, 1974 Population and Housing Census of 
Liberia : Population Characteristics of Major Areas, 
Monrovia, 1977, 84-86. 
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Fig. 1. Ethnic Groups 
Source : Stefan von Gnielunsci, 
of London Press, 1972) 
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to foreigners. Their lives were governed by traditional 
practices established by their ancestors whom they highly 
respected. Life always followed the traditional pattern, 
whether in government, business, or ordinary fellowship, 
leaving very little room for hatred or misunderstanding. 
Tribalism, which has now become a political issue, was 
originally only a matter of ethnic pride universally 
accepted for the preservation of the cultural heritage of a 
people. It was seldom used as a means for one group of 
people to oppress or annihilate another group. These issues 
were about to change, altering the lives of all Liberians 
and leading them to a new uncharted and uncertain future. 
The Colonial Period, 1800-1847 
At the beginning of the 19th century, bands of 
liberated and/or freed slaves from the United States arrived 
on the Grain Coast in search of an "asylum" where they would 
live in peace and freedom. Approximately 4,708 colonists 
came to Liberia (Appendices B,' C, and D) . These freed 
American slaves first settled on a small island along the 
mouth of the Mesurado River, which they named Providence 
Island. Land was later acquired on the main land, and a 
government was established and patterned after that of the 
United States of America. Along with this was the 
introduction of the Christian tradition and tenets among the 
native Liberians. The indigenous Liberians showed initial 
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resistance to the new government and Christian doctrine. 
The peoples of the hinterland were far removed from the 
political system of Liberia. "They were not represented in 
the national legislative system since they could not vote 
nor be voted for."2 It was because of this exclusion and 
suppression that the indigenous Liberians felt that they 
were under some form of colonialization. For the indigenous 
Liberians, colonial rule was alien rule, imposed from 
outside by outsiders and established amidst an ongoing 
Liberian culture. This exercise was carried out 
predominantly by the American freed slaves, who were very 
few in number compared with the population that was being 
administered. The political roles of these administrators 
began to change in terminal stages as government became 
specialized in function. 
In colonial Liberia, evidence abounds that the 
colonialists were mainly interested in maintaining their 
living standards in the face of deteriorating economic 
situations with total disregard to the well-being of the 
indigenous Liberians. Two main reasons stand out 
significantly as the main cause for a continued conflict 
between the Americo-Liberians and the indigenous Liberians, 
which consisted of, among others, three major ethnic groups, 
Bassa, Grebo and Gio. These were land tenure and cultural 
2M. B. Akpan, "Black Imperialism: Americo-Liberian Rule 
Over the African Peoples of Liberia," The Canadian Journal 
of African Studies 7, no. 2 (1973): 217-336. 
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differences. Regarding the issue of land tenure, the 
indigenous Liberians resisted attempts by the American 
Liberians to deprive them of their land with little or no 
compensation. 
This struggle began and sparked land wars as the 
settlers from the United States arrived on Liberian soil. 
This was destined to happen since the Annual Reports of the 
American Colonization Society are replete with instances in 
which whomever controlled the land also controlled the 
resources therein and thereupon. Initial land negotiations 
between officials of the American Colonization Society and 
local chiefs resulted in the signing of a treaty that 
permitted the sale of land in the Mesurado area to the 
Liberian settler group.3 (See Appendix E) 
Shortly thereafter, however, warriors attacked the 
settlement contending that the indigenous chiefs, under 
their customary law, had not renounced their claim to the 
land. The chiefs contended that they had only granted 
permission for the settlers to temporarily occupy the land 
so they would not be stranded in the harbor.4 Although by 
tradition, tribal law dictates the chief to be the trustee 
3J. E. Holloway, Liberian Diplomacy in Africa: A Study 
of InterAfrican Relations (Washington, D.C.: University 
Press of America, 1981), 3. 
4Report of the Board of Managers of the American 
Colonization Society, presented at the annual meeting, Jan. 
13, 1827 (Washington, D.C.: American Colonization Society, 
1827) . 
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of tribal land, "That trust did not allow the chief to 
dispose of the land without the consent of the tribe."5 
Communal lands, land owned by private or family groups who 
had delegated authority from the chief, could not have been 
sold by the chief or entered into any signed agreements 
without contravening traditional laws and customs regarding 
such lands. American interest in colonization and slave 
ideology and philanthropic organizations (such as the 
American colonization society founded in 1816), helped in 
increasing the size and number of freed black migrants to 
Liberia. 
In order to understand Liberian history, we must take 
into consideration the norms, mores and folkways of a 
settler culture as a colonizer of the indigenous population. 
The new culture had to assimilate itself as equal into the 
existing population, or it had to gain supremacy over the 
indigenous culture by subjugating it under the control of 
the settler community, the Americo-Liberian class. In the 
Liberian case, though met with great hostility with the 
native Africans, the latter was chosen. There are ongoing 
class distinctions and certain feelings of arrogance 
emanating from an assumed feeling of superiority by the 
Americo-Liberian class over the indigenous Liberian 
population. Several clashes and disputes arising out of 
this had been resolved by the intervention of some tribal 
5Holloway, 46. 
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chiefs and the intervention of the Americans by the 
construction of forts for future protection. 
The first intra-Liberian intervention took place in the 
early 1800s when King Boatswain threatened to take the head 
from the shoulders of any chief who disturbed the colonists. 
The first American intervention in a Liberian conflict was 
recorded in 1823 when Captain Spense of the U.S.S. Cayne 
arrived in Liberia to respond to attacks against the 
settlers and to assist them in the construction of forts for 
future protection. 
Upon the establishment of a central government or the 
Commonwealth of Liberia in 1839, the Americo-Liberian 
population continued to be isolated from the indigenous 
population by establishing a separate society from that 
which already existed in Liberia. At one point, the 
indigenous Liberians were required by law to carry 
flashlights at night to warn the Americo-Liberians of their 
approach. 
As the repatriated freed slaves increased in strength 
and size, they began to establish laws forbidding not only 
marriage among the various groups, but also sexual 
intercourse. Robert Jackson stressed that: 
The Americo-Liberians were in effect instituting 
a slave-master situation in Liberia. With time, 
the skin color became less important, class 
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differences were exaggerated, thereby keeping the 
Americo-Liberians apart from local Africans.6 
The same culture that existed in the American South was 
transferred by the freed black slaves into Liberia. Their 
attitudes, feeling of superiority, contemptuous treatment of 
Africans, and even those who had converted to Christianity, 
continued to pose the greatest obstacle to integration. 
Liberia's last white governor (Governor Thomas Buchanan) 
died in 1841, and was succeeded by Joseph Jenkins Roberts. 
The Liberian Republic, 1848-1980 
On July 20, 1847, the Americo-Liberian settlers held a 
convention and drew up a constitution. This constitution 
was in all respects similar to the United States 
Constitution. Liberia, adopting the motto "the love of 
liberty brought us here,"7 proceeded to declare herself a 
constitutional Republic. Britain and other western powers 
recognized Liberia as an independent nation, but the United 
States, due to serious opposition from the South, did not 
recognize Liberia until 1862. Shortly after Liberia 
declared her independence in 1847, the American Colonization 
Society withdrew from Liberia, thereby leaving the country 
to assume her responsibilities as a sovereign state. The 
6Robert H. Jackson, Social Structure and Political 
Change in Ethiopia and Liberia: Comparative Political 
Studies 3 (April 1970): 47-61. 
?Abagoni Cassell, History of the First African Republic 
(New York: Fountained Publishers, 1970), 140. 
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epoch of white governors from the United States ended, as 
did the United States' responsibility for Liberia as 
established in the Act of 1819. 
In January 1848, Joseph Jenkins Roberts took the oath 
of office as the first President of the infant republic-- 
Liberia. The dominance of light-skinned blacks or 
"octoroons" in Liberian politics commenced in 1847 with the 
formation of the True Liberation Party which was later the 
Republican Party. In 1869, Edward Roye became the first 
Liberian of entirely black ancestry to be nominated by the 
True Whig Party as its presidential candidate. His victory 
ended the Republican Party political domination. 
Although Arthor Barclay, the fifteenth president of 
Liberia, finally recognized the native Liberians as legal 
citizens, many of these citizens were unable to take 
advantage of the democratic process to redress their 
problems. The indigenous Liberians lived far away from 
Monrovia and could not utilize the law to their advantage, 
and hence, had to express their frustration and anger 
through violence. 
With Liberian independence, heavy demands were placed 
on the government, as well as on the political system as a 
whole, by the newly enfranchised electorate under the new 
independence constitution. Liberian politicians (mainly 
Americo-Liberians), recently installed in office, scarcely 
had time to formulate effective economic policies, let alone 
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think of inculcating the indigenous Liberians into the day 
to day administration of the country. Often these 
politicians could not fulfill their electoral promises and 
several of them found convenient scapegoats in the general 
population, alleging that a vast majority of the governed 
are illiterate, uncivilized and unpoliticized. 
The strategy of separation, preferential treatment and 
maladministration, was effectively used by the Americo- 
Liberians in administrating the affairs of state. This was 
a new administrative strategy which did not function 
primarily in accordance with a rationale-legal code. On the 
contrary, administrative action was determined in large 
measure by personal ties and obligations, and was 
characterized by the preferential treatment of friends and 
relatives. 
The economic cancer that permeated Liberia for over 110 
years and culminated in a military takeover in 1980 cannot 
be ignored. During this period, Americo-Liberians intended 
to sustain and maintain its growth level by maintaining 
Americo-Liberian standards. These objectives were achieved 
by preventing a huge indigenous Liberian growth rate in 
education, employment, social, etc. Liberia was not only 
affected by internal economic woes, but also by global 
problems far beyond any one country's capacity to control. 
Such problems involved worldwide inflation, trade recession, 
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the international monetary crises and other economic 
problems. 
Liberia's economic boom of the 1950s saw an economic 
growth rate second only to Japan. Liberia had the largest 
fleet in the world, hosted the largest rubber plantation in 
the world, and was also ranked high as Africa's iron 
exporter. Despite these examples, Liberia's open door 
policy and economic reform did not benefit all Liberians. 
The flow of capital was only out of the country, and the 
Americo-Liberians elites were more interested in their own 
gain while integration, unification and genuine concern for 
jobs and wages of the people from the hinterland had little 
or no consideration. Instead, people from the hinterland 
were subjected to near slavery by being exported to the 
island of Fernando Po and others to serve as forced labor in 
Liberia's Firestone Rubber Plantation. 
For example, available economic data indicates that 
during the 1965-69 period, iron ore export contributed 
upward of 70% of Liberia's export value. During this 
period, rubber declined from 21% to 15% of the total export 
value. In each of these years, iron ore, rubber and 
diamonds combined, contributed at least 90% of the value of 
sales of Liberian export commodities. Rubber prices climbed 
to an export value of $30.7 million in 1969. These economic 
benefits in Liberia were never extended to benefit the 
people in the hinterland. 
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In 1959, soon after President Truman's fourth Inaugural 
address, the Liberian American-Swedish Mineral Company 
(LAMCO) started full operation in Liberia. Banks, hotels, 
restaurants, palm oil production, road construction and 
sawmills operations began to take shape in Liberia either as 
a solely-owned Liberian project or as a joint venture with 
foreign firms from Italy, Germany, Sweden, Lebanon, Israel 
or Great Britain. 
During the 1950s up to the mid-1960s, Liberia relied 
mostly on foreign aid to develop and maintain its projects. 
The United States, Germany, Sweden, China, Israel, United 
Kingdom and the International Monetary Fund either gave or 
promised financial aid to Liberia. Some of this aid came 
with political ties. Such aid from the USA and the IMF 
required Liberia to institute reform in the areas of 
government, business and education. 
In the early 1970s, the national economy showed some 
strength, fueled by the growth in iron ore and rubber 
output. In 1970-74, the overall monetary economy expanded 
by 4 percent annually. This meant about $2,400 for the 
Liberian economy and $900.00 for the national monetary 
economy. However, the majority of Liberians were engaged in 
agriculture; and consequently, the industrial sector of the 
economy was not adequately developed. As of 1980, only 1 
percent of the population was employed in manufacturing, 
contributing only 5 percent to the Gross Domestic Product 
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(GDP) . Since 1980, Gross National Product (GNP) per head 
had decreased in real terms by 5.2 percent per annum while 
the GDP had fallen by 1.3 percent per annum during the 
period of 1980-86. 
The poor nature of the national economy is exemplified 
by the structure of imports and exports (in percentages) in 
Tables 3 and 4. The table also shows that towards the late 
1980s, Liberia relied more on imported goods and at the same 
time exported very little products. There was no doubt that 
Tubman's open-door policy did not commit foreign investors 
to reinvest a portion of their profits in Liberia. 
TABLE 3 
STRUCTURE OF IMPORTS AND EXPORTS 
19G5 1985 1988 
IMPORTS : 
Food 17 24 20 
Fuels 8 20 22 
Other Primary Commodities 3 3 2 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 33 27 28 
Other Manufactures 39 27 28 
1965 1985 1988 
EXPORTS : 
Fuels, Minerals and Metals 72 65 54 
Other Primary Commodities 25 34 44 
Textiles and Clothing 0 0 n/a 
Machinery and Transport Equipment 1 0 0 
Other Manufactures* 3 1 1 
* Other manufactured exports including textiles and clothing. 
Source: Africa Today, Second Edition (London: Africa 
Books Ltd., 1991), 1144. 
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TABLE 4 
MAJOR IMPORT PARTNERS (US dollars irai) 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1981 1982 
Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % Value % 
Total imports 320.4 100 554.4 100 3542.4 100 6776.4 100 8381.7 100 7175.5 100 
Italy 81.3 24.5 119.6 21.6 918.4 25.9 2001.7 29.5 2534.5 30.2 1822.2 25 
Germany 32.8 10.3 50.3 9.1 429.9 12.1 902.5 13.3 881.7 10.5 1035.4 14 
Japan 12.0 3.8 31.1 5.6 293.3 8.3 511.2 7.5 640.5 7.6 363.4 5 
United Kingdom 47.5 14.8 52.0 9.4 194.7 5.5 471.8 7.0 582.1 6.9 572.1 8 
France 16.8 5.2 35.1 6.3 313.1 8.8 458.1 6.8 526.4 6.3 409.0 c 
USA 54.7 17.1 76.5 13.8 141.5 4.0 426.2 6.3 524.3 6.3 301.0 4 
Spain 1.7 0.5 4.4 0.8 88.5 2.5 298.4 4.4 248.5 3.0 230.0 3 
Rates of Growth 1965-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1982 
Total 16.1 37.9 8.4 1.9 
Italy 14.4 41.8 8.8 -3.1 
Germany 12.8 44.5 12.1 4.7 
Japan 22.3 44.1 10.1 -10.8 
United Kingdom 11.9 21.4 13.4 6.6 
France 15.0 52.2 6.9 -3.7 
USA 18.3 7.0 14.9 -10.9 
Spain 14.6 77.9 1C.9 -8.3 
Source: International Trade Statistics Year Books, 1984. 
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The Tubman Era 
William Tubman was 49 years old when he became 
president of Liberia in 1944. His reign lasted until 1971 
when he died in a London hospital after a brief illness. 
Although not always peaceful, his tenure as president, 
1944-71, ushered in a period of increased domestic security 
in Liberia. Tubman's objectives were: 
(1) develop Liberia economically and socially into a 
modern nation, 
(2) assert an open-door policy designed to attract 
extensive foreign investment to Liberia, and 
(3) move towards greater national unification by 
drawing the indigenous Liberians towards social and 
political integration into what was essentially a 
settler-created society. 
Over the years, he built an impressive patronage 
network that included relatives, in-laws and wards. In 
order to cope with the various tasks of modernization, 
Tubman relied extensively on foreign advisers and 
technicians who were not influenced by party intrigues. 
He was a strong proponent for the establishment of a 
community of African states in which each member will 
maintain its national identity and constitutional structure. 
From the moderate camp of the so-called "Monrovia Group," 
Tubman helped initiate the formation of the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU). 
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The Tolbert Years 
After 20 years as Vice President, Mr. William Tolbert 
quietly became the President of Liberia in 1971 following 
Tubman's death. President Tolbert was met with great 
opposition in his attempt to sustain elements of Tubman's 
policies while initiating his own agenda. The economic 
mismanagement of the past signaled serious decay and an 
eventual opposition and collapse during the Tolbert 
administration. Indicators of economic crises, gross 
national product, per capita income, the buying power of 
wages, the volume of trade, revealed a profound structural 
deterioration of all formal economic activity in Liberia. 
These activities are subject to recording and 
accountability. From the Tubman era through the Tolbert 
period, foreign firms not only repatriated the major portion 
of their earnings to their various countries, they also 
disinvested by failing to renew equipments, etc. 
The exercise of absolute power continued during the 
Tolbert administration. The redistribution of money and 
functions through traditional clientelism, kinship, 
solidarity, bred corruption. This tribute was often the 
strategy that the government used in exerting control over 
all citizens. 
Tolbert's political system, based on corruption and 
handouts, was able to function with impunity since the 
founding of the nation. Liberia's political and economic 
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system survived for over 30 years because it was based on 
constraint from the Liberian military, and from the 
administrative machinery. The near-single political party 
(system) and the consent of those who fear a dominance and 
leadership by the indigenous Liberians helped maintain the 
corrupt system. This system also survived due to complicity 
of all those who held a portion of power or some monopoly, 
and finally on the hopes of all those for whom the 
administration or big brother inspired dreams for a better 
future. The progressive degradation and disappearance of 
formal economic activities in Liberia long before and during 
the Tolbert era created conditions for civil disobedience, 
economic stagnation and general popular discontent. 
Tolbert's domestic policies were almost identical to that of 
his predecessor, the late Mr. Tubman, with very few 
variations. Setting the tone for his domestic development 
of Liberia, President Tolbert vowed to: 
(1) Restructure and diversify the national economy 
(This in essence means a continuation of the 
economic diversification program of President 
Tubman). 
(2) Attract foreign capital investment by realistically 
and vigorously pursuing the open door policy. (To 
a large extent, this is a continuation of Tubman's 
open door policy.) 
70 
(3) Pursue a more technological, vocational and 
scientific educational training. 
(4) Institute a more viable revenue collection system 
while at the same time injecting self discipline, 
less government spending and total resource 
management ethics in the Liberian system. 
(5) Make agriculture technologically modern. 
Liberian historians agree that President Tolbert's high 
point was his war on corruption and his effort to reorganize 
the civil service. His National Fund Raising Rally, "Rally 
Time," was designed to involve all Liberians in the 
financing and development of their own projects. These 
projects were in the areas of agriculture, health, 
education, accommodation and transportation. 
In order to make his "Rally Time" project a success, 
Tolbert involved the Liberian youth, whom he constantly 
referred to as his "precious jewels," in its operation. 
Some of these initiatives and programs did not go 
unchallenged. The most vehement opposition reared its ugly 
head in 1979 during an attempt to raise the price of rice, 
which was Liberia's staple food. This bloody rice riot of 
April 14, 1979 led President Tolbert to declare a state of 
emergency and postpone a forthcoming mayoral election. 
Tolbert was captured and killed during the military coup of 
1980. He was also the current chairman of the Organization 
of African Unity at the time of his death. 
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In summary, the Liberian economy had always been 
intertwined with those of its powerful overseas neighbors, 
both in Europe and especially America (see Table 4), and not 
always to Liberia's advantage. It is evident that the 
Liberian economy was largely dominated by expatriates and 
dependent on foreign aid. Amidst the contradiction and 
crises of a dependent political economy characterized by 
fragile state power, external manipulation, weak 
constitutional framework for conflict management, Sergeant 
Samuel Doe assumed power after a military coup in April 
1980. By 1980, Liberia was already at the brink of 
bankruptcy with only $5 million cash. Liberia had also 
overspent $50 million, owing foreign governments and 
businesses nearly $700 million. 
Thus, Liberian problems were both economic and 
ideological, each pulling the country in different 
directions. While the ideology apparently remained much as 
before, economic rationality suggested an increasingly 
strong case for basic change. 
The Military Rule, 1980-1990 
The Samuel Doe Era 
On April 12, 1980, Liberian troops led by some 
noncommissioned officers (NCOs) of the Armed Forces of 
Liberia (AFL) seized power by force in Monrovia, the capital 
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of Liberia. President William Tolbert, who was also the 
current chairman of the Organization of African Unity (OAU) 
was killed by the belligerent coup planners. The surprised 
Liberian citizens, police and the president offered little 
or no resistance, thereby making it easy for a takeover of 
Monrovia and then the whole of Liberia. Master Sergeant 
Samuel K. Doe, a 28-year-old NCO of the Wee (Kran) ethnic 
group, took over the realm of government as head of the 
People's Redemption Council (PRC). Doe became the 21st 
president of Liberia. He was also the first president of 
indigenous origin of Liberia. His first presidential action 
on assuming power was to suspend the constitution, dissolve 
the civilian government, disband the existing political 
parties and detain leaders of the former regime. Doe's 
administration also established a new structure of control, 
topped by a military council and rule by decree. 
In a radio broadcast, President Doe argued that 
incomparable corruption and violation of human rights, 
including illegal detentions and punishments, were the 
reasons for the overthrow of the Tolbert administration. 
He also said that the civilian government had failed to 
handle effectively the affairs of the Liberian people, 
causing unemployment, excessive cost of food, impossible 
high rents and poor health services. He declared himself to 
be "committed to the establishment of equal opportunities 
73 
for all without discrimination, wherein the resources of the 
country are used for the benefit of the people."8 
On the formation of his cabinet, President Doe relied 
heavily on the former bureaucrats (especially on economic 
matters), some of whom had just been recently released from 
jail. Baccus Matthews was appointed Foreign Minister. 
Others, including Major Joseph N. Douglas and Lt. Alfred 
Suah, held the important ministries of commerce and 
agriculture respectively. Some Liberians believed that the 
coup was generally against the True Whig Party's (TWP) 
administration, and particularly against the Americo- 
Liberian hegemony. 
President Doe spoke of creating a Liberian society of 
justice and human dignity, transforming the structure of 
society and ending the prevailing elite rule. He declared 
April 12 as the new national day, instead of July 26. Like 
many military dictators all over the world, a consistent 
program for ending this Liberian military rule was not 
clearly stated. 
Prominent members of the True Whig Party (TWP) and the 
former government were arrested, tried and killed. The 
former president and 27 others were assassinated. 
Indiscriminate violence and looting that were common 
characteristics of the day were minimized as Doe warned 
8D. Elwood Dunn and Svend E. Holse, Historical 
Dictionary of Liberia, African Historical Dictionaries, no. 
38 (Metuchen, N.J. and London: The Scarecrow Press), 61. 
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against undisciplined behavior. Though gradual return to 
normal work everywhere encouraged hopes that the violence 
unleashed in the wake of the coup would be minimized, Doe's 
military administration still lacked an organized popular 
base and an easy means of communicating with the people. 
Brigadier General Frank Senkepeni was appointed head of 
a military tribunal to begin trying many of the members of 
former civilian administration and members of the TWP on 
charges of corruption, human rights violation, misuse of 
funds and "treason." The Doe administration argued that 
though some former government officials might have been 
innocent individually, but because they were part of an evil 
empire, they were guilty by association and had to die. 
The executions of these former government officials 
received worldwide condemnation and was criticized by the 
United States of America, the International Commission of 
Jurists, and many African governments. The Liberian 
newspapers, in a bold demonstration of new found freedom, 
called for an end to further executions. During the 
national week of prayer called by Doe, the preacher, 
military chaplain General Lt. Col. Edwin Lloyd, called for 
an end to bloodshed. Doe promised on April 29 that there 
would be no more shedding of blood. 
However, on May 14 eight officers were arrested for 
plotting against the government. Among them were General 
Rudolf Kilako, four colonels, two majors and Lt. Col. Edwin 
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Lloyd (who had earlier in his sermon called for an end to 
executions). All senior officers had been in effect 
displaced, to some extent, by the non-commissioned officers 
(NCO) coup and the subsequent promotion of some NCOs to high 
officer rank. Staff Sergeant Thomas Quiwonkpa was promoted 
to Brigadier General and appointed Commander of the Army, 
and Col. Podier, Speaker of the People Redemption Council 
(PRC), to Brigadier General. But Doe did not promote 
himself immediately: that came later. Doe claimed that the 
assassination of President Tolbert was not planned, but was 
accidental when he resisted arrest. As the incumbent 
Chairman of the OAU, Tolbert had a high reputation in 
Africa. The shooting of Cecil Dennis, then the Foreign 
minister, had a negative impact on the Doe administration. 
Though there was considerable initial aversion to the new 
regime, the normal acceptance of all new regimes and all 
their internal acts would be applied to Liberia as its 
international standing was gradually restored. Doe was not 
allowed to succeed President Tolbert as OAU chairman, nor 
was he given admission on May 28 to an ECOWAS summit in Lome 
where he had gone uninvited. 
During the Reagan presidency, Samuel Doe sought and was 
able to restore relations with the USA. This opened the way 
for aid and technology to flow into Liberia. The Liberian 
aid package created in 1980 by the USA included army 
engineering battalion, a $7 million budget supplement and 
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military lorries worth $1 million. The United States would 
also continue rice supplies. America hastened this economic 
aid because it wanted Liberia to continue maintaining its 
traditional close link with the west. In December 1980, a 
new commission to draft the constitution was announced. 
1981-82 was a period marked by frequent dismissals, 
resignations from the council of ministers and the PRC. 
This was as a result of Doe's attempt to rid his 
administration of corrupt and suspicious elements. The new 
draft constitution stipulated that a presidential candidate 
should be an individual who has resided in Liberia for 10 
years. The clause automatically locked out an elite group 
from contesting the presidential election. 
Doe continued ruling by intimidation, repression and 
fear, eliminating all opponents both civilian and military. 
For example, Quiwonkpa refused to accept a demotion, but 
rather went into exile. He later led an abortive coup to 
unseat President Doe. With major crises and powerful toxins 
poisoning the nation's political discourse, Samuel Doe 
thought that he could keep Liberians happy with a 
pointillistic civilian democratic presidency. Doe believed 
solely in himself, in taking a leap of faith and the road 
less traveled by others. He called for a presidential 
election and declared himself the presidential candidate 
under the political party of National Democratic Party of 
Liberia (NDPL). Samuel Doe wanted to win the presidential 
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election at any cost. At the critical hours before the 
election, never did Doe wander without a plan, furiously 
switching strategies, changing tactics, and desperately 
seeking unwinable votes. In October 1985, election was held 
and amidst much controversy, Samuel Doe emerged as the 
winner and the civilian president of Liberia. 
Doe's first task as President of Liberia was to rid the 
country of all corrupt politicians, inject a sense of 
national pride into the citizens while at the same time 
improving the national economy for the benefit of all 
Liberians. The modernization approach for the development 
of Liberia under the Doe administration was mainly focused 
on implementing a public sector salary reduction program. 
He further embarked on improving the tax administration, 
strengthening of development administration and enforcing 
concession agreements. Expansion also increased in such 
areas as forestry, rubber and upland rice production. 
Indeed, under the Liberian civilian administration, the 
ruling elite contended that only their welfare should count. 
They also encouraged the preservation of the status quo with 
regards to socioeconomic affairs, and political 
administration. Due to this domination and monopolistic 
style policies of the Liberian elites, the development and 
modernization of the Liberian national economy and 
ultimately that of the ordinary people became near 
impossible and unpraticable. It was the policies of the 
willing Liberian administration that once again brought 
development and modernization to Liberia (up until the 
outbreak of the civil war) . 
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Liberia in the 1990s 
One of the most evolving developments in the post-cold 
war international systems is the inculcation of 
ethnopolitics into the new wave of conflicts, conflict 
resolution and democratization efforts in many third world 
countries. This is not a new phenomenon, but the scope is 
widening with increased intensity in such areas as 
ethnopolitical competition, revenue, security, and economic 
development. 
The human carnage and wanton destruction of lives and 
properties, the human rights abuse and the internalization 
of the Liberian woes in the 1990s was initiated in the late 
1980s when : 
Taylor invaded Liberia from neighboring Coté 
d’Ivoire in December 1989.... He never crusaded to 
make Liberia a better managed, more secure, and 
more socially just and equitable nation-state. On 
the contrary, he was merely aspired to avenge a 
personal vendetta.9 
There were three main factions in the Liberian 
conflict--the Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL), the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) and the Independent 
9Vivan Lowery Derryck, President of the African- 
American Institute, Africa Report (January-February 1993), 
71. Taylor himself confirmed this in an interview with 
Baffour Ankomah, "With Taylor Inside Liberia," New Africa 
(October 1992): 11-13. 
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National Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL). During the war 
that engulfed Liberia in the 1990s, each warring faction 
fought in a ruthless fashion, turning its guns against the 
other ethnic groups. Each group was poised to conquer or 
annihilate the other. More than half of the entire Liberian 
population has been displaced with tens of thousands of 
civilian casualties. It is evident in the U.S. Department 
of State Country Reports in Human Rights Practices in 
Liberia for 1990 that: 
All combatants routinely engaged in indiscriminate 
killing and abuse of civilians, looting and 
ethnically based executions, with one of the worst 
single episodes occurring in July when the AFL 
soldiers killed approximately 600 persons taking 
refuge in the courtyard of St. Peter's church.10 
In a complex situation of personality mixture, 
ethnicity and gross inequities in the distribution of 
available socio-economic and political resources, the 
Liberian crisis is atypical of African conflicts. 
Constrained by its modus-operandi and politics, the U.N. was 
not willing to intervene in Liberia unless Ethiopia and 
Zaire were willing to take the lead. The OAU did not press 
the issue or take independent initiative to intervene, but 
the Liberian crisis was, as Benjamin Rivlin forcefully puts 
it, a "situation which cried out for someone to come in and 
stop the carnage."11 
10U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human 
Rights Practices: 1990 (Washington, D.C.: Government 
Printing Office, February 1991), 192. 
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With such an attitude taken by the U.N. and the OAU's 
lack of initiative, ECOWAS was left with no choice but to 
step in and invoke Article 52(2) of its charter. This 
charter empowers regional organizations to be the first 
actors in conflict situations within their member states. 
ECOWAS peace initiative later received endorsements from the 
OAU, UN and the USA (see Appendix I for details). Today 
Liberia is on the verge of conducting an election and should 
be ready to implement the formation of an elected government 
in June 1997. 
Conclusion 
This chapter concludes with grave concern that various 
actors, (ethnic and other) groups, institutions, and factors 
contributed to the entrenchment of maladministration in post 
independent Liberia. These roles were either indirect, 
benign, inadvertent, or in some cases blatant and active. 
Soon, Liberia became a theater of blunders and 
miscalculations in almost everything. War became inevitable 
with faction fighting against faction and ethnic group 
fighting one another. This created the worst war scenario 
in modern time. ECOMOG's intervention in the civil war 
brought order and direction into the Liberian society. A 
successful Liberian resolution, combined with other 
1:LRivlin, "Regional Arrangements and the U.N. System, " 
8. See also Weiss and Campbell, "Military Humanitarianism," 
451-465. 
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favorable developments in the region, could bring about an 
era of regional political stability, and economic growth 
that will make future war less likely. 
CHAPTER III 
THE OAU AND THE ECOWAS ATTITUDE TOWARDS INTERVENTION, 
CONFLICT AND CONFLICT RESOLUTION 
Overview 
The OAU was founded to harmonize relations between the 
newly emerging African States, from their colonial 
experience, to defend their newly-won sovereignty, and to 
expand the liberation movement into the still "unliberated" 
states of the continent. The OAU has existed with a mixed 
record of successes and failures since its inception. 
Before ECOMOG came into being, the OAU's failure in Chad in 
1982 was the closest the (OAU) had come to putting together 
a regional peacekeeping force as a method of conflict 
management on the continent of Africa.1 
West African leaders presumably initiated ECOMOG based 
on their Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
treaty obligations. These obligations find force in two 
documents: the Non-Aggression Pact signed in April 1978 and 
1See among others, Amadu Sesay, "The Limits of Peace- 
Keeping by a Regional Organization: The OAU Peace-Keeping 
Force in Chad," Conflict Quarterly 11, no. 1 (Winter 1991): 
7-26; Guy Martin, "Security and Conflict Management in 
Chad," Bulletin of Peace Proposal 21, no. 1 (March 1990): 
37-47; and Bukar Bukarambe, "The Role and Impact of the OAU 
in the Management of African Conflicts," Survival 25, no. 2 
(March/April 1983): 50-58. 
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the Defense Protocol adopted in May 1981. The latter 
entered into force on 30 September 1986 as stipulated in its 
Article 24(1) .2 
The more pertinent sections of the Protocol include 
Article 5 which charges three organs - the Authority (Heads 
of State and Government), the Defense Council, and the 
Defense Commission with the powers to initiate and oversee 
ECOWAS policy on matters of defense, peace and security in 
the sub-region. 
Background 
The annual celebration of the OAU has always been an 
occasion of reflection and rededication to the cause of the 
unity on the continent. During the last 30 years of its 
existence, the OAU has survived many trials and afflictions, 
but seems to be here to stay. It is significant therefore 
to study its activities during these years of existence. 
Amare Tekle notes that the OAU has on many occasions 
been designated as an expensive white elephant, as Africa's 
burden and as a continental embarrassment. It has been 
criticized for real as well as imagined failures, mistakes 
and weaknesses. Today it suffers from an overwhelming 
2The full text of the ECOWAS "Protocol Relating to 
Mutual Assistance on Defence" is published in the Official 
Journal of the ECOWAS, no. 3 (June 1981): 9-13. 
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crisis of confidence, credibility and relevance.3 Among the 
critics are well-meaning and concerned Africans. However, 
such criticisms fail to realize the tight constraints under 
which the OAU has had to function. 
One must admit that the OAU has made several mistakes 
and has been saddled with many failures, but the aggregate 
of these failures does not nullify the unheralded 
achievements. It is difficult to imagine what might have 
been the fate of Africa if at the point of decolonization in 
the early 1960s, its leaders had failed to provide the 
deeply balkanized and politically divided continent with a 
political center. 
OAU's Role in International Conflict and Conflict Resolution 
The OAU has played the roles of mediator, conciliator 
and arbitrator, all of which were institutionalized in the 
OAU convention. Even though the OAU1s power to act 
decisively in settling disputes is extremely limited, it has 
nevertheless played an important role in stopping military 
conflict between Algeria and Morocco in 1963 when the two 
countries were involved in a border dispute, between 
Tanzania and Uganda in 1972, and between Ethiopia and 
Somalia on many occasions, to mention but a few examples.4 
3Amare Tekle, "The Organization of African Unity at 
Twenty-Five Years: Retrospect," Africa Today 3rd/4th 
Quarters (1988): 7. 
4Colin Legum, "The Organization of African Unity-- 
Success or Failures?" International Affairs 60 (1982): 210. 
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Its offices have been used on a number of occasions to 
either reduce tensions or promote settlements in the 
periodic disputes between Guinea, on the one hand, and Côte 
d'Ivoire and Senegal on the other, and between Mali and 
Burkina Faso.5 
However, despite ten years of trying to end the 
potentially dangerous conflict between Ethiopia and Somalia 
over the Ogaden, this problem remains as far from being 
settled as ever. Neither has the OAU succeeded in stopping 
a member-state like Libya from playing an actively 
subversive role in Chad or Morocco. The OAU has not even 
tried to stop Somalia and Libya from supporting the Eritrean 
Liberation Front in Ethiopia.6 
The OAU is weakest and most disappointing in trying to 
deal with serious internal problems of its member states. 
There has never been any question of the OAU expressing even 
mild criticism of the "double genocide" that has scarred the 
life of Burundi, or of seeking to ameliorate the conditions 
in the Sudan caused by the long rebellion of the Southern 
Sudanese, before they were able to find an amicable 
settlement of their differences. The OAU's greatest 




contribution during years of the civil war in Liberia and 
Nigeria.7 
These failures are undoubtedly serious, but the reality 
is that no organization like the OAU can hope to survive 
once it attempts to intervene in the continental conflict, 
however good the intentions of the organization are. This 
essential limitation is inherent in any international 
organization. An organization like this should not be 
condemned for failing in an area which it cannot, 
realistically, touch. 
In addition, the peacekeeping role is crippled by the 
lack of pan-African force. Ghana's Defense Minister, in his 
capacity as the outgoing chairman of the OAU Defense 
Committee, pointed out that: 
After twenty-three years of its establishment, the 
Committee had failed to set up a viable system for 
collective security in the event of external 
aggression and of mounting peacekeeping operations 
in intra-African conflicts.8 
One of the most important problems facing African 
states is the creation of nation-states. Most African 
countries retained the frontiers arbitrarily drawn by late 
19th-century European diplomats and administrators. Ethnic 
boundaries are divided by national boundaries, but loyalties 
to such groups were often stronger than those to the states. 
When the African States attained independence, however, the 
7Ibid., 213. 
8Amadu Sesay, The OAU After Twenty Years, 64. 
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dominant nationalist movements and their leaders installed 
themselves in virtually permanent power. They called for 
national unity and urged that multiparty parliamentary 
systems be discarded in favor of the single-party states. 
When these governments proved unable or unwilling to fulfill 
popular expectations, the result was often military 
intervention. Posing as efficient and honest public 
guardians, military governments emerged as major African 
political forces. Under such a system, day to day 
administration is left to the permanent civil service. By 
the 1980s, however, many military governments had developed 
the same interest in power that had characterized their 
civilian predecessors. Many African states have thus been 
ruled by military dictatorship since 1960 (see Map 4). 
Economic development was another major problem. 
Although a number of African states have considerable 
natural resources, few have the adequate financial 
capabilities to develop their economies. Foreign private 
enterprise have often regarded investment in such 
underdeveloped areas as too risky, and this view has been 
justified in many instances. The major alternative source 
of financing is the national or multinational source. 
Expectations in African nations for a better living 
standard have increased, and the price of consumer and other 
manufactured goods has kept pace, but the price of most 
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Have had at least one military 
coup since independence 
Map 4. Independent African States 
Source: Robert W. Strayer, The Making of the Western 
World (St. Martin's Press, 1995), 471. 
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African primary products has lagged behind. A worldwide 
recession in the early 1980's multiplied difficulties that 
were initiated by the oil-price increase of the 1970's. 
Serious foreign-exchange problems, national debt, and public 
discontentment were particularly burdensome. Famines and 
drought plagued the northern and central regions of the 
continent in the early 1980's, and millions of refugees left 
their homes in search of food, increasing the problems of 
the countries to which they fled. Lack of transport and the 
disruption of international cooperation by local fighting in 
Ethiopia, Chad, Liberia and the Sahara area further 
exacerbated the situation. 
Another major problem has been the inability to project 
a voice in international affairs. Most African states 
regard themselves as part of the Third World and the 
nonaligned nations, which they see as forces for moral 
leadership. Because of their lack of military or financial 
power, however, the views of African nations are not 
generally taken into account. 
Most of the African nations have language problems. 
Their former colonial boundaries were drawn up without 
regard for traditional tribal and cultural divisions. Many 
African leaders condemned the colonial powers for creating 
these very "artificial" colonies. Once independence was 
achieved, however, these same leaders regarded existing 
boundaries as "settled" because they realized the wide 
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repercussions that would result from even considering a 
limited redrawing of the map. In any case, there are great 
differences in language, ways of life, and levels of 
economic development within the countries themselves. 
The internal difficulties of African states can be 
summed up in the term "problems of nation building." How is 
it possible to create a sense of loyalty to the new nation 
when one's loyalties have always been to one's village, 
district, or tribe? 
The appalling whirlwind of nation-building did not pass 
through sections of Africa unnoticed. Independent African 
countries consistently pursued policies of regional 
cooperation and integration as a means of promoting 
socioeconomic development and of reducing their dependence 
on the west. Many institutions for regional cooperation and 
integration were created after independence. 
Following Europe's initiative toward economic and 
political integration, a dozen or so regional economic 
schemes were created in various parts of the world notably 
among the so-called Third World nations. Most sought to 
stimulate regional economic growth. It is hazardous to 
generalize about organizations as widely divergent in 
membership and sometimes in purpose. 
Although the Organization of African Unity is 
exceedingly diverse, and the weight of the past and present 
problem hangs heavily over the organization, it has always 
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tried to evaluate its work to the best of its ability. Such 
problems as economic dependence, language barrier, political 
ties and lack of payment of dues by member states hindered 
the OAU's progress. The OAU has a bright future. It will 
have to take measures to dispense fear of domination by 
member states, size, language, extreme nationalism and 
impatience of delegates and states for it to move forward 
with problem-solving in the 21st century. 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) 
The Treaty of Lagos, establishing ECOWAS, was signed in 
May 1975 by 15 states, with the object of promoting trade, 
cooperation and self reliance in West Africa. Outstanding 
protocols bringing certain key features of the Treaty into 
effect were ratified in November 1976. The organization now 
has sixteen members states, with Cape Verde joining in 1977. 
TABLE 5 
ECOWAS MEMBERS 
Benin, Guinea Niger, 
Burkina Faso, Guinea-Bissau, Nigeria, 
Cape Verde, Liberia, Senegal, 
Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Sierra Leone, 
The Gambia, Mauritania, Togo, 
Ghana 
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ECOWAS and Its Impact on the Member States 
ECOWAS aims to promote cooperation and development in 
economic, social and cultural activities, particularly in 
the fields for which specialized commissions are appointed, 
to raise the standard of living of the people of the member 
countries, increase and maintain economic stability, improve 
relations among member countries and contribute to the 
priority and development of Africa. 
The treaty provides compensation for states whose 
import duties are reduced through trade liberalization and 
contains a clause permitting safeguard measures in favor of 
any country affected by economic disturbances through the 
application of the treaty. 
The treaty contains a commitment to abolish all 
obstacles to the free movement of people, services and 
capital. It promotes: harmonization of agricultural 
policies; common projects in marketing, research in 
agriculturally based industries; joint development of 
economic and industrial policies and elimination of 
disparities in levels of development; and, common monetary 
policies. 
Lack of success in many of ECOWAS' aims has been 
attributed to the existence of numerous other inter¬ 
governmental organizations in the region (such as the 
Francophone CEAO and the Mano River Union), and to member 
governments' reluctance to implement policies at the 
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national level; failure to provide the agreed financial 
resources (except Nigeria, Togo and Côte d'Ivoire) amounting 
to a total of US $58m. at mid-1990's, and the absence of 
national links with the secretariat. 
In 1991 a special committee was established to review 
the ECOWAS treaty, with the aim of accelerating the 
enforcement of decisions. The ECOWAS Summit conference that 
was convened in July 1991 in Abuja, Nigeria, issued a 
declaration of political principles in which member states 
reaffirmed their commitment to refrain from aggression 
against one another. Member states also pledged to respect 
human rights and fundamental freedoms, and to promote 
political pluralism and democratic processes in their 
countries. 
Economic Development 
Pre-feasibility studies on the establishment of a 
private regional investment bank were undertaken by the 
ECOWAS Secretariat in 1984. The creation of the bank (known 
as Ecobank Transnational Inc., based in Lome, Togo) was 
approved by heads of state and government in November 1984. 
It opened in March 1988. ECOWAS has a 10 percent share in 
the bank. By mid-1990, Ecobank affiliates had been opened 
in Benin, Côte d'Ivoire, Ghana, Nigeria and Togo. 
The West African Industrial Forum, sponsored by ECOWAS, 
is held every two years to promote regional industrial 
investment. The ninth Forum was held in Dakar, Senegal, in 




At the third Conference of Heads of State and 
Government a protocol of non-aggression was signed. 
Thirteen member states signed a protocol on mutual defense 
assistance at the 1981 conference. A mutual defense force 
and defense council were planned. In 1990 a Standing 
Mediation Committee was formed to mediate in disputes 
between member states. In July, ECOWAS ministers attempted 
to mediate in civil conflict in Liberia. In August they 
sent an ECOWAS Monitoring Group (ECOMOG-initially comprised 
of about 4,000 troops from The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, 
Nigeria and Sierra Leone, later increased in number to 8,000 
and joined in 1991 by troops from Mali and Senegal) to 
Liberia, to try and bring about a cease-fire between the 
rival factions, to restore public order and to establish an 
interim government until elections could be held. In 
September 1990 ECOMOG failed to prevent the capture and 
killing of the Liberian President, Samuel Doe, by rebel 
forces, and fighting between rival groups continued. 
ECOWAS agreed to impose an arms and economic embargo on 
all parties in the conflict. The embargo was upheld by the 
security council of the UN in Resolution 88 of 1992. The 
economic and military sanctions came into effect in the war- 
torn country on November 5, following the failure of the 
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warring factions in the crisis to implement the terms of the 
Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 1991. The accord was designed to 
bring peace and lead to free and fair democratic elections 
in Liberia. According to the United Nations Charter, 
regional bodies such as ECOWAS have the responsibility of 
maintaining international peace and security in the respect 
of peace keeping. The Resolution 78 adopted by the Security 
Council placed "a general and complete embargo on all 
deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Liberia 
until the Security Council decides otherwise." The Security 
Council debate came in the wake of the first meeting of the 
Committee of Nine on Liberation Crisis which was held in 
Abuja. The meeting, which was attended by heads of state 
and governments of Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, 
Ghana, Guinea, Nigeria, Togo, and representatives of the 
Presidents of Senegal and Gambia, asked Boutros Ghali to 
appoint a special representative to "cooperate with ECOWAS 
in the implementation of ECOWAS plans." This made Charles 
Taylor, one of the major participants, do the unusual by 
declaring a cease-fire 12 hours ahead of the deadline by the 
ECOWAS. The Associated Press (AP), an American News Agency, 
stated that Libya had been supplying arms to the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberation. But Libya distanced itself 
from that accusation. In December 1987, an armed invasion 
launched along the common Liberia-Côte d'Ivoire border by 
Mr. Taylor degenerated into an ethnic and religious carnage 
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threatening to engulf the whole country. There were also 
indiscriminate killings of members of warring ethnic groups. 
The fighting and massacre of mostly defenseless civilians 
had moved closer to the capital. As Liberia sank into total 
anarchy and a colossal tragedy, the United States, which 
claims a special relationship with the country, stood by. 
Because America and the West largely turned their backs on 
events in Liberia, which they considered internal affairs, 
ECOWAS leaders meeting in Banjul in May 1992 appealed to all 
parties to initiate a cease fire, respect human life and 
avoid destruction of property, and to resolve their 
differences through peaceful dialogue. ECOWAS moved further 
through a formula submitted by President Babangida of 
Nigeria to establish a permanent mediation committee of 
ECOWAS leaders to deal with all conflicts within the region, 
starting with Liberia. All pleas for a peaceful end to the 
fighting went unheeded by Taylor's NPFL and attempts to 
evacuate ECOWAS citizens were blocked by the NPFL fighters. 
The ECOWAS Mediation Committee, made up of Nigeria, Ghana, 
The Gambia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, Mali and Togo, met in 
Banjul and established ECOMOG in early August 1990 to go 
into Liberia. First, these ECOMOG peacekeepers were to open 
up routes needed for food and medical supplies. Second, 
they were to establish a security zone around the capital to 
enable discussion of a cease fire to begin. Finally, they 
were to take over security duties while an interim 
97 
government is established to oversee a peaceful democratic 
return to normal life. 
After ECOMOG landed, it opened the floodgate for 
humanitarian help. Thousands of people streamed towards 
ECOMOG for food, shelter, and safety. Soon ECOMOG was 
overwhelmed by a population desperate for everything and 
running from terror. Because ECOMOG had secured the port 
area, relief food began to arrive, thousands were evacuated 
and the cease-fire between the two factions NPFL and AFL, 
the regular army was upheld. While this was going on, 
diplomatic efforts to get Charles Taylor to agree to 
cooperate with ECOMOG and get a cease-fire on all fronts 
were gong on. The unrepentant posture of rebel Charles 
Taylor had reinforced the need to transform ECOMOG from a 
peace-keeping force to a peace-enforcement army, a euphemism 
for a fighting force. 
In November 1990, a temporary cease-fire was agreed to 
by the protagonists in Liberia, and an interim president was 
installed by ECOMOG. Following the signature of a new 
cease-fire agreement in February 1991, a national 
conference, organized by ECOWAS in March, established a 
temporary government pending elections to be held in early 
1992. In July 1991, ECOWAS established an emergency fund 
for use by the Liberian interim elections committee and 
resolved to send an observer mission to monitor the 
elections. In September an ECOWAS meeting issued a 
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communiqué stating that rival factions in Liberia had agreed 
to encamp their troops in designated areas and to disarm 
under ECOMOG supervision. At a subsequent meeting held in 
late October, it was agreed that the disarmament process 
would be in effect for a 60-day period, to be followed by 
the repatriation and rehabilitation of Liberian refugees. 
During the period preceding the proposed elections (due to 
take place six months after the agreement comes into force), 
ECOMOG would occupy Liberian air and sea ports, and would 
create a "buffer zone" along the country's border with 
Sierra Leone. 
ECOWAS Role in Regional Crises 
Achievements- - Challenges 
The Economic Community of West African States has been 
able to create a sense of belonging within West Africa, and 
solidarity among the leaders of the sub-region by bringing 
government officials of member states together. It has also 
adopted a regional development policy, and common 
agricultural and industrial development policies, helped 
liberalize the movement of people within the sub-region, and 
abolished visa and right of residence requirements. Other 
improvements were: a modern sub-regional telecommunications 
network; the construction of inter-connecting roads or "land 
corridors," providing landlocked member states access to the 
sea; harmonization of road legislation, including the 
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adoption of a common road vehicle third party; liability 
insurance, the ECOWAS Brown Card Scheme, and a common 
guarantee scheme for road transit of goods; fostering closer 
cooperation among local airlines and the development of 
community centers for production of selected seeds and 
cattle breeding stock. 
ECOWAS has not achieved anything approaching the same 
level of economic integration and supranational institution 
building as accomplished in Western Europe. As other 
regional organizations share a common denominator; national 
political leaders are reluctant to make the kinds of choices 
that would undermine their governments' sovereignty. These 
attempts at regional cooperation demonstrate nations 1 
beliefs that they are unable to resolve individually the 
problems that confront them collectively. 
Problems 
In 1976, after the initial great leap forward in 
signing the 1975 treaty, it was not possible to hold a 
summit at all because of the political changes in Nigeria. 
Again in 1984, the planned summit in Conakry was aborted 
because of the death of Sekou Touré, and the summit (moved 
to Lomé) was not held until November. The original ECOWAS 
treaty certainly eschewed politics, even if fears of 
upheaval caused the introduction of both a non-aggression 
pact and a security protocol in the first few years. The 
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first major inter-state conflict between Mali and Burkina 
Faso in 1984-85 was settled outside the ECOWAS umbrella with 
President Houphouet-Boigny playing the "Francophone family" 
card. 
The resolution in Liberia in which by consensus, all 
agreed to give a month's ultimatum to Charles Taylor to 
comply with ECOWAS agreement on encampment and disarming 
(the latter being the crucial factor in the reunification of 
Liberia) under the pain of economic sanctions, which would 
include a blockade, is an illustration of an unusual growth 
in political will. It is perhaps born out of a sense of 
frustration, desperation, or fears raised during the Sierra 
Leone invasion that demonstrated exactly how the Charles 
Taylor phenomenon can be. Military leadership in Nigeria 
and Ghana pondered ways of resolving the Liberian problem 
before they handed it over to an inferior civilian 
administration at the beginning of 1993. The close inter¬ 
state diplomatic cooperation, which the Liberian crisis has 
necessitated, was part of the background to the planned 
treaty revision. This was designed to give ECOWAS more 
political orientation and peace keeper outlook in resolving 
the Liberian crises. The Gowon Committee of eminent persons 
has made some important proposals for institutional change, 
some are controversial, such as percent tax or third country 
imports privileges and immunities, the free movement of 
persons, and non-aggression and defense. ECOWAS rendered 
101 
unacceptable the uneven distribution of the benefits and 
costs of integration due to member states' size and 
capabilities. They demonstrate dissimilar abilities to take 
advantage of specialization, economies of scale, 
augmentation of factor input, and opportunities to improve 
market structures. Consequently, deliberate policies 
designed by hegemonies to distribute more evenly or 
acceptably whatever net benefits might accrue to the partner 
states must be devised. Typically, redistributive 
mechanisms take the form of financial or fiscal compensatory 
schemes. The functioning of the ECOWAS Fund, which started 
operating in 1980, has from the beginning, been plagued with 
financial difficulties and institutional malfunctions which 
have seriously affected its efficacy. Guy Martin states 
forcefully in his "Regional Cooperation and Integration" 
that "institutional proliferation is one of the African 
regional organization's major deficiencies."9 There are 
many regional cooperation and integration organizations in 
Africa. Also, there are many inter-governmental 
organizations in West Africa alone, more than 160 are inter¬ 
governmental and the rest non-governmental. Martin goes 
further to state "to a large extent the activities of these 
organizations overlap and are not coordinated, resulting in 
9Guy Martin, "Regional Integration in West Africa: The 
Role of ECOWAS," in Africa: Perspectives on Peace and 
Development, ed. Emmanuel Hansen (London & Tokyo: Zed Books, 
UNU, 1987), 171-182. 
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duplication of functions"10 multiple functions and multiple 
loyalties. Over-centralization and over-politicalization of 
these organizations' decision-making process constitute 
another major institutional problem of most African regional 
organizations. To the extent that this process requires 
agreement at the highest level (Heads of State and 
Government), it is bound to create difficulties because of 
overriding concern with the preservation of sovereignty and 
the defense of national interest to the detriment of Supra¬ 
national and community interests. The experience of 
European integration suggests that sustained political will 
is necessary for acceptance of the constraints on national 
sovereignty that are involved in the harmonization of 
economic policies and economic power and authority to supra¬ 
national institutions. 
In ECOWAS, political regimes have ranged from socialist 
(Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Benin, Burkina Faso) to capitalist 
(Cote d'Ivoire, Nigeria, Senegal)through Islamic Republic 
(Mauritania). Since 1989, out of sixteen ECOWAS member 
states, twelve are ruled by army officers, and only four by 
civilian leaders. The militarization of this region 
introduces additional instability in member states to the 
extent that military regimes are generally insecure because 
of the permanent threat of possible counter-coups, and 
create a potentially dangerous civilian-military cleavage 
10Ibid. 
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among the various states in the region. ECOWAS' role in the 
sub-region of West Africa, though it has been difficult, it 
has also ranged from economic, political and war to include 
all spheres of national and regional crises. 
Conclusion 
The controversy of ECOMOG's intervention in the 
Liberian civil war continues to rage. Some ask what made 
the Liberian crisis a subject of international public 
concern? And what made it possible for ECOWAS intervention 
and not the OAU or the UN? Still others want to know what 
can be learned from ECOMOG about regional conflict 
management and peacekeeping outside the UN auspices. 
Since its founding in 1963, the OAU has yet to 
demonstrate its ability to contribute effectively to the 
solution of Africa's wars. In fact, the wars in Chad and 
Western Sahara had effectively exposed the virtual impotence 
of the OAU. Due to its failures and bureaucratic wrangling, 
little or no action was expected from this organization in 
regards to the Liberian civil conflict. In the Liberian 
civil war, the OAU was only able to seek the endorsement of 
the UN and the US in using its conflict resolution structure 
as a means of conflict management. The OAU cannot be an 
effective peace initiator or mediator until it establishes a 
sound financial base. 
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The ECOWAS Defense Protocol stands apart from any 
existing security agreement within the continent, and is 
significant for the recognition given to domestic conflicts 
in West Africa's political economies. Article 4 of the 
Protocol empowers ECOWAS leaders to intervene in the 
internal affairs of member states under certain conditions. 
The Article states specifically that ECOWAS can intervene in 
internal armed conflict within any Member State engineered 
and supported actively from outside likely to endanger the 
security and peace in the entire Community. 
In situations where such a breach has been ascertained 
to have occurred, Articles 6(3) and 17 entrust the Authority 
with the legal powers to invoke collective military 
intervention. Both of these Articles give the Authority 
options ranging from diplomacy to peacekeeping to the 
"expediency of military action." Alternatively, the head of 
state of the member country under attack can request, under 
Article 16, such action or assistance from the community. 
It was on the basis of this empowerment that the ECOMOG 
forces was formed and sent to intervene in Liberia in order 
to save lives and stop unwarranted destruction. This action 
by ECOWAS was not a departure from the UN Article 2(4) or 
from OAU Article 3(2). In fact, the ECOWAS leaders were 
acting to protect the status quo. The ECOMOG forces were 
drawn from standing national armed forces of member states 
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as stipulated under Article 13(1-2) and generally referred 
to as the Allied Armed Forces of the Community (AAFC). 
It is the position of this paper that ECOMOG needs to 
be researched closely for its precedent setting for future 
of peacekeeping by any regional organization. ECOMOG has 
also set a glaring example of how a regional economic 
organization can undertake a successful military expedition. 
CHAPTER IV 
THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR 
Overview 
In the western world, and mainly in the United States, 
the dominant view within the official circle, and as 
expressed in the scholarly literature, is that ethnic and 
communal conflicts are the main causes of civil conflict. 
African nation states, it is argued, resort to conflict 
since there are no permanent institutions within each nation 
to address historical grievances. 
While this chapter agrees with this assertion, it also 
addresses other known causes of crisis in general, and the 
causes of the Liberian crisis in particular. The values, 
goals and attitudes of each key belligerent leader and 
faction, as well as outside aid, is discussed. 
Background 
It is a basic assumption of this study that among the 
known causes of the Liberian civil crises, such factors as 
leadership, legitimacy, state and its components played a 
pivotal role in engineering the war. Even now that most 
underdeveloped nations are steadily marching toward 
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democratization, and most developed nations are making 
tremendous advances and gains in science, technology and 
space exploration, the African nations are increasingly 
engaging one another in acts of hostilities, conflicts and 
wars. Notably among factors that make Africa conflict prone 
are problems of leadership and legitimacy. 
The Liberian civil crises offer us ample opportunity to 
study the realities of urban problems, of a people's 
yearning for openness or glasnost along with multi-partism, 
and mass protest (as was the case not only in Liberia but 
also in Mali, and often by students in Algeria, Nigeria, 
Ghana or Kenya) owing to the over-increasing cost of living 
and structural adjustment policies. In Liberia, leadership 
and members of the organizational bourgeoisie were located 
at pivotal points of control in those overarching systems of 
political, social and economic power. The balance of power 
was against the indigenous Liberians, leaving them with no 
other option, but to revolt in arms.1 
1Stephen J. Blank, Lawrence E. Gunter, Karl P. Magyar, 
Lewis B. Ware, Bynum E. Weathers, Conflict, Culture and 




















THE LIBERIAN CONFLICT 
Source: C. Asberg, K. Axell, B. Heldt, E. Melandee, 
K. Nordquist, and T. Ohlson, "Major Armed Conflict, 
1993," SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 1994), 93. 
It is reasonable to point out here that the Liberian 
civil war, which has displaced thousands of people, started 
when armed belligerents led by Charles Taylor, fired the 
first shot in December 1989. This action indicated the 
collapse of the Liberian state. Collapse here means that 
basic functions of the state were no longer performed. As 
the decision-making center of government, the state was 
paralyzed and inoperative; laws were not made, order not 
preserved, neither are societal cohesion enhancements. 
Liberia as a symbol of identity had lost its power of 
conferring a name on its people and ultimately a meaning on 
its social action. As a territory, there was no longer an 
assured security or provision by a central sovereign 
organization. Its authoritative legitimacy was up for 
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grabs, so was its rights to command and conduct public 
affairs. The state of Liberia had destroyed its functional 
balance with regards to inputs and outputs, and no longer 
received support from or exercised controls over its people. 
Liberia as a state was no longer the target of demands, 
because its people knew that it was not capable of supplying 
their needs. The collapse of Liberia meant that leadership 
had lost its right to rule. The collapse of Liberia did not 
happen during one administration but has always been looming 
on the horizon since the Tubman era. Addressing the causes 
of the war as both immediate and remote, the Liberian 
account contends that the inevitable war in Liberia had been 
in the making since the founding of the nation. 
The course of the Liberian war was marked and 
punctuated by characteristic checqueredness and made 
possible by several actors with variable interest. For 
about a period of six months following the outbreak of the 
war in 1989, the rebel forces fought under a united front of 
National Patriotic Front of Liberia--NPFL. It was led by 
Charles Taylor. In late July 1990, and with the breakaway 
from the NPFL by Prince Yeduo Johnsons Independent National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (INPFL), the composition of the 
war took a dramatic turn. Each of the three major factions- 
-the Armed Forces of Liberia--AFL, the NPFL and the INPFL 
had to fight against others for the control of what was left 
of Liberia. 
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Feeling pressured by the conflict in all fronts, and 
probably wanting to exact revenge on rival forces, Samuel 
Doe turned instead to the civilian population and massacred 
about 600 civilians who sought refuge in a Monrovia Lutheran 
church. 
As the war progressed, so did the number of belligerent 
factions engaged in the conflict. With the existence of the 
3 main factors--AFL, NPFL and the INPFL were other hitherto 
unknown factions such as the United Liberation Movement 
Democracy in Liberia--ULIMO, and Revolutionary United Front 
—RUF. International participants were also involved in the 
Liberian civil conflict either directly or indirectly. Such 
actors, state or non-state, were Libya, USA, the United 
Nations (UN), the Organization of African Unity (OAU), and 
Economic Community of African States (ECOWAS). 
The Liberian war did not end even after the capture, 
torture, and death of President Samuel Doe. The on-and-off 
cease-fire agreement, peace accords, negotiations, 
involvement of the ECOMOG peacekeepers and the willingness 
of the Liberian people finally brought the war to an end and 
paved the way for a democratically elected government. 
Remote Causes 
To an innocent bystander or just a casual observer, 
many contributing factors to the Liberian civil war might go 
unnoticed. But to others, events, factors and situations 
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that prompted this inevitable civil war are fair, simple and 
obvious. 
Firstly and by Liberian account, the war was a result 
of existing tension between the indigenous Liberians on one 
hand, and the settlers, including their descendants on the 
other. The settlers' attitude towards the indigenous 
Liberians was evident in many ways. The settler group 
denounced the indigenous Liberians, pursued a policy of 
revenge against them, denied them important government 
positions, practiced a system of forced labor commonly 
translating into enslavement of the natives, and refused to 
integrate with the indigenous people. The Liberian 
indigenes were practically denied citizenship even though 
they paid taxes according to law. These policies stopped, 
however, after the intervention of the League of Nations. 
The indigenous Liberians were embittered by these 
blatant discriminatory practices and welcomed Samuel Doe 
with open arms when he overthrew the Tolbert administration 
in 1980. The Liberian people only turned against Doe when 
he was later found to be unable "to see more than five 
minutes" into the future and unable to govern. This study 
found that the current civil war in Liberia was in part a 
desperate attempt by a suppressed people to redeem their 
humanity. 
The fact that Liberia was growing did not automatically 
imply that every person in the country enjoyed or benefited 
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from its growth. The hinterland witnessed a total absence 
of substantial development. Towns and villages had no 
connecting roads from one to another; few schools and 
churches existed and such modern facilities as electricity, 
portable water systems, television and even industries were 
practically unknown in the hinterland. The denial of these 
amenities was another source of bitterness responsible for 
the war. 
Traditionally, the practice of collective 
responsibility which characterized the Liberian culture was 
another remote cause of the war. In the Liberian 
traditional culture, a person as an individual is not 
responsible for his crime. His family, tribe, as well as 
his associates are equally responsible. In view of this, 
Doe took revenge against the whole of Nimba county because 
Quiwonkpa who led an abortive coup against him originated 
from there. This was the reason why the people of Nimba 
County were so eager to join Charles Taylor in a war to 
unseat President Doe. The Liberian account also contends 
that corruption is one of the most important factors that 
caused the civil war. This ill-gotten wealth motivated the 
soldiers to harass, intimidate and even kill many civilians 
that they were supposed to protect. In order to avenge the 
death of their friends and families, many young Liberians 
joined the rebel cause (See Table 6). 
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Immediate Causes 
Though the Liberian constitution provides for a multi¬ 
party state, it is noted that for nearly twenty-seven and a 
half years during Tubman's presidency, the true Whig Party 
served as the nation's only de facto political party. 
Assuming the presidency following the death of William 
Tubman in 1971, the new president, Mr. Tolbert, undertook a 
huge political adventure by his effort to liberalize 
Liberian politics. He felt that the Liberian population had 
come of age to exercise their constitutional rights. The 
formation of political parties was permitted as well as 
encouraged by the freedom of the press. Baccus Matthews 
Progressive Alliance of Liberia (PAL) better known as United 
People's Party (UPP) was formed and wasted no time in 
launching a relentless attack and criticism of the 
government. People soon began to lose confidence in the 
True Whig Party and wanted changes. The Rice Riot of April 
14, 1979 was another important factor that triggered off a 
series of events in Liberia. The price of rice (Liberia's 
staple food) was increased from $9.85 per bag to more than 
$25 per bag by the Tolbert Administration. 
In protesting the new price of rice as being too high, 
PAL's leadership organized a demonstration on April 14, 
1979. Among other demands was the resignation of the 
government. The ensuing riot led to death, damage and loss 
of property and the paralysis of the Liberian government for 
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about twenty-four hours. These continuing popular political 
protests, combined with resentment against the existing 
patronage system, resulted in a military take-over by 
seventeen non-commissioned officers of the Armed Forces of 
Liberia led by Samuel Kanyon Doe on April 12, 1980. 
One of the few, but important, causes of the war was 
the massacre of government officials by the Doe 
administration. It is contended that the language was 
modern, but the beatings, humiliation, torture and finally 
the execution--all in public--were a display of brutality 
never known in Liberian history. Even some members of the 
Armed Forces who were considered to be anti-revolutionaries 
were also killed, while a few others received prison 
sentences. Some of the Americo-Liberians who were either 
killed or imprisoned also had their property confiscated. 
Because Samuel Doe's government was unpopular due to his 
military style approach to government, he was plagued and 
tortured by attempted coups before he could really 
consolidate his hold on power. The famous Nimba Raid of 
1985, which Brigadier General Thomas G. Quiwonkpa (a former 
commanding General of the Armed Forces) attempted to 
overthrow Doe, was viewed with grave concern. This popular 
uprising followed the election fiasco of October 1985 in 
which Doe declared himself president-elect. 
On August 22, 1984, after suppressing student riots, 
Dr. Amos Sawyer, the then Dean of College of Liberal Arts in 
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the University of Liberia was arrested and jailed on charges 
of planning to overthrow the government. These events in 
Liberia changed the already poisoned atmosphere and thus 
made civil war imminent. 
Outside (International) Source 
Timour Dmitrichev summarized and listed major causes of 
potential tensions and conflict, thus: 
1. Military: inter-state aggression, annexation, 
intervention, or hostility, for example support 
for the rebels of other states, or for 
separatist movements. 
2. Political/International: ideological or 
political campaigns, territorial claims, 
religious expansionism against other states, 
regional rivalries, terrorism, coercion or 
discrimination respecting the trade or 
economies of other states. 
3. Political/Domestic: power struggles, hostile 
groups, over-population, economic or religious 
disparities, oppression, demands for democracy, 
communal or ethnic violence related to 
economic, social, religious, cultural or ethnic 
issues. 
4. Persecution: violations of human rights, mass 
movements of refugees, poverty or instability 
caused by the mismanagement or ineptitude of 
the government. (One could add here: evident 
and perceived levels of corruption by the 
government beyond any acceptable limits of 
traditional toleration).2 
He further stressed that a more basic and long-term cause of 
conflict is the catastrophic economic performance of African 
nations. Boutros Boutros Ghali, Secretary-General of the 
United Nations, also echoed that the deepest causes of 
20liver Furley, Conflict in Africa (London, New York: 
Taurus Academic Studies, IB Taurus Publishers, 1995), 3-4. 
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conflict are "economic despair, social injustice and 
political oppression."3 
This study, however, reveals that Dmitrichev's items 
number three and four, respectively, support Boutros Ghali's 
assumption as being the general causes of the Liberian civil 
war. Victor Adetula states that the Liberian civil crises 
is a "manifestation of the rising authoritarianism, populist 
military absolutism, erosion of civil and human rights and 
indeed the collapse of state power."4 He elucidates that 
post colonial response of the Liberian state to the problem 
of accumulation of capital and the crises of legitimation 
generated the Liberian conflict. Adetula believes that 
regardless of whatever coloration this conflict assumed, it 
is at the level of production and production relations. 
Tracing the roots of the war to the distortions created by 
the pattern of state formation, Margaret Vogt defined the 
Liberian civil war as "a struggle for assertion of the 
erstwhile suppressed sub-national aspirations, a process of 
decolonization and national integration started much 
earlier. ..."5 
3MacFarlane, Boutros Boutros Ghali, An Agenda for 
Peace: Preventive Diplomacy, Peace-Making and Peace-Keeping. 
Report to the UN, 17-6-92. 
4Victor A. Adetula, "Nigerian Forum," The Nigerian 
Journal of International Affairs 12, nos. 9-12 (Sept-Dec 
1992): 140. 
5Margaret A. Vogt, "Nigeria's Participation in the 
ECOWAS Monitoring Group-ECOMOG," Nigerian Journal of 
International Affairs 17, no. 1 (1991): 101. 
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Historians as well as political observers generally 
uphold the fact that Liberia has never been colonized in the 
sense that no extra African or imperial authority ever 
governed her. However, the freed slaves who returned from 
America settled there. It was the structure of institutions 
set up by the repatriated slaves that was responsible for 
the turmoil in which Liberia found itself. The freed slaves 
(commonly called the settler group) considered themselves to 
be superior in almost all spheres of endeavor compared to 
the indigenous Liberians. It was the near-slave status that 
the indigenous Liberians were subjected to--the denial of 
political participation, the lack of social status, the 
absence of economic empowerment and the increased cost of 
living--that precipitated a military takeover in 1980. 
These same factors that caused military coup eventually made 
a civil war in 1989 possible. 
Ruling Liberia since 1847, Americo-Liberians constitute 
only 5 percent of the Liberian population. These ex-slaves 
made it possible for the indigenous Liberians to be 
neglected as people or identities. Accordingly, Karl Magyar 
indicates that Liberia's civil "conflicts of 1989-91 
represents most accurately the problems of unsuccessful 
internal consolidation."6 This absence of internal 
cohesiveness which led to the civil war has been a feature 
in Liberian life since the Tubman era, but became more 
6Blank, Gunter, Magyar, Ware, Weathers, 259. 
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evident during the Tolbert and Doe administrations 
respectively. 
It is the opinion of the writer, however, that the 
current Liberian civil war stems from the process of 
developing the Liberian state since its formation in 1821. 
In point of fact, evidence and facts presented in this study 
suggest that the foundation of formation laid the seeds for 
the present conflict in Liberia. Dr. George Kieh puts it 
more forcefully, that: 
The overarching framework under which the affairs 
of the emerging polity were conducted was anchored 
on a caste system. Under this rubric, very often 
the obvious but static caste distinctions based on 
skin color and ancestral origin, coincided with 
class differences defined by the relationship of 
each group of the major means of production and 
the state.7 
This study notes with great concern the socioeconomic 
class formation in Liberia prior to 1839. It revealed 
several strata: 
7George Kley Jr., "Combatants, Patrons, Peacemakers, 
and the Liberian Civil Conflict," Studies in Conflict and 
Terrorism 15 (1992): 126. 
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Socioeconomic Strata 
A Governing Body 
B Settlers (Mulattoes) 
Dark Settlers 
Fig. 2. Socioeconomic Strata on Liberia Prior 1839.8 
The American colonization society who occupied the 
upper tier in the diagram acted as Liberia's governing body 
controlled both politics and business. The middle stratum 
(B) was occupied by the mulattos, commonly referred to as 
the light skin settlers. This group represented people with 
sound educational backgrounds, who because of their middle 
class status, became go-betweens or intermediaries between 
the American colonization society and the underclass. They 
were also managers and merchants, and were called the 
comprado. Section "C" is made up of two classes or groups 
of people. The first stage are the dark-skinned settlers 
with no access to the state apparatus due to their cultural 
8Author's conception of socioeconomic strata in Liberia 
prior to 1839. 
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and ethnic background. They had expertise in arts, crafts 
and farming. At the bottom of the diagram are the slaves 
from Congo-recaptive slaves and all others under the 
Liberian colony. This bulk of people constituted free 
laborers and were denied participation in the Liberian 
affairs. 
Agents of the American colonization society withdrew 
its administration in 1847 when Liberia became independent. 
The prevailing atmosphere then made it possible for the 
mulattoes to emerge as the dominant political force, thus 
competing against their dark-skinned brothers. This 
situation left the Congoes and the indigenous Liberians 
marginalized. Liberian independence created a rivalry and 
oppressive situation, where on the one hand the mulattoes 
struggled against the dark-skinned Liberians, and on the 
other, the mulattos and the dark-skinned brothers joined 
together against the Congoes and the purely indigenous 
Liberians. This awkward situation continued and escalated 
into war. 
There was the absence of focus on real issues and 
political culture in their interpretation that events in 
Liberia will not change to benefit the common person. It 
was this situation that led Charles Taylor to fire the first 
shot and declared war on Samuel Doe's Liberia. The 
Liberians fought among themselves, and: 
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It did not matter to them how many people died. 
All that mattered was how well they handled the 
grim mathematics of the war, so that they could 
win the most important battle of all, which was 
for the leadership of this once beautiful and 
civilized land.9 
Emergence of the National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
Mr. Charles Chankay Taylor, an American trained 
economist who claims mixed Americo-Liberian and Gola 
heritage, returned from exile to lead a rebel group to 
overthrow the government of Samuel Doe. 
Before his military quest for the Liberian presidency, 
Charles Taylor was the procurement director under President 
Doe, but fled in 1983 to the United States to avoid 
prosecution for embezzlement. Living in exile in Ghana, he 
went to the embassy of Burkina Faso in 1987 and requested 
assistance in his attempt to overthrow President Doe. After 
his release from the Ghanaian jail, Taylor was introduced to 
the Libyans for military assistance. The NPFL started 
initially as a small group of about 100 to 150 fighting, 
Liberian commandos with help from Burkina Faso and Sierra 
Leone and trained by Libyans. But they gained strength in 
numbers as the war progressed. 
On December 24, 1989, they broke loose into Nimba 
County in Liberia by way of Cote d'Ivoire. Charles Taylor 
sBen Okhari, New York Times, 29 January 1993 (on his 
passage about soldiers). 
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chose Nimba County as his launching pad, presenting himself 
as the champion of the people who have been massacred by Doe 
due to Quiwonkpa's (a Nimbian) abortive coup against the 
regime. The NPFL controlled about 75 percent of Liberia, 
including Paynes Airport and much of Monrovia, the capital 
city. Charles Taylor's NPFL seeks to control Liberia with 
him (Taylor) as President. 
The Independence National Patriotic Front of Liberia 
Prince Yormie Johnson, a co-fighter alongside Charles 
Taylor's NPFL, broke away from the NPFL faction to lead his 
own group--The Independence National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (INPFL). Prince Johnson was the first field 
commander of the NPFL until differences with Charles Taylor 
over alleged human rights abuses, dictatorial tendencies, 
and non-commitment to the democratic process etc. forced him 
to break away and form his own faction-INPFL. Prince 
Johnson claims that his principal aim was to prevent Charles 
Taylor's NPFL from capturing Samuel Doe and proclaiming 
leadership in Liberia. However, Prince Johnson's hitherto 
unknown INPFL became widely known and recognized upon his 
capture of the Bushrod Island and thereupon announcing his 
split with the NPFL. Though not completely free from blame 
as a human rights abuser, the INPFL has adhered to the 
ECOWAS Peace Plan, discouraged looting, accepted the Interim 
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Government and generally agreed to the disarmament and 
encampment of his men. 
Prince Johnson also refused to join Charles Taylor and 
his NPFL forces during his October 5, 1992 "Operation 
Octopus." The INPFL has been credited with the capture and 
death of President Samuel Doe. There is speculation that 
with the dissolution of the INPFL after the Octopus 
Operation, the leader of INPFL, Prince Johnson might be in 
Nigeria on asylum. 
The Armed Forces of Liberia 
The Liberian Frontier Force began operation under the 
British officers from when it was taken over by the American 
military officers. With imported weapons, the Armed Forces 
of Liberia improved when the military ceased power in 1980. 
This newly reformed Armed Forces of Liberia (AFL) was made 
up of mainly members of the Krahn tribe of President Doe. 
It had about three thousand soldiers. As leader of the 
Armed Forces of Liberia until his death, President Doe's 
main objective and that of the AFL was to deter the NPFL 
rebellion and maintain the President in power. After the 
death of President Doe, however, emphasis shifted from 
maintaining power to the sole survival of its membership, as 
its military officers expressed fear of either being 
captured by other belligerent factions or of being killed. 
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The Armed Forces of Liberia under the leadership of Gen. 
Hezekiah Bowen are cooperating with the ECOMOG officials. 
The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
The United Liberation Movement for Democracy in Liberia 
is made up of several hundreds or maybe thousands of 
guerrilla fighters mainly from Doe's Krahn tribe and from 
the Mandingo tribe. The United Liberation Movement for 
Democracy in Liberia emerged as yet another contender for 
the control of Liberia. ULIMO came into being under the 
leadership of Alhaji G.V. Koromah and Gen. Roosevelt Johnson 
professing its opposition to the granting of concessions to 
the rebels (NPFL) by ECOMOG and President Amos Sawyer of 
Interim Government of National Unity (IGNU). 
This study did not find an actual date for Ulimo's 
incursion into Liberia, but accounts show that its initial 
activities centered primarily along the Sierra Leonian 
border where they were formed. This study found out that 
some elements of ULIMO under the flagname of Liberia 
National Defense Force (LNDF) helped the government of 
Sierra Leone in repelling Foday Sankor's Revolutionary 
United Front (RUF) forces. The ULIMO forces (formerly known 
as the National Defense Forces) were made of Krahn's men and 
Movement for the Redemption of Liberian Muslims (MRLM). 
This group felt victimized by Charles Taylor's NPFL. With a 
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very cloudy agenda and leadership problems, Ulimo, however, 
established itself as the main rival of the NPFL. 
Liberian Peace Council (LPC) 
Chaired by Dr. George Boley, the Liberian Peace Council 
was organized in 1993 of largely Krahn elements. The LPC 
primarily concerned itself in clashes with the NPFL. 
Conclusion 
Most of the factors listed are remote or immediate 
cause of the Liberian conflict. Due to these numerous 
factors, the number of possible outcomes are just as high as 
that of the combinations of the different and interrelated 
causes of the Liberian conflict. The most fundamental 
reason for the Liberian war is what this study calls the 
essence of sovereignty--the state's right to be 
unpredictable. Liberia, under President Doe, was willing to 
mortgage its sovereign right to the extent that it felt 
gravely threatened by an enemy that was concretely 
identified. In this case, the NPFL was the main enemy and 
the AFL was willing to deter its aggression. Without a 
doubt, the chief cause of internal disorder in Liberia will 
continue to be the multiple and complex dissatisfaction of 
the indigenous Liberian people. The war is on one hand 
against the dominant position of the Americo-Liberians, and 
on the other hand against their own traditional past. 
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Events in the battlefield confirmed a shift in the balance 
of power. 
The administration of Samuel K. Doe, of the Khran 
ethnic group and a former Sergeant who seized power in a 
bloody coup in 1980, was particularly surprised and angered 
by the rebel gains in 1990. Already plagued by corruption, 
maladministration and human rights abuse, Doe turned his 
guns against civilians of Gio and Mano ethnic groups in 
Nimba county. Taylor NPFL forces, in turn, launched 
reprisal attacks against civilians of the Khran and Mandigo 
ethnic groups. Prince Johnson broke away from the NPFL to 
form his own belligerent group--INPFL. These various 
factions, brutal attacks and group rivalries contributed 
immensely to a general sense of international revulsion 
towards the Liberian conflict. 
CHAPTER V 
WEST AFRICAN ECONOMIC COMMUNITY MONITORING 
GROUPS (ECOMOG) INTERVENTION 
Overview 
A potentially hopeful, but unusual, introduction on 
August 24, 1990 of peace keepers organized by the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) through its 
monitoring group (ECOMOG) helped lessen the tension in 
Liberia. By 1993, ECOMOG troops stood at a combined 
strength of 11,500. ECOMOG quickly secured Monrovia, made 
Dr. Amos Sawyer the President of the interim government and 
arranged cease-fire(s) among the contending factions. 
The United States, Libya, other governments, as well as 
some non-governmental actors, played direct and/or indirect 
roles in the Liberian civil war. This ECOMOG initiative was 
welcomed by the international community. 
Background 
This study has identified several factors that make it 
possible for African military intervention in African 
internal affairs. They include, among others, the inherent 
weakness of the party in power, be it civilian or military. 
In Liberia, the military administration inherited the mantle 
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of authority from civilian administrators who tended to 
underestimate their strength as well as their role in the 
demise of an administration. Not only did the remaining 
Liberian civilian administrators underestimate their own 
role in terminating the military presence, but they also 
underestimated their organizational capacity in controlling 
the military's activity. The obstructionist policies, 
inexperienced in organizational tactics and practices of the 
military administrators, prevented the civilians from 
emerging into a balanced party machine. In the face of 
deteriorating military management, the civilian population 
had to act in a concerted effort with some military 
personnel in inviting and welcoming an outside military 
intervention in the form of ECOMOG. At the height of the 
Liberian war, only a very few West African countries were 
willing to intervene in the crisis. Initially, five West 
African countries--Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, Gambia, and 
Sierra Leone--took into account their respective country's 
geographic and administrative position vis à vis Liberia. 
Each of these countries elected to provide troops to help 
control the situation in Liberia. 
Another factor that limited the power of Samuel Doe and 
his administration to maintain order and stability was the 
undermining or dismantling of the preceding civilian 
bargaining strategy that had been effective in securing the 
semblance of security. Faced with a seemingly unwinnable 
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war, Samuel Doe turned his attention for the most part to 
killing innocent civilians and driving most of them into 
exile. These activities continued with no end in sight, 
thereby giving the ECOWAS a reason to believe that only a 
peace-keeping force could intervene and abate the 
deteriorating situation. 
The rebel forces of Mr. Charles Taylor, the NPFL, 
continued to view the interim government of national unity 
as "alien" or an imperial administrator, and as such, 
refused its leadership. Although this proved to be a 
crucial mistake on the part of the rebels, the basis of 
their reasoning (being that Charles Taylor wanted to be 
President) was understandable. This posture of non¬ 
recognition of the interim government and a strong desire on 
the part of NPFL to continue in the war left ECOWAS no 
alternative but to intervene. 
Having viewed the AFL as a symbol of authority or at 
best a pillar of strength, President Doe went on to commit 
one error after another by mainly relying on its shaky 
military for authority, force, protection and legitimacy. 
Doe's continued use of the military to cope with situations 
that called for negotiation or arbitration had several 
drawbacks, such as revealing the weakness of both the 
military leadership and the military itself. ECOWAS quickly 
came to the realization that its intervention was 
indispensable to the survival of the Liberian people. 
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ECOMOG, however, came to resent being thrust into basically 
political situations in which it had to bear the brunt of 
the hostility of the suppressed dissidents, hostility that 
should instead have been directed against the flawed 
civilian and military leadership of Liberia. 
All of these activities compelled the ECOWAS Heads of 
States to table discussions of the Liberian issue during its 
13th summit in Banjul on 6 July, 1990. During this meeting, 
it came to light that some of the ECOWAS countries were in 
violation of the OAU tradition which disallows any member 
states to intervene in the internal affairs of member 
states. Specifically, it was revealed that Côte d'Ivoire 
was supplying arms to the NPFL of Charles Taylor and that 
Côte d'Ivoire was providing passage for arms from Burkina 
Faso that originated from Libya. Many heads of state felt 
that the non-intervention clause of the OAU charter had been 
violated. In order to arrest the situation in Liberia, they 
accepted a proposal by Nigeria to set up a standing 
committee to mediate the conflict and any other conflict 
that may arise in the future with the sub-region. The 
standing committee was charged with the following 
responsibilities : 
(a) Stop the belligerent factions, 
(b) Anchor a cease-fire, 
(c) Persuade Samuel Doe to step down from power, and 
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(d) Call for an all-party conference of Liberians to 
jointly appoint an interim government (to be 
followed later by an election and the formation of 
a national government.) 
In its attempt to realize these stated objectives, the 
ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group--ECOMOG--was established. 
Initially, only Nigeria, Ghana, Guinea, the Gambia and 
Sierra Leone contributed troops for this peace-keeping 
mission (See Table 7). Togo later withdrew its commitment 
to ECOMOG. 
TABLE 7 
THE COMPOSITION OF ECOMOG, FEBRUARY 1993 
Country Troops in ECOMOG National Total 
Gambia 150 900 
Ghana 1500 11900 
Guinea 600 9700 
Mali *6 7300 
Nigeria 9000 94500 
Senegal W 9700 
Sierra Leone 700 3150 
*Mali has only contributed 6 men as a token gesture to broaden the 
composition of ECOMOG in the effort to correct the impression that the 
operation is an anglophone undertaking. 
Source: IISS, The Military Balance 1991-1992 (London: IISS, 1991), 
136-137; and West Africa (June 22-28, 1992), 1041. 
As a peace-keeping force, ECOMOG's first task was to 
orderly facilitate the evacuation of women, children and 
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citizens of member states trapped in the war zone. ECOMOG 
was also expected to ensure a safe distribution of food, aid 
and medical care to all affected by the war. These peace 
keepers were also charged with the responsibility of 
establishing and maintaining order in all areas, especially 
the capital city of Monrovia, and ultimately making 
arrangements for the establishment of an interim government. 
ECOMOG's initial deployment to Liberia was delayed for 
about two weeks and its number was substantially too small 
to constitute an intervention force. This was done in order 
to display and show good intentions to all warring parties. 
The large naval contingent was to evacuate Nigerians and 
other African citizens, but Charles Taylor and his NPFL had 
already declared open war on ECOMOG troops upon its arrival 
in Liberia. The NPFL had already kidnapped and held many 
citizens of various West African countries hostage. As a 
peace keeper and mediator, the ECOMOG team continued to 
operate on the assumption that the situation will play 
itself out, thereby allowing for a cease-fire between the 
fighting forces. 
In August 1990 at Banjul, Gambia, representatives of 
most ECOWAS member-states, six Liberian political parties 
and a number of Liberian civic groups met and elected Amos 
Sawyer, president of an Interim Government of National Unity 
(IGNU). Members of the interim government had a mandate to 
establish a transitional government, re-establish law and 
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order, facilitate the provision and distribution of relief 
material and conduct a national election within one year. 
Members of the present interim government would not be 
eligible to contest for any position during election. 
Charles Taylor's group--the NPFL--did not attend the 
meeting and did not recognize IGNU. He opposed any interim 
government, especially one that he was not the head. The 
NPFL continued to terrorize both the AFL and ECOMOG forces 
by persistently bombarding its positions. By mid 1993, 
ECOMOG's forces stood at a staggering 16,000 strong (but 
this number was reduced in 1994). In view of continued 
attacks by the NPFL, ECOMOG had changed its mandate from 
peace keeping to Peace Enforcers, or outright 
interventionist troops. ECOMOG's role and its neutrality in 
the war was sharply criticized by Charles Taylor, as well as 
the United States. 
International intervention is generally exercised to 
address such abnormal behavior in the course of internal 
conflict as human rights abuses. International intervention 
is also designed to resolve disputes of considerable 
proportion, intensity and length, and to forestall the 
likelihood of outside forces interested in assisting either 
the government in power, the insurgent or other intervening 
states. It should also address actual or potential 
spillovers of a conflict across international borders, as 
was the case in Iraq, Afghanistan, Angola, Lebanon, 
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Mozambique, El Salvador, and Somalia. In addition to these 
historical facts is the abatement of large-scale refugee 
migration (as was the case in Afghanistan, Yugoslavia, 
Somalia, Iraq and Sudan). The fact that the presence of all 
these historical indications compelled Nigeria to join the 
ECOMOG forces and intervene in Liberia did not satisfy 
either Charles Taylor nor the United States. They continued 
to view Nigeria's participation in the Liberian peace 
keeping group with suspicion, doubt and uncertainly, 
thinking that Nigeria has a hidden agenda in Liberia. 
To Nigerians or the Nigerian leadership, the nation's 
interest in the Liberian crisis, according to Margaret Vogt, 
is "assessed to be derived from a recognition of a terribly 
destabilizing impact which such a conflict will have on the 
stability of the sub-region...."1 Nigeria has experienced 
first hand the horrors of war, and is opposed to any kind of 
armed revolt against a sister state, regardless of where it 
is on the African continent. Nigeria participated in ECOWAS 
peace initiatives in Liberia because it wanted to contribute 
to stopping the destabilizing trend since this could one day 
happen to her (Nigeria). Again, Nigeria participated in the 
ECOWAS peace plan in Liberia, as a humanitarian gesture to 
help restore law and order. Nigeria's overriding interest 
in championing the cause for peace and stability in Liberia 
^■Margaret Vogt, Nigerian Journal of International 
Affairs 17, no. 1999: 101. 
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through ECOMOG was to enable her (Nigeria) to preserve her 
spheres of interest and spheres of influence in Liberia and 
West Africa. Furthermore, Nigeria's domineering role in 
ECOMOG's activities was part of her grand design to be the 
leader and forerunner of democracy in West Africa. 
The liberation and democratization of Liberia will help 
enhance and promote Nigeria's economic interest. Nigeria 
sees Liberia as a potential large market for the sale of its 
oil and other made in Nigeria products, and was determined 
to make the ECOMOG initiative successful. Nigeria was a key 
player in attempting to bring peace in Liberia by supporting 
the Interim Government of National Unity. Nigeria has 
supplied the largest contingent of the peacekeeping force, 
given financial grants and engineered debt rescheduling to 
the tune of U.S. $30 million through the African Development 
Bank for Liberia. Diplomatic recognition both within and 
out of Africa has been sought by Nigeria for the interim 
government. 
Guinea's participation in ECOMOG was for a completely 
different reason. Religious and tribal reasons were the 
main reasons that triggered Guinea's desire to take part in 
the monitoring group to maintain peace in Liberia. The Dan 
massacre of the Mandingos (in Guinea) was a determining 
factor for Guinea to break ranks with other Francophone 
states and join ECOMOG. 
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For most part, most ECOWAS countries joined ECOMOG due 
to their dissatisfaction with the way Samuel Doe and Charles 
Taylor treated indigents of each participating country still 
residing in Liberia. One example was Doe's and Taylor's 
violation of diplomatic immunity by invading several 
embassies in search of alleged enemies and or citizens of 
the so-called unfriendly countries. Other reasons for 
participation in ECOMOG's peace mission in Liberia included, 
but were not limited to fear and tension, mounted all over 
the world and especially in the sub-region of West Africa, 
by both the AFL and the rebel group (NPFL). The neighboring 
nations wanted to prevent a spillover of the warring 
factions into their countries and West African countries, in 
general, were more concerned about security. They believed 
that if the Liberian civil crisis is stopped by their 
ECOMOG's initiative, other warlords might think twice before 
engaging in similar activities in any West African country. 
ECOMOG went to Liberia in part due to calls for outside 
help first by Senator David Tower from Nimba county and by 
Samuel Doe himself. Doe's call for a West African peace 
keeping force is chronicled by Harry Moniba, a former vice- 
president to Samuel Doe, and the only living Liberian who 
claims to have documentation to this effect. He forcefully 
states his claim by declaring: 
Incidentally, let me add that the coming of ECOMOG 
was due to a letter written by Doe administration 
to the chairman of ECOWAS, asking them to send a 
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peace-keeping force. I know because I have copies 
of those correspondence.2 
External State Actors 
In considering the role played by external state 
actors, either African or non-African, by intervening in 
Liberian crises, a few issues stand out clearly. First, the 
effort to put back a state through intervention has to be 
greatly supplemented by sub-regional, regional and/or 
international support. Second, external state actors as 
intervenors are not exactly neutral, neither in motivation 
nor in impact--indeed they might be part of the solution or 
part of the problem or even both. In Liberia, external 
state actors featured either as giving assistance or as an 
interférant. Such countries as Libya, USA and Burkina-Faso, 
to mention a few, fit this description. 
In war-torn Liberia, the maintenance of law and order 
as an attribute of statehood had existed only tenuously 
because the instrument of the state, such as the judiciary, 
the police, and the army had never been sufficient to cope 
with the full demands of governance. For the external state 
actors such as the USA, it makes no difference who wins the 
war in Liberia--Doe forces or the rebel soldiers--as long as 
the geostrategic and economic interests are maintained. 
2Margaret Vogt, The Liberian Crisis and ECOMOG: A Bold 
Attempt at Regional Peace Keeping (Lagos, Nigeria: Gabamo 
Publishing Co. Ltd., 1992), 216-217. 
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African intervention in African affairs have been seen 
in two perspectives--first, intervention by regional or 
subregional organization, including the Organization of 
African Unity (OAU) and the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS), and the other is the intervention 
by individuals, and usually contiguous states, acting either 
unilaterally or in conjunction with other African states. 
The West African countries acting under the ECOMOG umbrella 
to intervene in Liberia were in pursuit of regional 
stability. 
The United States of America 
During the 1980s, America had three objectives in 
Liberia: (1) to protect and have uninterrupted access to all 
American facilities in Liberian ports and airspace, (2) to 
promote political stability, reconciliation and the 
development of democratic institutions, and (3) to help 
bring about financial and economic stability in order to 
foster an atmosphere conducive to growth and development. 
This policy failed within eight years, and America became 
restless, moving its support from Samuel Doe to Prince 
Johnson, then to claiming neutrality, and finally supporting 
the ECOWAS peace initiative. Its support to the Doe 
administration was in the area of technical military advice, 
military lorries, economic aid as well as financial 
assistance. The Bush administration expected to suppress 
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the crises and get the country ready for a democratic 
election. 
It is widely speculated that the United States' support 
to Prince Johnson's NPFL by supplying him with logistical 
information and airlifting his men closer to the 
Presidential palace made it possible for the capture and 
subsequent execution of Samuel Doe. Fearing that Prince 
Johnson might not provide a leadership to the liking of 
Washington (due to his war crime record), the United States 
quickly moved on to support another group--this time ECOWAS. 
In spite of its shifting strategy, the U.S. was still an 
important player in the Liberian peace process. It 
contributed $31 million to finance the deployment of Ugandan 
and Tanzanian peace keepers and about $47 million to Senegal 
for her willingness to participate in the ECOWAS peace force 
and for a bid to disarm Charles Taylor. 
France's covert intervention in the Liberian crisis was 
in her support of an old friend, Houphouet-Boigny, who in 
turn was supporting Blaise Campore of Burkina Faso. France 
was in essence trying also to protect its economic interest, 
especially its source of timber and minerals. 
Libya's role in the Liberian civil war is twofold, 
first as an arms supplier to the NPFL forces and second as 
trainer to the initial troops of the NPFL. The Liberian 
civil war was an opportunity for Libya to challenge Nigeria 
as a rival in regional leadership and to undermine Nigeria's 
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efforts since Nigeria once helped in the evacuation of 
Libyan dissidents, from the Republic of Chad. Most 
important, Libya intervened in the war indirectly to 
attempt to dislodge Samuel Doe, who was thought of as a 
neocolonialist. Libya's intention was to replace Doe with 
Charles Taylor who would hopefully serve Libya's interest. 
Non-State Actors 
The United Nations came into Liberia's war theater late 
in 1992. They intervened in Liberia after an assessment of 
the situation made it clear that the security of the sub- 
region was threatened. The U.N. supported ECOWAS in calling 
for an armed embargo, a peaceful settlement of the crisis 
and holding of a democratic election. Playing a very 
minimal role in the Liberian crisis, the U.N. is to oversee 
the disarmament of the various factions while its agencies 
continued to be active in refugee operations both in Liberia 
as well as in neighboring states. 
The Banjul Accord - 1990 
On August 6, 1990, the ECOWAS Heads of States met in 
Banjul, the Gambia for their 13th summit. This meeting was 
necessary for the discussion of the deplorable situation in 
Liberia and ways of ending the crisis. It also brought to 
the table Côte d'Ivoire's role in the conflict by first 
providing arms passage from Burkina Faso to Charles Taylor 
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and second, supplying arms to the NPFL of Charles Taylor. 
These actions were in sharp violation of the clause in the 
OAU Charter, which called for the non-intervention in the 
internal affairs of member states. This summit also 
established an ECOWAS Cease-Fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) 
to observe and maintain cease-fire among the various 
factions. 
A national conference of all Liberian political parties 
and other interest groups was called to establish an interim 
government. It was also suggested that Samuel Doe should 
resign as President and should not participate in the 
elections of 1991. This August meeting was noted for 
setting in motion events that were to occur in Liberia in 
the future. 
The Bamoko Peace Plan--1990 
The Bamoko Accord is noted for its important decision 
of forging a cease-fire agreement between all the major 
belligerent factions, the AFL, the NPFL and the INPFL. This 
cease-fire agreement effectively ended the Liberian civil 
conflict and also called for help from international 
humanitarian relief organizations. 
The Lome Convent ion--1991 
Among other personalities attending this meeting were 
Lt. Gen. Hezekiah Bowen for the AFL, Charles Taylor as Head 
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of the NPFL, Prince Y. Johnson as leader of the INPFL and 
Dr. Amos Sawyer as the Head of the Interim Government of 
National Unity. This meeting was called to enable all 
parties concerned to meet and develop modalities for 
implementing the cease-fire agreement. Also of importance 
during this meeting was the agreement by the Republic of 
Mali to contribute troops to ECOMOG operations in Liberia. 
The All Liberian Conference II--1991 
In 1990, the first All Liberian Conference met in 
Banjul and decided to organize a government in conformity 
with the Liberian constitution. Dr. Amos Sawyer was elected 
as the interim president. The Second National Conference of 
all political parties, the Independent National Patriotic 
Front of Liberia, and various interest groups met again from 
March 16th to April 2, 1991 to elect a new interim 
government. This time representatives of the Economic 
Community of West African States as well as Liberians living 
abroad were invited. Citing security concerns, Charles 
Taylor did not attend this meeting but sent representatives. 
The NPFL's demands to replace the conference co- 
chairman Archbishop Michael Francis due to his anti-NPFL 
orientation and to establish a three-member interim 
presidency to include a member of the NPFL were all 
rejected. The rejection of this proposal was just cause for 
the NPFL delegation to walk out of the meeting. The 
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conference continued with its deliberations and re-elected 
Dr. Amos Sawyer as the interim president. 
Formation of the Interim Government 
The composition of the second Interim Government of 
National Unity did not differ greatly from the first. The 
former Dean of the Liberal Arts College of the University of 
Liberia and Chairman of the constitutional drafting 
commission, Dr. Amos Sawyer was re-elected as the President 
of the Interim Government. The INPFL took the Vice 
presidency (Dr. Peter Naigow, a former Doe Cabinet member). 
With separate and co-equal branches, vis, legislative, 
executive and judiciary, the unitary republican form of 
government was maintained. The Interim Legislative Assembly 
(ILA) had representatives from each of the existing thirteen 
counties, two from each six existing political parties, six 
from the National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), and 
four from the Independent National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (INPFL). The position of the Interim Speaker of the 
House was set aside for the NPFL, as well as three seats in 
the Supreme Court. It was further agreed that Charles 
Taylor would be the only top official in the interim 
government to contest for the Presidency in the election to 
come. Despite all these concessions to the NPFL, Charles 
Taylor rejected all decisions made. 
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Formation of the Transitional National Government 
The Liberian National Transitional Government took off 
from the pre-existing Interim Government of National Unity 
(IGNU), which was also the only internationally recognized 
body in the Liberian situation. Charles Taylor's NPFL which 
was not represented at the executive council of state, had 
meanwhile continued to rule over what he called Greater 
Liberia. He created the Government of the National 
Patriotic Reconstruction Assembly with its headquarters in 
Gbarnga--about ninety miles from Monrovia. The Liberian 
National Transitional Government superseded the Interim 
Government of National Unity under the Cotonou Accord. The 
government was maintained with almost the same personnel and 
with an alliance of about seven political parties. The 
Transitional Government was expected to continue its 
administration of Liberia until a general election was held. 
ECOWAS decided to intervene in the Liberian crisis 
since it was believed that the tragic situations of the 
Liberian magnitude cannot be left to local actors when the 
extent of human suffering and destruction of life and 
property far exceeded what should be tolerable, even by 
minimum standards of human dignity and global 
responsibility. 
It is ECOWAS' intention to help the Liberians to seek, 
not the political kingdom first, but to work together in 
bringing their country back together again. A peaceful and 
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stable Liberia would best serve all their interest, but for 
now, they seem stuck with earlier attachments. 
Liberia After the 1995 Abuja Accord 
Soon after President Jerry Rawlings of Ghana was 
elected Chairman of ECOWAS in August 1994, he moved quickly 
to commit to a quick resolution to the Liberian crisis. He 
acknowledged that the Liberian war was a costly human and 
financial venture that was losing political support in West 
Africa, especially in those countries participating in 
ECOMOG. He further warned the warlords that unless they 
talked about peace seriously, the monitoring group will be 
pulled out of Liberia.3 
With Rawlings' strong words for peace, the Akosombo 
Peace Accord was signed with only key factional leaders of 
Liberia. This hastily convened peace talk failed to 
materialize partly because of the exclusion of some splinter 
groups in the Liberian equation. These Ghanian-led peace 
talks fell short of expectations in various areas. They 
were widely criticized for insensitivity to genuine peace 
efforts by attempting to undercut the efforts of Liberians 
to talk peace among themselves. The Akosombo Accord also 
appeared to be appeasing and rewarding the warlords. The 
accord was criticized for its failure to reach an agreement 
3"Rawlings Pledges to End Liberian Crises," in the 
Journal of Modern African Studies 34, no. 3 (September 
1996) : 
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on the composition and the chairmanship of the suggested 
Council of States. In addition, it was widely criticized 
for its proposed (then abandoned) plan to create a new 
regime to be headed by a ninety-year-old Chief, Tamba Taylor 
(no relation to Charles Taylor). 
The Nigerian leadership quickly decided to topple the 
Ghanian peace plan as part of an attempt to thwart Rawlings 
grand desire of attaining the stature of an international 
statesman. Nigeria went ahead and convened a meeting at 
Abuja in May of 1995, which Charles Taylor refused to 
attend. However, another meeting was held in Nigeria's 
capital, Aubja, on 16th of August 1996 with the leaders of 
all the belligerent factions in attendance. Wilston 
Sankawulo, 58, was nominated to chair the "Collective 
Presidency" or the "Council of States," which was to be 
formed two weeks later. Civilian and military groups were 
represented in the five member council of states. Each 
representative, Charles Taylor (NPFL), Dr. George Boley 
(LPC), Alhaji Kromah (ULIMO), Oscar Quiah (Liberian National 
Council), and Tamba Taylor had equal status of Vice 
Chairman. Disarmament was scheduled to start in December 
1995, with elections to be supervised by foreign observers 
in August 1996. With the exception of the Chairman, any 
member of the council who resigns three months before the 
election can be eligible to contest for any office. 
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Observers of the Liberian situation believed this to be the 
best chance for peace. 
The Abuja accord of 1995 had some serious setbacks for 
the Liberian peace process. Though these mistakes were not 
deliberate, they set off a chain of events in this war-torn 
nation. The first mistake was the decision to exclude 
Johnson (as a leader of a major belligerent faction) from 
the Council of States. The decision to reject and exclude 
Johnson from the Council of States was based on the fact 
that he was from the Khran ethnic group. Since the Khran 
ethnic group is made up of about four percent (4%) of the 
entire Liberian population, it was agreed to limit its 
membership and representation in the council. Johnson was, 
however, compensated with an offer as Minister of Rural 
Development, a position that he used to accumulate arms and 
ammunition seized from captured ECOMOG troops. 
The second mistake was allowing militia forces from 
various belligerent factions to enter Monrovia in large 
numbers. These militias were not disarmed and were not 
mobilized outside the capital. Johnson's troops soon began 
attacking aid and relief convoys, captured and killed 
several ECOMOG soldiers. Due to this act of sabotage, 
Johnson was rejected as a factional leader and dismissed as 
Minister of Rural Development. 
The chain of events of April 1996 was triggered when 
Charles Taylor, acting in concert with Alhaji Kromah, 
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dispatched an elite force to arrest Johnson on charges of 
war crimes and murder. Johnson's supporters interpreted 
Taylor's decision to oust Johnson as a calculated attempt to 
exclude the Khrans from the benefit of peace in the post-war 
Liberia. This led many Liberians to question Taylor's 
intentions as a law enforcer when he (Charles Taylor) was 
responsible for the death of about 150,000 Liberians and the 
execution of hundreds of his own supporters in 1989. 
Johnson did not deny these charges, but argued that there 
was no reason for him to be treated differently from the 
other warlords. 
Following this April 1996 incident, Liberia witnessed 
the worst mass violence since Taylor's 1992 "Operation 
Octopus." Johnson escaped and took refuge with the AFL at 
the Barclay Barracks. As the fighting continued, US Marines 
for the first time killed three Liberians on April 30 when 
the US embassy came under attack. ECOMOG remained neutral 
and treated the matter as an internal affairs. 
A revised Abuja accord was signed on August 17, 1996, 
in which Mr. Sankawulo was replaced by Mrs. Ruth Sando Perry 
as the Council Chairperson. As a former senator, she became 
Africa's first woman Head of State at age 57. The 
composition of the Council remained unchanged as it moved 
ahead to make far reaching decisions. The new agreement 
incorporates threats to warlords and their families, threats 
of assets freezing, a ban on travel, expulsion from ECOWAS 
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member-states and the possibility of establishing war crime 
tribunals to try warlords who continue to be belligerent and 
are accused of human right violation. 
The Abuja accord further called for disarmament and 
demobilization by January 1997 and the dissolution of all 
warring factions by 28 February. It also set the tone for 
campaign and elections to be held in May 31, 1997. The 
elected government was inaugurated on June 15, 1997. 
The United States has pledged to increase their 
financial support for an enlarged ECOMOG. There is revived 
hope in ECOWAS peace plan and raised optimism that the 
salvaged Abuja peace plan will restore peace to one of 
Africa's oldest and troubled societies--Liberia. This study 
hopes that this is the time for Liberians to seriously 
tackle their country's unresolved past by beginning to 
reconstruct their own institutions and civil society. 
Conclusion 
As a new agenda for international security in a 
changing world, ECOWAS' initiative in using military forces 
to meet humanitarian needs has raised a heightened sense of 
awareness among leaders in Africa and elsewhere. ECOMOG has 
provided some useful factors to the abilities and 
limitations for regional conflict management in a post-cold 
war Africa, although a conclusive resolution of the Liberian 
conflict still remains elusive. 
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This chapter elucidates that in circumstances as the 
Liberian crises, intervention offers an apparent swift and 
easy way to reverse unfavorable trends. These unfavorable 
trends are the social dislocation in the form of labor 
unrest and strikes, heightened class antagonisms, and anonic 
violence, which was perceived to threaten both national and 
regional security. ECOMOG intervention in the Liberian 
civil war helped to end the prevailing ethnic dominance and 
ushered in political pluralism in Liberia. 
CHAPTER VI 
IMPACT OF ECOWAS' INTERVENTION IN THE LIBERIAN CIVIL WAR 
ON WEST AFRICA: CONCLUSION AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
Overview 
The fierce struggle to acquire or retain power along 
with its related material benefits by both the Liberian 
civilian and military leaders fueled ethnic violence across 
the country. The Armed Forces of Liberia and the National 
Democratic Party of Liberia became vehicles to promote 
Samuel Doe's sentiments and spread terror within the land. 
The consequences of the impact of ECOWAS intervention in the 
Liberian civil war was far reaching. ECOWAS overall 
interest in bringing the conflict to an end and returning 
Liberia and the whole sub-region of West Africa to stability 
was paramount. 
Background 
This chapter assesses the impact and grave concern of 
ECOWAS' intervention in the Liberian civil war. In Liberia, 
the ECOWAS countries utilized their military, humanitarian, 
economic and political power to influence the AFL, NPFL, the 
INPFL and other belligerent factions. The impact of the 
influence exerted by ECOMOG was instrumental in bringing all 
the warring factions to the bargaining table, and ultimately 
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to signing a cease-fire agreement. Liberia was also 
impacted by ECOMOG's intervention by the formation of first, 
an interim government, to be followed by the formation of a 
transitional government to govern Liberia until elections 
are held. 
ECOMOG's intervention in Liberia filled a power vacuum 
created by the war. The economic, political and military 
weaknesses of Liberia made it vulnerable to armed attacks by 
bands of renegade soldiers fighting for vengeance over one 
issue or another. The power vacuum in Nimba county (since 
the death of Quoimkpa) encouraged the rebel NPFL to use it 
as a springboard on December 24, 1989, to launch an invasion 
of Liberia. It was the existence of a power vacuum and the 
lack of effective central authority in Liberia that 
encouraged Libya to continue supplying arms to Charles 
Taylor's NPFL and to dislodge what was left of Samuel Doe 
and his army. 
The existence of a power vacuum in Liberia drew the 
OAU, UN, ECOWAS and other governmental and non-governmental 
agencies into action to attempt to rescue Liberia and bring 
it back on its feet. In their attempt to forge a common 
goal and act in concert in achieving set goals, each 
government or non-government agency was also propagating its 
military, strategic and ideological interest hoping to 
influence the other. 
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The quest for a democratic and peaceful solution to the 
Liberian situation are considered to be the main cause of 
ECOMOG's involvement in the Liberian conflict. ECOMOG's 
approach regarding democracy and peace is often exhibited by 
superpowers, regional and non-governmental agencies 
throughout the world to promote their vital interests and 
ideologies. In essence, such an activity represents a new 
form of international imperialism and neo-colonialism if the 
intervening forces decide to remain indefinitely in the 
country they occupy. First, by seeking to establish 
democracy and maintain peace in Liberia, the ECOWAS 
countries were also making it known that Africa is capable 
of solving an African problem. 
Second, ECOWAS' intervention in Liberia involved the 
search for the establishment of a strategic sphere of 
influence by some member countries, such as Nigeria. It was 
hoped that West African countries will actually, regardless 
of their different orientations and colonial upbringing, act 
together in a show of unity and purpose. While the Liberian 
crisis and ECOWAS' intervention was a documented case in 
contemporary African politics, it would be erroneous to 
conclude that political instability alone was the cause of 
conflict in Liberia. The conflict was a result of other 
factors, such as ideological, economic, personal 
disagreements within the ruling circle, long term 
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oppression, denial and gross violation of human rights and 
the lack of effective leadership. 
The conflict in Liberia involved cross-cutting 
alliances which made the outcome highly unpredictable. The 
involvement of Libya, Burkina-Faso, Côte d'Ivoire and the 
checquered relationship of the United States with the AFL, 
followed by its neutrality with ECOMOG complicated matters 
for ECOWAS as an organization dealing with a regional 
crisis. Moreover, especially with Libya, it had deepened 
the traditional Francophone-Anglophone ideological 
confrontation. 
Third, ECOWA'S strategic interest in bringing the 
Liberian crisis to an end is guided by four elements which 
have had an impact on the sub-region. First, ECOWAS' 
interest was to see that there was a political stability and 
politico-economic development in Liberia and in all the 
countries in the sub-region. Second, Liberia received from 
ECOWAS millions of dollars in economic and financial aid. 
Apart from economic and financial aid, there was commercial 
investment in such areas as oil, energy needs, etc. Third, 
traditional West African countries have been in favor of 
freedom of movement open to all without hindrance. Fourth, 
the intervention hoped to discourage dissident groups in 
other countries from carrying out coups or engaging in civil 
war. 
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In a continuous effort to emphasize the impact of 
ECOWAS intervention in the Liberian crisis on West African 
countries, this study states that the civil war in Liberia 
threatens an increase in military coups, promotes repression 
and also generates dependency. The influence of military 
activities in West African states created an atmosphere of 
increased tension and the need for nations in the sub-region 
to equip themselves militarily and unite to fight off the 
rebel Charles Taylor in Liberia. This diverted attention in 
each country in the West African sub-region from internal 
social problems. 
The worst-case scenario about consequences of the 
Liberian civil war was the case of refugees. Most of the 
refugees fled from Liberia to neighboring countries (see 
Fig. 3 and Table 8) mainly from political persecution, 
fighting and fear of death. The flood of refugees driven 
out of Liberia by oppression, war, fear of death and border 
warfare combined with Liberia's own deteriorating economic 
situation (or what is left of it) to evoke sympathy and 
massive humanitarian aid from Africa, the United States, the 
United Nations and many other non-governmental agencies all 
over the world. The mobility of humans across national 
boundaries for fear of political persecution, to escape 
fighting and for economic redress constitute another focus 
of analysis. According to Jerry L. Weaver (in 1985), 
population movements across the African continent form a 
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major theme as the movement usually occurs in response to 
natural disasters or to pressure from a neighboring 
community. Today he contends, political and ecological 
forces still produce massive migrations, albeit with a new 
dimension of concentrations in urban areas.1 
Fig. 3. Partial Map of West Africa Showing Major Countries 
of Refugee Flow 
Source: Crisis in Liberia: The Regional Impact and a Review 
of U.S. Policy and Markup of H.R. 994, July 10 and 
24, 1991. 
1Jerry L. Weaver, "Sojourner Along the Nile: Ethiopian 
Refugee in Khartoum," Journal of Modern African Studies 23, 
no. 1 (1985): 147-154. 
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TABLE 8 
AFRICA'S WARS AS SOURCES OF REFUGEES AND 
INTERNALLY DISPLACED PERSONS, 1992 
War Refugees Displaced Persons 
Mozambique 1,725,000a 3,500,000 
Somalia 864,800a 2,000,000 
Ethiopia and Eritrea 834,800 600,000 
Liberia 599,200a 600,000 
Angola 404,200 900,000 
Sudan 263,000 5,000,000 





Western Sahara 165,000b - 
Chad 24,000a - 
Totals 5,281,500 13,150,000 
Source: U.S. Committee for Refugees, World Refugee Survey, 
1993 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Committee for 
Refugees, 1993), 52. 
a Indicates that sources may vary significantly in number reported 
(World Refugee Survey). 
b This is the number given by the Algerian government and used by 
relief agencies. The U.S. government estimate has been 50,000. 
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According to Mr. Cohen, some 750,000 refugees crossed 
the borders into Côte d'Ivoire, Sierra Leone and Guinea, 
overburdening social facilities and undermining local 
development effort.2 The city of Monrovia normally had 
about 400,000 people, but now is over populated with an 
estimate of over 900,000 inhabitants. It is also estimated 
that out of the total number of refugees fleeing Liberia due 
to the war, about 320,000 are in Côte d'Ivoire, 420,000 in 
Guinea, and 20,000 in Sierra Leone. While these three West 
African countries had borne the brunt of the Liberian 
refugee crisis, other countries have also felt the impact. 
There are about 20,000 Liberian refugees in Ghana while 
Gambia and Nigeria similarly host smaller numbers (Table 9). 
TABLE 9 
DISTRIBUTION OF REFUGEES 
Total Internal External Host Countries and 
Number of Refugees 
Received 
1,884,000 1,100,000 784,000 Guinea 420,000 
Cote d'Ivoire 320,000 
Ghana 20,000 
Sierra Leone 20,000 
Nigeria 4,000 
Source: World Refugee Survey, 1995 (Washington, D.C.: 
Immigration and Refugee Services of America, 1995), 
42-44 . 
2Herman J. Cohen, Assistant Secretary, Bureau of 
African Affairs, Department of State. Crisis in Liberia: 
The Regional Impact and a review of U.S. policy and markup 
of H.R. 994, July 16 and 24, 1949, p. 4. 
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The researcher would also like to point out that the 
crisis has generated movement of people not termed refugees. 
West African countries had to cope with third country 
nationals fleeing Liberia as well as the return of thousands 
of their own nationals who had lived and worked in Liberia. 
Notably, these large-scale movements of people across many 
countries, especially those who fled to the forest region of 
Guinea, made coordination of relief initially very 
difficult. 
Within Liberia itself, the damage to infrastructure was 
extensive. Although electric, water and telephone services 
were sporadic in downtown Monrovia, and ship and air traffic 
can reach Freeport or Spriggs Payne Field, basic services 
were cut off in most of the country. The problems of 
Liberian refugees were important for West African countries. 
In terms of the provision of food, shelter, clothing, health 
care and employment, in addition to controlling increasing 
crime. 
This crisis has seriously threatened regional security 
in West Africa. As a result of Charles Taylor's desire to 
greatly sponsor the overthrow of those governments that are 
in support of the ECOWAS peace initiative, on March 23, 
1991, marauding rebel forces from the NPFL moved across the 
border into Sierra Leone. These rebels were pillaging, 
occupying towns and terrorizing local populations in the 
East and Northeast of the country. This was done with the 
160 
help of dissident Sierra Leonians who had become members of 
the National Patriotic Front of Liberia. The leaders of the 
region became concerned for regional stability and security 
within their own respective countries. With help from such 
friendly countries like Nigeria, Guinea and even the United 
States, Sierra Leone gradually gained back its territory. 
The West African sub-region was impacted by a rift that 
nearly caused the collapse of the organization. Due to 
suspicion and the lack of trust of the ECOWAS peace plan by 
mainly Nigeria, Gambia, Ghana and Guinea, the former Ivorian 
President, Felix Houphouet-Boigny led the West African 
Francophone countries to boycott participation in the peace 
plan. In order to save the organization, serious diplomatic 
initiative efforts were carried out and the ECOWAS-led peace 
effort was reformulated to include Ivory Coast and other 
Francophone countries in the sub-region. 
The irrational and unwarranted killing of innocent 
civilians in Liberia created both tension and anxiety in the 
subregion. The killing of foreigners generated fear that 
superpowers might be attracted into the subregion to display 
their power and weapons of war. This failed to materialize 
due to effective leadership and political maneuvering of the 
ECOWAS leaders and the demise of the Soviet Union. The 
internationalization of the Liberian crisis impacted and 
prolonged the war and above all, it affected the domestic 
politics of some member states. For example, there were 
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questions and concerns asked by some participating ECOWAS 
countries and the general population about the expenditure 
to be incurred by each country, and the length of 
intervention in the crisis. 
The economic effect of ECOWAS' intervention in the 
Liberian civil crisis is felt by all participating ECOWAS 
countries. ECOWAS countries face the diversion of 
developmental resources to financing peace keeping in 
Liberia through funding the ECOMOG. Sierra Leone, Guinea 
and Côte d'Ivoire are not wealthy nations. Food, health 
care, education and transportation are major problems in 
ordinary times. These countries welcomed many refugees over 
the past year. In some cases, there were long-standing 
kinship and business ties across the border, which was 
reflected by Liberians, Cote d'Ivorians, Sierra Leonians and 
Guineans having resided in each other1s countries for long 
period, married, or having made shorter business trips. For 
most Liberians, there are no direct ties in any of these 
countries but they (Liberians) help in sharing the rents and 
tending the fields rather than being in a refugee camp far 
away. In most cases, Liberian students were admitted to 
schools even up to the university level. These add to the 
drain of the economy of the host country. In the city of 
Freetown where employment was extremely scarce and wages 
low, citizens and visitors suffered. As an example, a 
teacher earns about $25-$40 per month, but pays about 
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$20-$25 per 50 kilo bag of rice per family of six, thereby 
finding it difficult to sustain his family and feed a 
refugee family member. Liberians are taking over the taxi 
industry to the dismay of some Sierra Leonian drivers. In 
some of the West African countries, there are large and 
available quantities of goods, increased population, but few 
customers to buy the available products. 
In summary, warfare is nothing new to the subregion of 
West Africa. Conflict is not a completely new experience 
for the people of Liberia given its history. What is new is 
the magnitude of the present Liberian crisis in terms of 
destruction of lives and property, social and economic 
depreciation as well as political denial. Also noted as new 
is the level of involvement to restore stability and 
maintain peace by a regional organization. The core 
interest of the regional organization had to be achieved 
under three guiding principles: (1) the value placed on the 
objectives, (2) the time element to achieving the set 
objective, and (3) the type of demands imposed on all the 
parties involved in the conflict in order to achieve its 
obj ectives. 
In the Liberian situation, the intervention and the 
crisis impacted both Liberia and the subregion of West 
Africa in all spheres. Finally, as a result of ECOWAS' 
intervention in the Liberian civil crisis, policy makers 
must be sensitive to the problem of perception and bias. 
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Conclusion 
Liberia, one of the first African countries to elude 
colonialism, and one of the first African countries to gain 
independence, was also one of the first African countries to 
attempt to pursue a policy of economic reforms. Until the 
outbreak of the civil war, the Liberian economy stood at a 
crossroads between upward mobility and deterioration. Some 
writers on African politics postulate that this single 
factor was the cause of the military takeover in Liberia. 
This study also states that one does not have to be a vulgar 
Marxist to recognize that a stagnating economy in 
conjunction with rising unemployment and underdevelopment, 
recurrent balance-of-payment crises, and flagrant corruption 
create an environment in which military coups can become 
highly probable events. In fact, the likelihood of military 
intervention rises with the perceived deterioration of 
economic conditions, especially if accompanied by a belief 
that the government cannot resolve, or is responsible for 
this deterioration. This was the case in Liberia. 
Because of the descriptive and historical approaches 
used in this study, most conclusions have already been 
stated or are so obvious as to need no iteration or 
amplification. Nevertheless, a few points do need refining, 
especially given the sequential relationship of the events 
that occurred in Liberia. 
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When Liberia's economy was destroyed, real growth 
remained at a very minimal level and per capita income was 
nothing laudable. This left Liberia as one of the world's 
poorest nations with questions and concerns as to whether 
Liberia will ever cross the poverty line in the next 100 
years. What will it take for Liberia to attain democratic 
rule, rid itself of factional fights, attain a sustainable 
economic growth by the year 2000? What Liberian policy 
makers and ECOWAS peacemakers need to do is to (1) disarm 
all warring factions, (2) maintain a sustainable peace, (3) 
hold free and fair elections, and (4) begin to focus 
attention on short-term as well as long-term growth and 
development. 
In general, the state of Liberia since its inception 
has been poised for conflict. When the conflict had to 
occur or what form and duration it had to take was not 
known. The foundation of the state formation, 
maladministration, oppression, ethnic clashes, poor 
governance and people yearning for a change are some of the 
significant factors that brought about a coup. Military 
leadership under Samuel Doe was not any better than his 
civilian predecessor. The result of a chaotic Liberia was 
an eventual war. The escalation of the war and the desire 
to bring it under control and to an end called for outside 
forces to intervene to save lives and not to take sides in 
the fighting. 
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In intervening, ECOWAS countries became experienced in 
negotiations, knowing how to make deals more than how to 
keep them. The act of intervention was necessary because 
Nomads and agriculturalists, Muslims and Christians, Arabs 
and indigenous Africans, clans and subclans all confronted 
each other in a complex mosaic of overlapping interests and 
loyalties, which criss-crossed state boundaries. 
The basic social divisions that existed in Liberia 
created pressures on and opportunities for outside forces to 
intervene. The intervention brought about the end of 
hostilities (at least for now) among all the warring 
factions, set up a transitional government, and made it 
possible for a return to normalcy in some parts of Monrovia 
and has given hope for some Liberians. The ECOWAS countries 
once again re-established unity among themselves regardless 
of ideological differences. It has also proved that a 
regional economic organization could transform parts of its 
services to perform a tough military duty and in so doing 
have "an African solution to an African problem." 
The cessation of hostilities and the end of the civil 
war will not solve the problems that had been embedded in 
Liberian history since its independence in 1847. Postwar 
Liberia must be ready to address the numerous problems 
always associated with postwar reconstruction, 
rehabilitation and be able to put Liberia on the road to 
recovery. 
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Greater government transparency, due process and speedy 
divestiture are necessary to rebuild confidence, while at 
the same time showing continuity and pragmatism. One of the 
most important recommendations is for the reconstitution of 
the Liberian military to be a fair, just, disciplined and 
professional military, where all citizens of Liberia can 
enlist. 
This study does not renounce either the military or 
civilian administration, but disapproves the use that 
certain people have made of the military and civilian 
administration. What this researcher wants is for a 
military or civilian administration to be placed in the 
service of the Liberian people and not the Liberian people 
placed in the service of the military or civilian 
administrators. 
In the Liberian situation, the priorities for domestic 
policies are clear. As is generally recognized by policy 
makers in the sub-region, the focus of reforms (post-war) 
needs to be structured and aimed at improving the supply and 
manufacturing economies in order to ensure sustained growth, 
employment creation and development. However, the 
effectiveness of these measures in Liberia will also depend 
on the implementation of a consistent mix of macroeconomic 
stabilization policies, including pursuit of appropriate 
fiscal and monetary policies. The human resource base of 
Liberia is its key asset. Since education is the important 
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means of increasing the productivity and income of workers, 
there is a particular need to intensify efforts to educate 
the general population. If Liberia is to avoid its past 
mistakes and survive in the years ahead, it must integrate 
continued political change and economic growth into its 
policies. 
This study found out that Liberia is one of Africa's 
most exciting living laboratories of social and political 
change. Capitalist, socialist, feudal, and mercantilist 
economies exist in a variety of forms, along with numerous 
hybrids of these major types. The political structures vary 
from repressive authoritarian regimes, which ignore 
democratic processes and ride roughshod over human rights, 
to liberal and democratic polities, whose citizens wanted to 
be as free as any in the world. In between are a variety of 
halfway houses, with combined civilian and military 
features, and transitional regimes of various kinds, some 
tending toward democracy, others seemingly going back toward 
authoritarianism. The social systems also range from feudal 
and two class to multiclass pluralistic to socialist. The 
most primitive and backward conditions prevail in some 
areas, the most sophisticated and modern in others. 
What helps make Liberia such a fascinating laboratory 
for political science study is not only these differences, 
but the common background of the citizens that make up the 
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country. Few parts of Africa offer such fruitful conditions 
for research. 
Although the main structures of Liberian society and 
polity remained quite stable for a long period of time, 
extending from the settler period into the nineteenth 
century, in recent decades, need for change process has been 
greatly accelerated. This study identified six major areas 
to change: political culture and values, the economic 
structure, social and class structure, political groups and 
organizations, the range of public policy, and the 
international environment. 
Liberian political culture is undergoing 
transformation. New values and ideologies had challenged 
the old belief systems, and new communications and 
transportation grids were increasingly breaking down 
traditional isolation. Although there were enormous 
variations within the country, it is plain that the older 
authoritarian and hierarchical assumptions were being 
questioned everywhere, the older bases of legitimacy were 
being challenged, and a great variety of new ideologies were 
competing for people's minds. 
The economic system has also altered dramatically. 
These economic changes have served to accelerate social 
change. A new labor class has risen up, wresting power from 
the old elites but often so internally divided as to offer 
few possibilities for stable rule. The elite groups 
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themselves are now increasingly differentiated between old 
landed wealth and new industrial, banking, commercial, and 
manufacturing elements. The social composition of the 
church and the military has changed from upper to middle 
class. An urban sub-proletariat has emerged in Liberia. In 
the countryside the lethargic and tradition-bound peasant of 
the past has become restless and, in some cases, organized 
and mobilized. 
The political system has changed concomitantly. New 
political parties have been formed, often replacing elite 
factions; they are organized around new ideological 
principles and often are mass based. Large-scale 
organizations of workers, peasants, university students, and 
professionals have emerged. These are no longer nations in 
which a handful of oligarchs, clerics, and military officers 
dominate national life; increasingly competitive and 
pluralistic societies have evolved, and there is a great 
variety of competing interests. The United States is a 
major influence on the Liberian political systems, bringing 
both benefits and a situation of dependency. 
Liberia's recuperation will depend critically on 
endogenous economic development. What needs to be done is 
to empower Liberia and African states, preferably through 
OAU, ECOWAS and other sub-regional organizations for 
economic self-sufficiency, industrialization and internal 
commerce such as trade, monetary union, travel, transport, 
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communications, economic development, defense, energy, 
agriculture, social programs, tourism, environment, to 
mention just a few. The prospects for internal economic 
development in Liberia have dramatically improved now that 
South Africa has formed the country's first, and the 
continent's last majority rule government. South Africa's 
eventual participation in African continental activities, if 
properly organized, could empower the organization's 
economic agenda. 
Liberia needs to address deficiencies in institutional 
and physical structures, economic strategies and policies 
that have fallen short, in some cases, of achieving their 
objectives. Disparities in urban and rural development and 
income distribution, insufficient managerial administrative 
capacities, inadequate human resources development, 
ineffective political leadership and lack of financial 
resources, needs to be addressed. Venal administration, 
organization of political power, the problem of political 
participation, the question of democracy, and political 
instability giving rise to a large refugee population, 
requires initial examination. The former include such 
factors as the international economic recession, the decline 
in commodity prices, adverse terms of trade, the decline in 
financial flows, increased protectionism and high interest 
rates. More importantly, these issues are to be seriously 




In general, the researcher suggests that education, 
infrastructure, telecommunications, market development and 
technological innovation be pursued with paced 
aggressiveness. A corrective measure must be taken to bring 
about economic and social equality, which would bridge the 
wide gap between the poor majority of about 70 percent and 
the affluent 5 percent minority of the population. It would 
be essential to maintain stability and economic equality as 
a prerequisite for accelerated growth. Poverty and 
unemployment must be fought against at all levels. 
Specifically, and in order for Liberians' domestic 
activities to be successful, its post war activities must 
focus on: 
(1) education, literacy and public sector discipline. 
Education spending should be focused on literacy 
programs and primary education as a precondition 
for rapid growth. Liberia needs to focus the bulk 
of its education spending on literacy programs and 
primary education, but rely on private resources 
and on governmental organizations to finance its 
growing secondary education programs. In order 
for the project to be successful, all Liberians, 
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the ECOWAS countries and the international 
community must join forces together in working 
aggressively towards its implementation. This 
reform policy will help Liberia in its growth and 
thus impact West Africa. 
(2) The impact on Liberia's civil war in Liberia and 
West Africa's health care is evidenced in various 
types of disease, sickness, infant mortality and 
war related deaths witnessed in Liberia and spread 
to neighboring countries refugees and those fleeing 
Liberia for their lives. 
In order to have a healthy population and a 
healthy nation, emphasis should be placed in 
ensuring equitable primary health and preventive 
care as far as the hinterland. Each West African 
country, the private sector and the World Health 
Organization (WHO) must institute a program to 
combat not just war related health problems, but 
also tropical diseases. 
(3) Foreign firms and Liberians abroad can play a key 
role in Liberia's drive towards an open export- 
oriented economy by opening up markers in Liberia 
and West Africa. Efforts should be made to form 
partnerships with foreign businesses which can in 
turn engineer the transfer of technology to 
Liberia. 
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(4) The Liberian leadership must agree to make possible 
systemic improvements in the area of social 
equality without committing political suicide. 
Sensitive consulting may help learn from past 
mistakes, while adopting a systematic approach and 
analyze confidentially the various categories of 
political benefits. 
(5) This study further recommends that Liberia and the 
ECOWAS leadership jointly develop strategies that 
would recognize threats and take steps to eradicate 
them. Security measures should be taken by Liberia 
and each ECOWAS country to counter internal threats 
or transnational breach of security. 
(6) International initiatives that can help engender 
both the will to fight political upheaval and 
economic disaster is recommended. Despite the 
obvious sensitivity of devising and implementing 
strategies to combat maladministration, 
competition, abuse of power, etc., international 
organizations can help by providing aid to support 
Liberia's and West African democratic reforms, more 
competitive economies and improved governance. 
(7) This study forcefully recommends that ECOWAS have a 
standing military force that can respond almost 
immediately to any threat of stability within the 
region. It is also recommended that ECOWAS should 
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invite other African countries to participate in 
future conflict resolution or peace keeping 
activity. 
As a final caveat on a difficult area of discourse, 
argument should not be made that civil liberties are 
important only because they are instrumental to greater 
government efficiency. Rather, as was the case in Liberia, 
it should be stressed that civil liberties along with other 
forms of expression and incorporation of citizens' voices, 
do appear to have an instrumental value for improving 
Liberia's economic performance and for designing the 
mechanisms for delivering government services of all types-- 
from roads to schools. These linkages need to be better 
understood and incorporated, in ways that will vary, perhaps 
enormously, from sector to sector, into development 
activities in Liberia. 
APPENDIX A 
CHRONICLE OF EVENTS 
DECEMBER 24, 1989: An armed insurrection begins in the 
north-eastern border region of Nimba County. The rebels 
belong to a hitherto unknown opposition group, the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), led by Charles Taylor. 
MAY 28-30, 1990: Thirteenth Summit of ECOWAS in Banjul, The 
Gambia, established the Community Standing Mediation 
Committee, made up of The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Sierra 
Leone and Nigeria. Communiqué calls for immediate cease¬ 
fire in Liberia. 
JULY 1990: NPFL begins its military offensive in Monrovia. 
Taylor repeatedly demands Doe's resignation as a pre¬ 
condition for cease-fire and for talks. 
AUGUST 3, 1990: OAU Chairman, President Yowen Museveni of 
Uganda declares OAU support for any ECOWAS initiative in 
Liberia. 
AUGUST 3-8, 1990: Most foreign nationals and diplomatic 
staff are evacuated by a U.S. naval force. 
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AUGUST 8, 1990: The United States states that it will not 
intervene in Liberia, but will support any initiative 
designed to bring peace. 
AUGUST 9, 1990: Taylor's NPFL attacks Nigeria Embassy near 
Monrovia. 
AUGUST 31, 1990: ECOMOG gains control of Spriggs Payne 
Airport in Monrovia. 
SEPTEMBER 9-10, 1990: Samuel Doe is captured, tortured and 
killed by Yeduo Johnson's troops, and Johnson declares 
himself acting Head of State. 
SEPTEMBER 12, 1990: President Babangida, ECOWAS Executive 
Secretary Abas Bundu and Lt.-General Arnold Quainoo meet in 
Abuja. Quainoo subsequently announces that ECOMOG's mandate 
has changed from peace-keeping to peace-enforcement. ECOMOG 
embarks on air bombardment of rebel strongholds. 
NOVEMBER 28, 1990: Following negotiations organized by 
ECOWAS in Bamako, Mali, the NPFL, INPFL and AFL sign a 
cease-fire agreement. 
JANUARY 1991: Amos Sawyer nominates 6 ministers and 
announces that general elections would be held within a 
year. 
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JANUARY 22, 1991: UN Security Council issues a statement on 
the ECOWAS Peace Plan and urging all warring factions to 
cooperate with ECOMOG. 
MARCH 1991: NPFL rebels begin incursions into Sierra Leone. 
Several Sierra Leoneans are reported killed. 
APRIL 1991: Sierra Leonean forces enter Liberia, launching 
retaliatory strikes at the NPFL. 
APRIL 1991: Burkina Faso announces that it will send troops 
to ECOMOG. 
NOVEMBER 12, 1991: Mr. Daniel Berthoud, the new Head of the 
Delegation of the International Committee of the Red Cross, 
pays a courtesy visit to the ECOMOG Field Commander. 
JANUARY 17, 1992: "J.J. Roberts" five dollar note, the then 
Liberian official currency (which depicted J.J. Roberts, 
Liberia's first President) ceased to be legal tender. A new 
currency called "Liberty Five Dollar Note" is introduced. 
"Liberty" is, however, not accepted in NPFL and INPFL held 
areas. 
MARCH 11, 1992: Maj.-Gen. Bakut, ECOMOG Field Commander 
meets with the, Chairman, U.S. Joint chiefs of Staff, Gen. 
Collin Powell in Sierra Leone. 
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SEPTEMBER 8, 1992: The NPFL begins holding the ECOMOG 
troops deployed in its area "hostage" following its forceful 
disarming of the troops and public announcement that it will 
not allow the troops to leave its territory. 
SEPTEMBER 15, 1992: Release of all ECOMOG troops by the 
NPFL minus all equipment, vehicles, etc. 
OCTOBER 15, 1992: NPFL attack ECOMOG in its "Operation 
Octopus" 
OCTOBER 20, 1992: Prince Johnson surrenders to ECOMOG. 
OCTOBER 20, 1992: Sisters Barbara Ann and Mary Joel 
murdered by NPFL fighters near the Barnersville Estate. 
OCTOBER 23, 1992: Sisters Agnes, Shirley, and Kathleen 
murdered by NPFL fighters at their Convent in Gardnersville. 
MARCH 1994: The Liberian National Transitional Government 
formally took it seat. 
JUNE 1995: Charles Taylor, leader of the NPFL visited Abuja, 
Nigeria and apologized on Nigerian Television for his past 
antagonism towards ECOMOG and Nigeria in particular. 
JANUARY 1996: The death of about 130 Nigerians (in December 
1995) caused ECOWAS to suspend disarmament process 
indefinitely. 
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APRIL 1996: Fighting erupted in Monrovia when Taylor's elite 
forces stormed Johnson's headquarters in an attempt to 
capture and force him to stand trial for war crimes. 
MAY 1996: The US deployed about 2,000 Marines to protect the 
American Embassy and Mambo Point (the diplomatic 
headquarters where the fighting concentrated). 
MAY 1996: The second surge of the Liberian refugee were 
crammed into ships when they were refused entry to any 
neighboring states. 
APRIL 30 1996: The US Marines shot to death three Liberian 
militia men when the American Embassy came under attack. 
AUGUST 17 1996: At the Abuja accord, Mrs. Ruth Sando Perry 
replaced Mr. Sankawulo as council chairman and became the 
first woman to do so. 
JANUARY 27, 1997: Thousands of fighters from Liberia's rival 
militias turns in their arms in compliance with ECOMOG's 
disarmament program designed to dissolve militias by the end 
of January 1997. 
FEBRUARY 19, 1997: U.S. Air Force planes arrive in Ghana to 
transport Ghanain and Malian peacekeepers to Liberia. 
MARCH 10, 1997: ECOMOG forces search for arms in the homes 
of people related to Alhaji Kroman, one of the warlords at 
the center of the Liberian civil war. 
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JUNE 17, 1997: Mrs. Ellen Johnson-Sirleaf emerged as a 
strong challenger to Charles Taylor in Liberia's 
presidential election--among a poll of 10 other candidates. 
JULY 1997 : Charles Taylor is declared victorious and the 
winner of the Liberian presidential election. Charles 
Taylor is the Liberian President-Elect. 
181 
APPENDIX B 
THE TOTAL NUMBER OF EMIGRANTS FROM EACH STATE 
State Number State Number 
Alabama 13 Missouri 20 
Connecticut 5 New Jersey 1 
Delaware 2 New York 85 
District of Columbia 36 North Carolina 759 
Georgia 216 Ohio 22 
Illinois 22 Pennsylvania 71 
Iowa 3 Rhode Island 32 
Kentucky 138 South Carolina 181 
Louisiana 117 Tennessee 221 
Maryland 308 Virginia 1866 
Mississippi 427 Unknown Origin 21 
Grand Total 4,708 
Source: Presented at Annual Meeting. American Colonization 




OCCUPATION OF EMMIGRANTS SENT TO LIBERIA 
Occupation Number Occupation Number 
Barber 7 Oilmaker 1 
Barkeeper 1 Painter 1 
Blacksmith 20 Plasterer 1 
Brickmaker 2 Potter 1 
Brickmason 2 Preacher 12 
Bricklayer 4 Ropemaker 1 
Cabinetmaker 3 Saddler 2 
Carpenter 43 Sailmaker 2 
Caulker 2 Sawyer 20 
Coachman 2 Scrivener 1 
Cook 2 Seaman 15 
Cooper 13 Seamstress 21 
Druggist 1 Shipcarpenter 2 
Farmer 403 Shoemaker 44 
Fisherman 3 Stonecutter 1 
Hatter 1 Stonemason 16 
Laundress 12 Tailor 7 
Machinist 1 Teacher 4 
Mantuamaker 9 Trader 1 
Midwife 2 Turner 1 
Millwright 6 Tanner 2 
Nailmaker 1 Tobacconist 3 
Nurse 1 Wheelwright 6 
Source: Presented at Annual Meeting. American Colonization 













Source: Presented at Annual Meeting. American Colonization 




TREATY OF MESURADO 
"Agreement or the cession and purchase of lands, entered 
into between the Agent of the American Colonization Society 
and the Kings and Headmen of Cape Mesurado." The first 
significant instrument of territorial transfer between the 
repatriate Liberians (represented by the American 
Colonization Society and the United States government 
agents) and leaders of the Mambahn, Dei and Gola Liberians, 
whereby land was "ceded" by the latter to the former for the 
establishment of "a colony of freed American Negroes." This 
was the culmination of protracted and tedious negotiations 
marked by considerable misunderstanding, threats, 
counterthreats and intimidation, reflecting fundamental 
cultural differences and involving the interests of "slavers 
and their agents" in addition to those of the negotiating 
parties. Not only did this treaty lay the political 
foundation of the modern Liberian state, it was as well a 
major source of the disunity out of which Liberia was born. 
The "legal" document itself, drafted by U.S. Naval 
Lieutenant Robert F. Stockton and Colonial Agent Eli Ayres, 
and signed on December 15, 1821 by Stockton and Ayres on the 
one hand, and on the other by Kings Peter, George, Zoda, 
Long peter, Governor and Jimmy (witnessed by John S. Mill 
and John Craig), provided for a purchase price of $300 in 
the following articles of merchandise: "Six muskets, one box 
of beads, two hogshead of tobacco, one dozen knives and 
forks, one dozen spoons, one box of pipes, one keg of nails, 
twenty looking-glasses, ten iron pots, twelve guns, three 
barrels of gunpowder, one dozen plates, twenty hats, five 
casks of beef, five barrels of pork, ten barrels of 
biscuits, twelve decanters, twelve glass tumblers and fifty 
shoes." Only a portion of the merchandise was provided and 
the remainder promised. There is no evidence of this being 
subsequently provided. In January 1822, King George and 
others protested to authorities in Sierra Leone about the 
land transaction, but it seemed too late. Hostilities 
followed. [ACS 1825: 64-66; Cassell 1970: 67-68; Guannu 
1980b: 25-26] . 
Source: Presented at Annual Meeting. American Colonization 
Society, 1825 (Washington, D.C.), 64-66. 
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APPENDIX F 
ECONOMIC COMMUNITY OF WEST AFRICAN STATES 
FIRST SESSION OF THE COMMUNITY 
STANDING MEDIATION COMMITTEE 
BANJUL, 6-7 AUGUST 1990 
FINAL COMMUNIQUE 
The First Session of the ECOWAS Standing Mediation 
Committee was held at the Kairiba Conference Center, Banjul 
on 6 and 7 August, 1990. The Session was attended by the 
following Heads of State and Government and/or their 
accredited representatives: 
• His Excellency Alhaji Sir Dawda Kairiba Jawara, President 
of the Republic of the Gambia. 
• His Excellency Flight-Lt. Jerry John Rawlings, Head of 
State of the Republic of Ghana. 
• His Excellency General Lansana Conte, President of the 
Republic of Guinea. 
• His Excellency General Ibrahim Badamasi Babangida, 
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria. 
• His Excellency Dr. Joseph Saidu Momoh, President of the 
Republic of Sierra Leone. 
• Honourable Dr. N'golo Traore, Minister of Foreign Affairs 
and International Cooperation, Representing the President 
of the Republic of Mali. 
• Honourable Bitokotipou Yagninim, Minister of Justice, 
Representing the President of the Togolese Republic. 
• The Secretary-General of the O.A.U.; and 
• A Member of the Liberian Inter-Faith Mediation Committee. 
The Session was presided over by His Excellency Alhaji 
Sir Dawda K. Jawara, current Chairman of the ECOWAS 
Authority and Chairman of the Community Standing Mediation 
Committee. The Session was convened to review the current 
Liberian crisis and plan appropriate Community action with a 
view to re-establishing peace and security in Liberia. 
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Subsequent to the Banjul Summit, meaningful 
consultations were held among the Member States of ECOWAS 
and with the warring parties and other interested groups of 
Liberians. These consultions culminated in the convening at 
Ministerial level of a meeting of the ECOWAS Standing 
mediation Committee in Freetown from 5 to 20 July, 1990. 
Despite the great effort made by that meeting, it did not 
produce the result desired by the people of Liberia and the 
entire international community who have been appealing over 
a considerable period of time for an immediate cease-fire. 
The failure of the warming parties to cease 
hostilities has led to the massive destruction of property 
and the massacre by all the parties of thousands of innocent 
civilians including foreign nationals, women and children, 
some of whom had sought sanctuary in churches, hospitals, 
diplomatic missions and under Red Cross protection, contrary 
to all recognized standards of civilized behaviors. Worse 
still, there are corpses lying unburied in the streets of 
cities and towns, which could lead to a serious outbreak of 
an epidemic. The civil war has also trapped thousands of 
foreign nationals, including ECOWAS citizens, without any 
means of escape or protection. 
The result of all this is a state of anarchy and the 
total breakdown of law and order in Liberia. Presently, 
there is a government in Liberia which cannot govern and 
contending factions which are holding the entire population 
as hostage, depriving them of food, health facilities and 
other necessities of life. 
This development have traumatized the Liberian 
population and greatly shocked the people of the sub-region 
and the rest of the international community. They have also 
led to hundred of thousands of Liberians being displaced and 
made refugees in neighboring countries, and the spilling of 
hostilities into neighboring countries. 
It is against this background that the Heads of State 
and Government of ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee met in 
Bamjul from 6 to 7 August, 1990, where they decided to 
assume their responsibility of ensuring that peace and 
stability is maintained within the sub-region and in the 
African Continent as a whole, for they believe that the 
tragic situation in Liberia poses a threat to international 
peace and security. Heads of State and Government of the 
ECOWAS Standing mediation Committee, acting on behalf of the 
ECOWAS Authority, therefore, decided to take the following 
immediate actions aimed at restoring peace and stability in 
Liberia. 
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OBSERVANCE AND MAINTENANCE OF CEASE-FIRE 
Heads of State and Government called on the warring 
parties to observe an immediate cease-fire. 
An ECOWAS Cease-fire Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) shall be 
established in Liberia for the purpose of keeping the peace, 
restoring law and order and ensuring that the cease-fire is 
respected. ECOMOG shall be placed under a Commander 
provided by the Republic of Ghana to be assisted by a Deputy 
Commander provided by the Republic of Guinea. National 
contingents shall be drawn from the members of the ECOWAS 
Standing Mediation Committee as well as from Guinea and 
Sierra Leone. 
Heads of State and Government called upon the entire 
population of Liberia to cooperate fully with the ECOWAS 
Cease-fire Monitoring Group and to provide it with every 
support and assistance. Heads of State and Government wish 
to assure the people of Liberia that the sole purpose of the 
ECOWAS peace-keeping force is to create the necessary 
conditions for normal life to resume to the benefit of all 
Liberians. 
Heads of State and Government also called upon the 
entire international community, and in particular, the 
Permanent Members of the United Nations Security Council, to 
support this humanitarian and political action by ECOWAS in 
the interest of the African people as a whole, and for the 
maintenance of international peace and stability. 
ESTABLISHMENT OF AN INTERIM GOVERNMENT IN LIBERIA 
The committee re-affirmed its belief that in the 
interest of restoring peace and stability in Liberia, an 
Interim Government should be established to which power 
should be transferred in a proper manner. To this end, it 
called for a national conference of all Liberian political 
parties and other interest groups to be held as soon as 
possible. Considering the degree of mistrust, antagonism 
and division among the pouplation of Liberia that each of 
the parties has created, the Committee urged that the 
Interim Government should not be dominated by any one party 
or faction. It should be a broad based administration. 
Source: The Liberation Crises: Compliments of the Justice 




POSITION STATEMENT ISSUED BY WOMEN OF LIBERIA 
MAY 24, 1990 
We, Women of Liberia, being of diverse religious, 
social, educational, economic and cultural backgrounds are 
solidly united in love of our beloved country, Liberia, and 
our loyalty to the State. In a common identity as Mothers, 
Daughters, Sisters and Wives of men and children of Liberia 
concerned with the present situation in our dear country- 
have after a careful study of the situation decided to issue 
a Position Statement. 
The massive destruction of human lives and properties 
as a result of fighting between the invading rebel troops 
and that of the Government troops have pricked the 
consciences of Liberians and concerned foreign residents of 
our nation. 
The unfavourable and dangerous effects of this savage 
warfare have caused thousands of fear-stricken victims to 
seek refuge in neighbouring countries. Others have died and 
those who are too frightened to flee away roam about among 
bushes and forests without food, water, shelter and medical 
treatment for the wounded and displaced people. 
On this day, we as Women, Mothers, Sisters, Wives, and 
Daughters, as God's continuity creation instruments lift our 
voices to deliver the message of the Prince of Peace. Our 
hearts bleed for the many children we have lost. We are 
grief-stricken for the continuous bloodshed and saddened by 
this situation that has caused disintegration of families, 
the mass exodus of both our own brothers, sisters and 
children as well as foreign friends and the worsened 
condition of an already ailing economy. 
We would like at this point, to pose a question: After 
eliminating a large percentage of the population of this 
country, who would be governed after a so-called victory? 
We ponder this question for we have come as Messengers of 
Peace and not as Judges. 
The men in the battle-front are the rich human 
resources of Liberia--this Nation's hope for the future. 
They are our sons, our fathers, brothers, husbands and other 
relatives. Why then destroy them? Liberia needs them and 
we need them too! Our lives and total existence as a nation 
depend on peace being restored; and we are not convinced 
that our national interest can be justified by the 
continuous mass destruction of lives and properties. For 
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modem warfare knows no difference between the front-line 
and civil society or between the armed forces and civilians. 
We as Woman of Liberia humbly appeal for an immediate 
cease-fire and pray fervently for lasting peace. As 
Liberians we are a naturally peaceful people and in these 
times of crisis should not forget that we are our brothers' 
keeper. As we women believe in the protection and promotion 
of Liberia's integrity, unity, peace and brotherhood towards 
all mankind, deem it most appropriate to lend our motherly 
advice and counsel as a step toward peace while asking the 
God of mercy and justice for His guidance, direction and 
blessing, that: 
1. If it is substantiated that countries other than 
Liberia are directly or indirectly involved in the 
armed conflict (beside providing humanitarian 
assistance) that the OAU and/or the United Nations 
be requested to immediately intervene, order a 
cease-fire and mediate in the dispute. 
2. That both parties in conflict for the sake of God, 
at whose command and will the best and worst happen 
and for the sake of our dear Motherland, we humbly 
appeal that you lay down your arms, put an end to 
this bloodshed and wait on the Lord to renew our 
strength so as to enable our beloved country to 
proceed with the building of a democratic society. 
3. We are on our knees begging for a Peace Conference 
by representatives of both parties at a neutral 
place of mutual consent. Think about the effects of 
the CRISIS. Come together as Liberians and help to 
build a vibrant and sustainable nation. 
MAY GOD BLESS LIBERIA AND SAVE THE STATE! 
Signed: Ecumenical Women Organization (EWO) 
Liberian Council of Churches 
Women Development Association of Liberia (WODAL) 
Muslim Women 
Source: The Liberation Crises: Compliments of the Justice 




STATEMENT OF US POLICY IN LIBERIA 
BY AMBASSADOR EDWARD PERKINS 
US AMBASSADOR TO THE UN 
NOVEMBER 19, 1992 
Mr. President: 
I am please to have this opportunity to review US Policy in 
Liberia. I want to start with a clear articulation of US 
objectives in Liberia: 
• A negotiated settlement under the leadership of ECOWAS 
• Full disarmament of all Liberian warring factions 
• The return home of nearly one million Liberians 
• The establishment of a United Government based on 
respect for human rights, democratic principles, and 
economic accountability. 
I am saddened that we meet here today against the 
backdrop of renewed conflict in Liberia. The cease-fire 
brokered by the Economic Community of West African States 
(ECOWAS) held successfully for 21 months. 
It began to break down in August of this year, then was 
shattered on October 15 when the National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia (NPFL) launched attacks on the West African Peace¬ 
keeping Force (ECOMOG) which is protecting Monrovia. 
Fighting continues on the outskirts of Monrovia, as 
ECOMOG re-establishes its defensive perimeter around the 
city, while the NPFL continues to resist ECOWAS calls for 
encampment and disarmament of the Liberian warring factions. 
Good faith and extensive efforts to resolve the conflict 
peacefully have foundered against the NPFL's refusal to 
implement the agreements that Charles Taylor signed in 
Yamoussoukro and Geneva. 
Weapons remain plentiful throughout the country, and 
almost one million Liberians displaced in surrounding 
countries and in Monrovia do not feel they can safely return 
to their homes. The revolution against Samuel Doe, 
supported by most Liberians, has become bogged down in a 
bitter struggle for personal power while the interest of the 
nation suffer. None of the Liberian warring factions is 
blameless for the resumption of hostilities. 
Elements of every warring faction demonstrated a 
willingness to resume hostilities in the build-up of the 
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current crisis, and we have repeatedly criticized ULIMO for 
launching its incursion in Southwestern Liberia. But no 
factor contributed to the climate of distrust so much as the 
intransigence of the National Patriotic Front. 
As the undisputed leader of the NPFL which controls 
some 90 percent of Liberia territory, Charles Taylor bears 
primary responsibility for the implementation of the 
Yamoussoukro peace plan calling for encampment and 
disarmament. Once he can determine whether to create the 
conditions for free and fair elections throughout the 
country, he has chosen instead to seize on a variety of 
excuses not to. 
The U.S. remains open to cooperation with the NPFL and 
we recognize that Taylor has legitimate security concerns. 
But Charles Taylor must find a way to work with ECOWAS and 
discontinue his verbal and military attacks on the regional 
organization. Continued resistance to disarmament portends 
continued conflict. 
The declared purpose of the peace-keeping forces is, 
first of all, to defend themselves and disrupt the NPFL1s 
ability to attack Monrovia, and second, to convince Charles 
Taylor that military victory is not possible; he must return 
to a negotiated settlement, disarm his troops, and give the 
Liberian people the chance to select their own leaders 
through free and fair elections. 
The problems which plague Liberia--proliferation of 
weapons, insecurity and banditry, ethnic tensions, huge 
numbers of refugees and displaced, a shattered economy--will 
not yield to military solutions. But we must send a clear 
message to aggressors in Liberia and elsewhere: aggression 
will not be rewarded. No party which comes to power in 
Liberia through force or fraud can expect normal relations 
with the Untied States. 
Mr. President, much of the progress of the past year in 
reaching a political settlement has been undone, but we must 
not lose sight of what ECOWAS has accomplished through 
intervention and negotiation. The dispatch of a six-nation 
West African Peace-keeping Force in August, 1990, 
demonstrated unprecedented African determination to take the 
lead in regional conflict resolution. 
ECOMOG ended the killing, separated the warring 
factions, allowed relief assistance to flow to avert 
starvation, and established a cease-fire and framework for 
peaceful negotiations. 
In a country where anarchy reigned, ECOMOG provided 
order and a bastion of security in Monrovia, and hundreds of 
thousands of Liberians flocked to the relative safety of the 
city. ECOMOG troops won the support of the populace, and 
acted with restraint and professionalism during the 21 
months cease-fire. ECOMOG remains virtually the only force 
in Liberia unblemished by serious human rights abuses and is 
the one military force not motivated by personal 
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aggrandizement. Clearly, the ECOMOG troops would like to 
return to their home countries; but ECOMOG remains critical 
of peace, free elections and regional stability. 
Although the dispatch of peace-keeping forces to 
Liberia was a decision taken by the ECOWAS governments on 
their own initiative, we have supported this effort from its 
inception. 
In addition to more than $200 million in humanitarian 
assistance to victims of the Liberian conflict, we have 
provided a total of $8.6 million in assistance to ECOWAS 
directly, and $18.75 million in bilateral military grants to 
ECOWAS members slated to support ECOMOG. Their effort has 
been endorsed by the Organization of African Unity and the 
UN, but ECOWAS countries have borne the vast majority of the 
expense of fielding the peace-keeping force in Liberia. 
In addition to providing material support for ECOWAS 
and humanitarian support for Liberians, the United States 
stands ready to help support demobilization of all Liberian 
factions and help ensure that the proposed elections are 
genuinely free and fair. To assure real progress, however, 
comprehensive disarmament is necessary. 
Our experience in Angola, Cambodia and elsewhere amply 
demonstrates that peace without disarmament's tenuous at 
best. This is especially true in Liberia, where 
proliferation of guns is accompanied by indiscipline, drugs 
and widespread human rights abuse. 
It is imperative that the regional peace-keeping effort 
in Liberia succeed. Abandonment of the regional peace 
process could lead to resumption of warfare and probably 
humanitarian catastrophe. A bloody takeout by force would 
deal a set-back to democratic aspirations throughout Africa 
and lead to the conclusion that might makes right. 
Dissidents throughout the regions, many of whom 
maintain connections to Charles Taylor would be encourage to 
take their battle into the streets, rather than work through 
the democratic political process. 
If the united ECOWAS effort fails in Liberia, the 
organization is unlikely to venture into the difficult realm 
of peace-keeping and conflict resolution in the future, and 
pressure will build rapidly for direct U.S. or UN 
intervention. 
We owe ECOWAS our full support as they consider means 
of pressurizing the Liberian warring factions to implement 
the peace plan calling for encampment, disarmament and free 
and fair elections. 
Thank you, Mr. President. 
Source: The Liberation Crises: Compliments of the Justice 




U.N. RESOLUTION ON LIBERIA 
Recalling the statements by the President of the Council 
on its behalf on 22 January 1991 (S/22133) and 7 May 1992 
(S/23886) on the situation in Liberia, 
Re-affirming its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord 
of 30 October 1991 (S/24811) offers the best possible 
framework for a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict 
by creating the necessary conditions for free and fair 
elections in Liberia, 
Taking into account the decision of the Joint Meeting of 
the Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee of Five 
of 20 October 1992 held at Cotonou, Benin (S/24737) and the 
Final communiqué of the First Meeting of the Monitoring 
Committee of Nine of the Liberian conflict issued at Abuja, 
Nigeria, on 7 November 1992 (S/24812, annex), 
Regretting that parties to the conflict in Liberia have 
not respected or implemented the various accords to date, 
especially Yamoussoukro IV Accord (S/24811), 
Determining that the deterioration of the situation in 
Liberia constitutes a threat to international peace and 
security, particularly in West Africa as a whole, 
Recalling the provisions of Chapter VIII of the Charter 
of the United Nations, 
Noting that the deterioration of the situation hinders 
the creation of conditions conducive to the holding of free 
and fair elections in accordance with the Yamoussoukro IV 
Accord, 
Welcoming the continued commitment of the Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS) to and the efforts 
towards a peaceful resolution of the Liberian conflict, 
Further welcoming the endorsement and support by the 
Organization of African Unity (OAU) of these efforts, 
Noting the request of 29 July 1992 from ECOWAS for the 
United Nations to dispatch an observer group to Liberia to 
verify and monitor the electoral process, 
Taking note of the invitation of ECOWAS of 20 October 
1992, in Cotonou, Benin, for the Secretary-General to 
consider, if necessary, the dispatch of a group to observe 
the encampment and disarmament of the warring parties, 
Recognizing the need for increased humanitarian 
assistance, 
Taking into account the request made by the Permanent 
Representative of Benin on behalf of ECOWAS (S/24825), 
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Convinced that it is vital to find a peaceful, just and 
lasting solution to the conflict in Liberia, 
1) commends ECOWAS for its efforts to restore peace, 
security and stability in Liberia; 
2) Reaffirms its belief that the Yamoussoukro IV Accord 
offers the best possible framework for a peaceful resolution 
of the Liberian conflict by creating the necessary 
conditions for free and fair elections in Liberia, and calls 
upon ECOWAS to continue its efforts to assist in the 
peaceful implementation of this Accord; 
3) Condemns the violation of the cease-fire of 28 
November 1990 by any party to the conflict; 
4) Condemns the continuing armed attacks against the 
ECOWAS Peace-keeping Forces in Liberia by one of the parties 
to the conflict; 
5) Calls upon all parties to the conflict and others 
concerned to respect strictly the provisions of 
international humanitarian laws ; 
6) Calls upon all parties to the conflict to respect and 
implement the cease-fire and the various accords of the 
peace process, including the Yamoussoukro IV Accord of 30 
October 1991, and the Final Communiqué of the Informal 
Consultative Group Meeting of the Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) Committee of Five on Liberia, issued 
at Geneva on 7 April 1992, to which they themselves have 
agreed; 
7) Requests the Secretary-General to dispatch urgently a 
Special Representative to Liberia to evaluate the situation, 
and to report to the Security Council as soon as possible 
with any recommendations he may wish to make; 
Arms Embargo 
8) Decides, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the 
United Nations, that all States shall, for the purposes of 
establishing peace and stability in Liberia, immediately 
implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries 
of weapons and military equipment to Liberia until the 
Security Council decides otherwise; 
9) Decides within the same framework that the embargo 
imposed by paragraph 8 shall not apply to weapons and 
military equipment designated for the sole use of the peace¬ 
keeping forces of ECOWAS in Liberia, subject to any review 
that may be required in conformity with the report of the 
Secretary-General; 
10) Requests all States to respect the measures 
established by ECOWAS to bring about a peaceful solution to 
the conflict in Liberia; 
11) Calls on Member States to exert self-restraint in 
their relations with all parties to the Liberian conflict 
and to refrain from taking any action that would be inimical 
to the peace process; 
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12) commends the efforts of Member States, the United 
Nations system and humanitarian organizations in providing 
humanitarian assistance to the victims of the conflict in 
Liberia, and in this regard re-affirms its support for 
increased humanitarian assistance; 
13) Requests the Secretary-General to submit a report in 
the implementation of this resolution as soon as possible; 
14) Decides to remain seized of the matter. 
Source: The Liberation Crises: Compliments of the Justice 




THE DIPLOMATIC CORPS 
MONROVIA, LIBERIA 
The Doyen 
The Diplomatic Corps held a meeting on 30 May 1990 to 
review the prevailing situation in Liberia and noted with 
grave concern the continued wanton violation of human rights 
including killings, harassment, rape, looting, of properties 
of Liberian as well as nationals of foreign countries 
resident in Liberia, in particular, African citizens namely 
Guineans, Ghanaians, Nigerians, Sierra Leoneans, etc., 
inspite of the assurances given by the Liberian Government. 
The Diplomatic Corps cognizant of the adherence by 
their respective countries of the human rights principles as 
enshrined in the United Nations Charter such as respect for 
the protection of properties, peaceful co-existence, etc., 
wishes to appeal that more concrete measures and disposition 
should be effected to protect lives and properties. 
In this regard, the Diplomatic corps while at the UNDP 
Compound was informed about the experience of Liberian 
citizens who had been the subject of violent acts during the 
night by soldiers who entered the compound and shot and 
wounded several people. The Diplomatic Corps interviewed 
many of the people who were directly affected, including 
women and children. The Diplomatic Corps was further 
informed of the acts of abduction of women and children and 
their husbands by military personnel. The Diplomatic Corps 
was astonished that no protection had been provided in spite 
of the request of the Secretary General of the United 
Nations to the President of the Republic of Liberia on 28 
May 1990. 
The Diplomatic Corps demands that the provisions of the 
United Nations Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the 
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Immunities should be 
absolutely and scrupulously respected and appropriate 
measures taken regarding the protection of Liberian and 
foreign citizens and of the premises of Diplomatic and 
International Organizations 
Monrovia, 
31st May 1990 
Source: The Liberation Crises: Compliments of the Justice and Peace Commission 
(Catholic Archdiocese of Monrovia, 1995), 62. 
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APPENDIX K 
ECOWAS SUMMIT COMMUNIQUE 
The Authority of Heads of State and Government of the 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) held its 
Fifteenth Ordinary Session in Dakar, Republic of Senegal, 
from 27 to 29 July, 1992 under the Chairmanship of His 
Excellency Abdou Diouf, President of the Republic of 
Senegal. 
The Liberian Situation 
Heads of State and Government reviewed developments 
relating to the situation in Liberia since its last Summit 
in Abuja, in the light of the reports made by the Chairman 
of the Committee of Five and the Field Commander of ECOMOG, 
supplemented by the Foreign Minister of Senegal. The 
Authority commended the Committee of Five, under the 
distinguished Chairmanship of His Excellency Felix Houphouet 
Boigny, President of the Republic of Cote d'Ivoire, for its 
untiring efforts these past twelve months to restore peace, 
stability and security in Liberia in accordance with the 
mandate given to it at the Abuja Summit. That mandate 
entailed the restoration of necessary conditions of peace 
and security and the proper environment that would conduct 
free, fair and democratic elections. 
The Authority noted that the Committee of Five had held 
no fewer than four meetings in Yamoussoukro during 1991 and 
one meeting in Geneva in April 1992. The Authority endorsed 
all the agreements reached at these meetings between the 
parties concerned, particularly the Accord of 30 October 
1991 and the clarifications made to it at the Geneva Meeting 
of 6-7 April 1992. The Authority affirmed its strong 
conviction that Accord offered the best possible framework 
for a peaceful and lasting settlement of the Liberian 
conflict. 
The Authority also noted that the Yamoussoukro Accord 
had called on all the parties in particular the National 
Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL), to fully cooperate with 
ECOMOG to ensure the speedy, uninterrupted and effective 
implementation of the Accord. In this connection, the 
Authority noted that the Accord of 30 October 1991 had 
provided, inter-alia, for the accomplishment of the 
following tasks before the holding of democratic elections: 
that at entry and exit points into and out of Liberia were 
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to be secured by ECOMOG; that roadblocks on all highways 
were to be dismantled to allow for unfettered movement of 
persons; that a buffer zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone 
border, secured by ECOMOG, was to be established; that all 
hostile foreign forces were to be withdrawn from the 
territory of Sierra Leone; that all combatants of the 
warring parties were to be encamped and disarmed by ECOMOG; 
and that an Interim Elections Commission and an Ad-Hoc 
Supreme Court were to be established. 
In considering the extent to which these goals had been 
accomplished, the Authority noted that some progress had 
been made, including the establishment of an Interim 
Elections Commission and Ad-Hoc Supreme Court, the 
commencement of the deployment of ECOMOG troops throughout 
Liberia, and the commencement of the insertion of the buffer 
zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border. However, the 
Authority believed that much more could have been achieved 
but for the lack of cooperation by the NPFL on the terms of 
the Yamoussoukro Accords. 
The Authority determined that the uncooperative conduct 
by the NPFL, especially with regard to the encampment and 
disarmament of its combatants and the insertion of a buffer 
zone along the Liberia-Sierra Leone border, continued to 
pose a serious threat to the peace, stability and security 
of the West African region. The Authority therefore decided 
that no effort should now be spared by all the Member States 
of ECOWAS and the rest of the international community to 
bring the situation in Liberia to an early end. 
Accordingly, the Authority has decided as follows: 
a) that the Field Commander of ECOMOG shall complete the 
implementation of the programme contained in the 
Yamoussoukro Accord of 30 October 1991, clarified by the 
Geneva Meeting of the Committee of Five, not later than 
thirty (30) days from the conclusion of this Summit Meeting 
of the Authority; 
b) that unless Charles Taylor and the NPFL comply fully 
with the implementation of the said programme, the Authority 
shall impose comprehensive sanctions against Charles Taylor 
and the NPFL-contorlled areas of Liberia and any other party 
that fails to comply with the implementation of the 
programme; 
c) that all the Member States of ECOWAS shall take all 
necessary measures to give full effect to this decision; 
d) that the Committee of Five, in consultation with the 
Standing Mediation Committee, shall seek the assistance of 
the Security Council of the United Nations to make whatever 
sanctions are imposed effective in accordance with the 
provisions of the United Nations Charter. 
The Authority also decided to invite the Secretary 
General of the United Nations to take all necessary measures 
to facilitate the verification and monitoring of the 
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electoral process in Liberia by the United Nations. The 
Authority extended a similar invitation to the International 
Negotiation Network (INN) of President Jimmy Carter. 
The Authority strongly condemned the cowardly murder of 
ECOMOG forces by Charles Taylor and the NPFL, and paid 
tribute to the courage and sense of sacrifice of all ECOMOG 
servicemen who have fallen in Liberia. 
The Authority also paid tribute to the member States on 
the Community Standing Mediation Committee and the Committee 
of Five for the sacrifices they are making on behalf of the 
Community, in human and material terms, in seeking the 
restoration of peace, stability and security to Liberia. 
The Authority called on the Member States which do not have 
contingent in ECOMOG to endeavour to send troops in order to 
enhance and strengthen ECOMOG's capacity. IN this 
connection, it welcomed with appreciation the participation 
of Senegal which had sent troops to join ECOMOG. 
The Authority once more called on the entire 
international community to provide every assistance to 
ECOWAS to ensure the success of its peace-keeping efforts in 
Liberia. 
Heads of State and Government congratulated members of 
the Committee of Eminent Persons for the Review of the 
ECOWAS Treaty for their excellent report which was presented 
to the Authority by His Excellency General Dr. Yakubu Gowan, 
Chairman of the Committee. The Authority took note of the 
report and also the report of the second extraordinary 
session of the Council of Ministers which was held in Abuja 
on 6 and 7 July, 1992 to consider the Draft Revised Treaty 
prepared by the Committee of Eminent Persons. 
The Authority considered the fundamental changes being 
proposed by the Committee of Eminent Persons and agreed to 
convene an Extraordinary Session at the headquarters of the 
Executive Secretariat in Abuja in December 1992 for the 
adoption and signing of the Revised ECOWAS Treaty. In the 
meantime, it was agreed that each Member State would 
undertake national consultations on the proposals in order 
to formulate its position. In this regard, each Member 
State was called upon to sensitize all sections of the 
population and obtain their views as well as their support. 
The Extraordinary Session on the Authority shall be preceded 
by meetings of Legal Experts and the Council of Ministers on 
October and November 1992 respectively. 
Source: The Liberation Crises: Compliments of the Justice and Peace 
Commission (Catholic Archdiocese of Monrovia, 1995), 128-131. 
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APPENDIX L 
LETTER FROM PRESIDENT BUSH TO THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 
The White House 
Washington, DC, August 6, 1990 
Hon. Thomas S. Foley 
Speaker of The House of Representatives 
Washington, DC. 
Dear Mr. Speaker: Following discussions with congressional leaders, at approximately 5:05 
a.m. (EDT) on August 5, 1990, a reinforced rifle company of approximately 237 marines was sent to 
provide additional security at the U.S. Embassy in Monrovia, Liberia. At the same time, two helicopter 
extraction teams, including up to one rifle platoon each, were sent to two communication sites in Liberia 
to extract American citizens and bring them to U.S. ships in International waters off Liberia. Approx¬ 
imately 62 American citizens, and a limited number of foreign nationals, were removed from the Embassy 
and the two communication sites to the U.S. ships. Protective cover for these operation was provided by 
U.S. forces. These steps were taken for the purpose of protecting American citizens and were not intended 
to alter or preserve the existing political status quo or to make the U.S. presence felt in any way. 
I am please to report that no hostilities were encountered and that the extraction of American 
citizens from the two sites was completed successfully, as was the insertion of the rifle company into, 
and evacuation of citizens from, the Embassy. The reinforced rifle company will remain at the Embassy 
for as long as its presence is needed. Additional steps to protect American interests and to evacuate 
American or foreign nationals will be taken as necessary. 
Our Embassy in Monrovia will continue to function under Ambassador Peter de Vos and continue 
to have as its principal task assistance to American citizens and the exercise of American diplomatic 
influence. The Marine presence does not indicate or constitute any intention on the part of the U.S. 
Government to intervene military in the Liberian conflict. 
Because of my desire to keep Congress fully informed I wanted to share this information with you. 
I appreciate Congress' support in these actions to protect American citizen. 
Sincerely, 
GEORGE BUSH 
Source: Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1990, p. 89. 
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